Why Bangladeshis are turning to extremism

An estimated 5-7 million Bangladeshis work in the Middle Eastern countries. This predominantly labour workforce makes them the third-biggest expatriate community, after the Indians and Pakistanis. But unlike the Indian diaspora, which has a diverse occupational and socio-economic status, the Bangladeshis are predominantly in the low-wage sectors like construction, transport, factories, domestic work, cleaning, security, et al. Despite the low-to-modest wages, the Bangladeshi workforce live frugally and support their families back home, and even their national economy, through remittances of crucial foreign currency. Bangladeshi exchequer earnings from remittances are higher than earnings from exports. A sizeable $25 billion annually (6-7 per cent of Bangladeshi GDP) in remittances ensures the maintenance of adequate forex reserves (stabilisation of the Bangladeshi taka), fuelling domestic consumption, investments, and therefore economic growth.

Given the widespread regional tumult, with the presence of extremist/terror organisations in the Middle Eastern region, the presence of this sizeable Bangladeshi diaspora, that too with relatively sparse means, ought to make them natural targets for recruitment into these organisations, like other foreign nationalities. Counterintuitively, that is not the case. Proven instances of Bangladeshis joining the ranks of ISIL, Al-Qaida or their metastasised groups are relatively few.

Comparatively, there are less than 1 million Indonesians, and only about 50,000 Malaysians, working in the Middle East. The socio-economic profile of these Indonesians and Malaysians is also significantly higher than that of the Bangladeshis. Yet, it is estimated that up to 700 Indonesians and 150-odd Malaysians may have joined the Middle Eastern terror groups, as opposed to only an estimated 30-40 Bangladeshis who joined the terror ranks in these Middle Eastern conflict zones. On the contrary, even lesser-numbered ethnicities like Chechens, Dagestanis, Ingushis and other sub-groups from the Russian Caucasus have contributed several thousands of foreign fighters in the Middle Eastern theatre.

This low level of Bangladeshi participation in terror groups in the Middle East is further significant as there was always space for extremist organisations like Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh (JUMB), which supposedly has links with ISIL, or Ansarullah Bangla Team (ABT), which had purported links with Al-Qaida, and other jihadist groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami Bangladesh (HuJI-B), Jagrata Muslim Janata Bangladesh (JMJB), Shahadat-e-al-Hiqma, Allah'r Dal, etc., in Bangladesh itself. These groups have conducted bombings, targeted seculars, minorities, foreigners, and intellectuals. The most significant terror incident was the 2016 Holey Artisan Bakery attack in Dhaka that killed 22, mostly foreigners. Even from a mainstream political perspective, there have been political parties with extremist agendas like the infamous Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh (JeI), which supported Pakistani forces in the genocide leading up to 1971, and other parties like Hefazat-e-Islam, Islami Andolan Bangladesh, etc., which provide the societal, ideological and religious context towards radicalisation.

However, all these hardline parties have never garnered more than 10 per cent vote share (barring 1991, when they peaked at about 12 per cent vote share) and have seen a steady decline ever since. This perhaps explains why a Bangladeshi expatriate was not as radicalised or aggrieved to start with, as opposed to a Chechen, Tunisian, or even a European immigrant. It is often forgotten that Bangladesh was created by willingly spurning the 'Two-Nation Theory' that predicated religion over all other identities - but for the culturally evolved Bengalis, that did not sit well. Historically, the Bangladeshis (and Bengalis in general) have always punched above their weight in terms of artistic traditions, culturality, and societal sophistication. Social cohesion, harmonious coexistence with other diversities, and social awareness have always been amongst their latent strengths. Presumably, this richness of social consciousness, aesthetic sense, and inherent humanism would have held the Bangladeshi diaspora in good stead, despite their relatively challenged economic status.

Unsurprisingly, the local perception of the Bangladeshis in the Gulf is more positive than that of even the Indians or Pakistanis. If the Indian is often seen as more skilled and worldly-wise than the Bangladeshi — consequently, the impression of a hard-bargainer, and of being astutely demanding, is affixed on the Indian - whereas the Pakistanis suffer from far graver impressions of distrustfulness, indiscipline, and behavioural aggression. Owing to this perception of reliability and trustworthiness, the Bangladeshi is invariably preferred for domestic work (the co-religious and co-cultural Pakistani does not even come close in terms of matching perceptions). Yet another factor attributed to the relative apathy of the Bangladeshi towards the terror ecosystem is their inherently pacifist, inclusivist, and rational underpinning for a Bengali, as opposed to the more 'martial' bearing and conduct of Pathans, Baloch, Punjabis, or even those from the heartland or coastlines of India.

But all that is poised to change drastically as Bangladesh (therefore Bangladeshis) find themselves caught in the whirlwind of reimagining their societal, ideological, and governance moorings. A recent survey conducted by the International Republican Institute (IRI) reported a surge of up to 30 per cent preference for hardline Islamist parties - which, when cumulated with splinter religious parties, tallies up to 36-37 per cent of the hypothetical spot polls, exceeding even the principal opposition party of Bangladesh National Party (BNP), which hovers around 33 per cent. Innovision Consulting estimates that the decidedly moderate (ostensibly pro-India?) and ousted Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League would only get about 18.8 per cent of popular votes.

Importantly, despite many of its own failings and excesses on various fronts, it was the Sheikh Hasina-led dispensation (for over 16 years, since 2009) that had reined in the toxic appeal of extremist/religious forces. Despite the fact that the recent student protest was not necessarily religion-inspired or triggered and had focused on Sheikh Hasina's increasingly undemocratic regime, today the primary force behind the students' protest and the incumbent Muhammad Yunus-led caretaker government are the religious forces. This fundamentally changes the dynamics and augury for Bangladesh as it will now risk going the 'Pakistan-way' in terms of implosive narratives and violent outcomes.

Change in environment domestically, both politically and societally, will translate into new global perceptions. Signs leading up to the Bangladesh general elections in February, with the ensuing tensions, violence, and therefore the polarisation, are suggestive of dark days for Bangladesh and Bangladeshis.

The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry; views are personal