New START ends: A nuclear free-for-all

Trust, the prerequisite for peace, is abysmally low at the moment. The expiry of New START, or the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, makes things worse. Though hopefully it will be replaced by another treaty, until that happens the world sits on a nuclear stockpile that can blow the planet apart several times over on a false alarm. The New START treaty provided a semblance of order in otherwise murky nuclear stockpile management. The New START — Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which had replaced SALT, came into effect on April 8, 2010, and governed the nuclear stocks of the United States and Russia, the two countries that hold 90 per cent of the world’s nuclear arsenal. Both are estimated to have over 5,000 nuclear warheads each, followed by China, which has an estimated 600 nuclear weapons. India and Pakistan are estimated to have 180 and 170 nuclear weapons respectively. With the expiration of the New START treaty, the US and Russia have no binding limits on their nuclear arsenals. In a world passing through a phase of conflict and mistrust, frayed by the Ukraine war, West Asia turmoil, and growing rivalry between the US and China, this could have serious consequences. New START, signed in 2010, capped deployed strategic warheads at 1,550 each and created a framework of inspections, notifications, and data exchanges.

It did not end the nuclear race but efficiently managed it, leaving no room for guesswork and thus eliminating fear and mistrust — the two factors that fuel arms races. It built predictability, eliminated the scope for false alarms, and thus provided a safety mechanism. Now, US President Donald Trump argues that the treaty was “badly negotiated” and wants a “new, improved, and modernised” agreement that includes China. Though he has a point, it is very unlikely that China would be part of such a tripartite deal, as its nuclear stockpile is almost one tenth of that of the US or Russia. Besides, it is aggressively pursuing deployment and would not like to be halted in its tracks.

That said, a future arms control regime that does not include China would be strategically incomplete and politically fragile. So far, Beijing has refused to join trilateral negotiations until parity is reached — that is, the two nuclear giants substantially reduce their stockpiles. But that looks rather remote. Russia, for its part, suspended inspections and data sharing even before New START expired. The technical challenges are no less daunting. Arms control cannot be achieved overnight; it needs verification rules, counting methods, and intrusive inspections that take years to negotiate. Meanwhile, right now, a whole range of weapons — tactical nuclear warheads, hypersonic delivery systems, and dual-use missiles — are completely unconstrained. Arms races are driven by fear — fear of falling behind, fear of vulnerability, fear of surprise. START did not abolish these fears, but managed them. The way forward will have to be phased and pragmatic. The two countries must at least agree to keep observing New START’s central limits and restore inspections until a new treaty replaces START; else we may be heading for yet another spell of nuclear arms race.