BRICS at 20: United by difference

Perhaps the most salient feature of BRICS is its lack of uniformity, twenty years after the formation of the group. It has a diverse membership with varying political systems, economic bases, strategic interests and relationships with the great powers. In spite of trade and cooperation in multilateral forums, India and China are still viewed as strategic competitors. In its conflict with the West, Russia has found itself in a much different geopolitical situation than India, Brazil or some of the newer members. The Gulf economies provide a different energy, financial and investment paradigm to the “original” BRICs. Yet, BRICS has flourished and expanded. This paradox is more significant than the more common BRICS-G7 juxtaposition. At 20, the only question is whether BRICS has become big enough to challenge another group. It is whether a group of increasingly different countries can turn their numbers into collective power.

BRICS started as an economic initiative. The term was coined in 2001 and referred to the four emerging economies of Brazil, Russia, India and China, whose increasing influence would potentially alter the global economy. This was followed by the political grouping in 2006, and South Africa entered the fold in 2011. It was then changed in nature by its further development. BRICS is no longer an association of fast-growing economies. It now numbers 11 members and is becoming a forum for countries with different interests to have a greater voice in global governance, as well as seeking practical economic cooperation. The 18th BRICS Summit will be held in New Delhi on 12-13 September 2026 on issues related to trade, finance, technology, energy, agriculture, climate and institutional reform. With this expansion, BRICS becomes more demographically and economically powerful. It also poses a more difficult question, however, which is whether a more representative grouping is a more effective one. Not necessarily. The more varied the interests and the more members that join, the more difficult the balancing act. Expansion may generate legitimacy and, at the same time, exacerbate the consensus price. This tension shouldn’t be considered a fluke. It could be one of the most distinguishing aspects of BRICS in its 30th year.

The traditional method of assessing international groupings is based upon the level of political agreement they can reach. A different yardstick is needed for BRICS. Its members do not need a common foreign policy or to become a political coalition. They need the ability to discover common points of interest and create institutions for the surrounding. This is a case of “co-operation, not convergence”. India, for example, is a member of the Quad, the G20 and BRICS. Increasingly, strategic autonomy is about operating in more than one institution rather than being on one side or the other. BRICS fits into this more fluid international environment. This logic has proven effective to some degree. In the last two decades, trade among BRICS countries has undergone phenomenal growth. But the key is how much more trade would happen if transaction costs were reduced. Trade facilitation, customs cooperation, common standards, logistics, investment channels and reliable payment mechanisms should therefore be a focus for BRICS.

The New Development Bank is likely BRICS’s most tangible institutional accomplishment. Created in 2015, it has sanctioned investments in 139 projects totalling $42.9 billion, including clean energy, transport, water, sanitation, social infrastructure and digital infrastructure.

However, BRICS can’t ignore its internal tensions. With the expanding grouping, a lack of consensus has become more apparent. A May 2026 meeting of BRICS foreign ministers ended in a statement by the chair rather than a common declaration. This need not mean failure; it could instead indicate what BRICS can realistically be. Collective action will become more difficult if all members are expected to agree on major geopolitical issues. If consensus is required only in some areas, with differentiated cooperation in others, BRICS may become more effective. This would mean moving from “What does BRICS collectively believe?” to “What can BRICS collectively do?”

The distinction is significant in the context of the India-China relationship. The two nations reflect both the potential and constraints of BRICS. They are important trading partners and members of the same multilateral institutions, but differences in strategy, economic-security concerns and regional ambitions remain unresolved. BRICS cannot solve the India-China relationship, but it can provide a space where cooperation in unrelated fields is not derailed by competition.

BRICS must also resist defining itself through opposition to the West. Its more enduring role lies in reform rather than rejection. India’s BRICS priorities for 2026 focus on resilience, innovation, cooperation and sustainability, with emphasis on trade, technology, development and climate. The opportunity is to build BRICS less as a “geopolitical signal” and more as an institutional “delivery”.

The third decade should therefore be judged by practical outcomes: easier trade, greater access to development finance, secure payment systems and cooperation on digital infrastructure, AI, climate adaptation, energy transition and health technologies. These are not ‘show’ questions. They’re important ones. They also provide a means to embrace the diversity of the grouping. Interests need not be identical for payments cooperation to be possible. They do not have to have the same geopolitical agenda to fund renewables. They do not have to agree on all matters of international conflict to work together on agricultural technology or disaster resistance. This implies a new institutional format for BRICS — discussion and cooperation based on specific issues within a wide political space. Some members might run faster in some parts than others. This does not necessarily have to be a flaw. In an increasingly diverse mix, it might be the only realistic method that will keep the group moving. BRICS at 20 should give rise to a paradox for BRICS as it begins its third decade. It is its best achievement that it has weathered differences that could have split a stiffer alliance. The biggest danger it has is that growth might lead to the loss of flexibility and become vague. The answer is not to impose the conventional definition of a geopolitical bloc on BRICS. Nor is it to boast of its size without inquiring about the product of its size.

In India, the more beneficial goal is to strengthen processes that allow disagreement while fostering effective cooperation. This requires focusing on tangible achievements, strong institutions and measurable economic and development results rather than grand statements or competition for power.

BRICS, at the age of 20, does not have to show that it speaks as one. It must show how countries with different interests can achieve outcomes together that they couldn’t achieve alone. The next obstacle it must overcome is the challenge of being consequential.

The writer is a Professor at CHRIST (Deemed to be University). She is a senior academician, researcher and columnist; Views presented are personal.