India’s strategic autonomy needs a reset

New Delhi’s carefully cultivated policy of balancing competing powers is facing unprecedented stress. The larger question is whether India’s current approach is adequate for a world where power politics is being rewritten in real time

Speaking on the anniversary of the nuclear tests conducted in defiance of US warnings, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said: “India will not bow down to anyone”, heralding the successful execution of its strategic autonomy, though its evolution has seen more downs than ups, especially during the turbulent Trumpian era. Punitive tariffs and multiple sanctions, along with waivers on Russian military platforms, Russian oil, and Chabahar Port, have taken their toll. During the recent BRICS Foreign Ministers’ meeting in New Delhi, External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar criticised unilateral non-UN sanctions on India, calling them “unjustified”, even as Delhi awaited waivers on Chabahar and Russian oil. Later at the conference, he noted the unnecessary resort to unilateral coercive measures and sanctions, which are inconsistent with international law and the UN Charter. These measures “disproportionately affect developing countries”. This is perhaps the first time such comments have been made - akin to closing the stable door after the horse has bolted.

Strategic autonomy has been bruised notwithstanding the slew of deals with the EU and France. The purchase of 36 Rafale fighters in 2016, subsequent contracts for 18 naval versions, and the rejection of US, Russian, European, and Swedish offers were seen as a combination of high technology and, more importantly, trust. Trump’s coercive tariffs and warnings over de-dollarisation in BRICS have made India compliant. But the narrative worsens. A US submarine sinking an Iranian naval ship, IRIS Dena, in the Indian Ocean after it returned from the Indian Fleet Review 2026 dented India’s image as a net security provider.

“Strategic” is perhaps the most overused adjective in the diplomatic lexicon. It is attached to “restraint”, “patience”, “sovereignty”, and “national interest”. The word “partnership” is variable, dynamic, and transactional. But “strategic autonomy” — hedging or balancing relationships through sovereign choices — has endured. It originates from non-alignment adopted after independence, when New Delhi punched far above its weight. With adversarial relations with the US intensifying, India was gradually pulled towards the Soviet Union. Confronted with simultaneous threats from Pakistan, China, and the US in 1971, India was compelled to sign the first formal Treaty of Peace and Friendship with the USSR. Then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi insisted that the phrase “India is a non-aligned country” be inserted into the treaty, although it functioned de facto as an alliance.

India has evolved from non-alignment to multi-alignment, multi-engagement, and multipolarity, culminating in strategic autonomy, whose utility appears to be diminishing in a disrupted global order. Since no formal national security policy or strategy documents have been produced, strategic autonomy remains an immaculate conception, despite six drafts reportedly gathering dust. With India’s oldest ally, Russia, the relationship is described as “Special, Privileged and Strategic”. The partnership with the US has evolved from an “Estranged Democracy” into a “Comprehensive, Global and Strategic” partnership. Relations with China have fluctuated between war and border skirmishes, signifying deep mistrust. The EU is a more recent entrant into the strategic club, though largely in trade and commerce. Relations with Vietnam were elevated to an “Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” during the recent visit of President To Lam.

Lately, there has been intense debate regarding strategic autonomy and India’s graded strategic relations with other nations, many of which have undergone qualitative upgrades. Strategic autonomy is a dynamic policy that requires periodic recalibration in line with contemporary geopolitics and geo-economics. The recent summit between Xi Jinping and Donald Trump in Beijing confirmed a shift in the US strategic approach towards China — from rivalry and competition towards “stable and respectful relations”. Diplomatic vocabulary acquired a new phrase from Xi: “constructive strategic stability”, replacing the Biden-era term “strategic competition”. Trump went further in a Fox News interview, describing the meeting as resembling a “G2”, recalling earlier remarks made by President Obama that had caused consternation. Trump displayed unusual restraint and respect towards Xi, praising his leadership extensively. The subsequent Xi-Putin summit was described as a meeting between “dear friends” in an “everlasting strategic partnership”. In both cases, Xi conceded little to either Trump or Putin. These developments call for a reassessment of India’s strategic autonomy.

At the recent Chennai conference, the majority opinion supported the establishment’s approach, calling it “pragmatic”. The opposing view argued that the government had deferred excessively to Trump, beginning with Modi’s February 2025 visit. Regarding the two kinetic assaults on Iran, critics argued that India had effectively taken sides even before the conflict began. It appeared aligned with the US and Israel, particularly after Modi addressed the Knesset 48 hours before the Iranian Supreme Leader was assassinated in an Israeli precision strike. Apparently, both US and Indian intelligence agencies believed the conflict would end swiftly. Delhi remained silent, despite Modi’s earlier repeated assertion that “this is not an era of war” and that only a political solution could resolve conflicts. India’s attempt to balance strategic relations with the US, Russia, China, Israel, the EU, and Vietnam has resulted in too many competing priorities, with its relationship with Israel increasingly becoming a liability among Global South nations.

Some of India’s recent diplomatic difficulties might have been avoided with more skilful handling of Trump’s claim that the US facilitated the ceasefire during Operation Sindoor, which was not entirely untrue. Acknowledging this would not necessarily have undermined strategic autonomy. India’s insistence that there was no third-party mediation appears

difficult to sustain, given that in nearly every crisis since 1971 the US has played a role. Pakistan, meanwhile, managed its diplomacy skilfully, transforming its image from a state sponsor of terrorism into that of a responsible mediator in conflict resolution.

Pakistan can now claim to have helped facilitate the impending ceasefire between the US and Iran, in which Israel is conspicuously absent. Its international profile has consequently risen, and rather than being re-hyphenated with India, it now occupies a different diplomatic category.

At another seminar, Ambassador Jawed Ashraf remarked emphatically: “Silence is not strategic autonomy”, hinting at India’s silence regarding what many consider illegitimate actions by the US and Israel against Iran and others. To become a Viksit Bharat, India must play a more proactive role and truly avoid bowing to anyone, as Modi frequently states. Its credibility among the Global South and within its neighbourhood is at stake. Strategic autonomy is indeed in need of a reset.

To become a Viksit Bharat, India must play a more proactive role and truly avoid bowing to anyone, as Modi frequently states. Its credibility among the Global South and within its neighbourhood is at stake. Strategic autonomy is indeed in need of a reset

The writer, a retired Major General, served as Commander, IPKF (South), Sri Lanka, and was a founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff; Views presented are personal.