Economic justice beyond Sterling Biotech
The Supreme Court’s closure of the Sandesara/Sterling Biotech case in December 2025, following a settlement of INR 5,100 crores, has triggered a debate on economic crime enforcement in India. This development, combined with the Jan Vishwas Reforms, indicates that India may be slowly moving from a purely punitive approach to a more pragmatic framework for economic justice.
The Supreme Court treated the Sandesara settlement as a one-time exceptional measure and clearly stated that it should not be treated as a precedent. The Court’s caution was understandable. However, the case highlights a larger structural issue in India’s economic enforcement system, that is, the absence of a formal institutional mechanism for structured financial settlements in large-scale economic offence cases, especially those involving fugitive economic offenders operating outside India.
In many such cases, prosecution becomes prolonged and uncertain due to extradition challenges, jurisdictional complexities, and multi-agency investigations. Legal proceedings may continue for years while public money remains unrecovered. In contrast, structured settlements that ensure large and immediate recovery of public funds may, in certain cases, serve the public interest more effectively than long-drawn criminal trials with uncertain outcomes.
Hence, India does not need ad hoc judicial improvisation in such cases. It needs a statutory institutional mechanism. This is where the idea of an Economic Offence Resolution Authority (EORA) becomes relevant. Such an authority could provide a transparent, rule-based framework for negotiated financial settlements in large-scale economic offences such as corporate fraud, banking fraud, money laundering, and cross-border financial crimes, where recovery and restitution are critical public interest objectives.
This proposal aligns with the broader philosophy behind the Jan Vishwas legislative reforms. Importantly, the Jan Vishwas framework recognises that not every violation should automatically lead to criminal prosecution if proportionate financial penalties, compliance reforms, and administrative resolution can achieve deterrence and recovery more efficiently.
India needs to replicate global best practices. The United States uses Deferred Prosecution Agreements through the Department of Justice. The United Kingdom follows a similar framework through the Serious Fraud Office. France has introduced the CJIP settlement mechanism under the Sapin II law. Brazil operates corporate leniency agreements in corruption cases, and Singapore is developing its own structured settlement framework for financial crimes. These systems do not eliminate criminal liability but allow negotiated settlements under strict regulatory and judicial oversight, ensuring monetary recovery, corporate governance reforms, and compliance monitoring.
In India, however, major economic crime laws such as the Prevention of Money Laundering Act and the Fugitive Economic Offenders Act do not provide any structured settlement mechanism. Enforcement agencies such as the Enforcement Directorate (ED), Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI), Serious Fraud Investigation Office (SFIO), and banking regulators often operate in parallel, leading to fragmented proceedings across multiple legal forums. This not only delays resolution but also reduces the effectiveness of asset recovery.
An EORA could function as an inter-agency statutory body empowered to negotiate settlements, ensure full financial disclosure, mandate penalties and restitution, and require compliance reforms. Settlements could be subject to judicial approval to ensure transparency and accountability. The objective would not be to allow offenders to escape liability, but to ensure that economic justice includes recovery, restitution, and systemic reform.
There are, of course, some concerns. Such a system could weaken deterrence or allow powerful offenders to negotiate their way out of criminal liability. These concerns must be addressed through strict eligibility criteria, transparency norms, mandatory penalties exceeding unlawful gains, and judicial oversight. Efficient enforcement, not leniency, should be the main purpose.
The Sandesara settlement should therefore be seen not merely as an isolated judicial decision but as a policy signal. Combined with Jan Vishwas, it suggests that India’s economic enforcement framework may need to evolve from a purely prosecution-driven system to a recovery-oriented and resolution-based system in appropriate cases.
The writer is a Senior Journalist who writes on legal affairs ; views are personal
