India should be wary of China using the ‘cabbage tactic’ in the Indian Ocean region the same way it tries to grab islands in the South China Sea
This week will witness Prime Minister Narendra Modi meeting in person with the leaders of Australia and Japan, apart from the US, a move that holds significant importance and may perhaps change India's foreign policy contours. The meeting comes in the backdrop of Australia's alliance with the UK and the US - AUKUS -- which aims to provide nuclear submarines to Canberra.
Quad and AUKUS objectively overlap with India's maritime security interests in the South China Sea (SCS). Almost 50 per cent of India's global trade transits through the SCS region. The governments of Quad focus on the freedom of navigation on high seas as a legitimate right.Beijing has actively adopted a “cabbage tactic”, which is multi-layered, to increase its leverage by capturing the SCS. This vital trade route also happens to be a potential source of natural resources such as hydrocarbons. For this purpose, it builds artificial islands by claiming its “historic rights” and then legislateunusual domestic laws on it to exercise its "sovereignty" over them. The “cabbage tactic” is used to take control of an island by surrounding it in multiple layers of fishing boats, coast guard ships and Chinese naval and military ships to cut off the island from outside support. The more significant motive, of course, is occupying as much space as possible by threatening other countries.
The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) does not have a provision to address the issues regarding construction, maintenance and militarization of artificial islands beyond ta state's “territorial waters”. Article 60 (1) of the UNCLOS allow for artificial islands only in the Exclusive Economic Zone. Artificial islands of China beyond its territorial waters are thus farcing.
The International Court of Justice asserted the same in its 2016 arbitration, which Beijing refuted. The Chinese maritime domestic laws conflict with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and sharply violate the maritime rights of the other states. The UNCLOS provides the vital 'freedom of 'navigation' and 'right to innocent passage' on the high sea, i.e., area outside internal waters, the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf of a state to regulate their maritime trade and movement for peaceful purposes such as helping the other states in distress, scientific exploration, etc.
Chinese intentions can be ascertained by examining its 1992 Law of the PRC. Article 14 emphasized the option of using a “hot pursuit” against a foreign ship if it enters its territorial waters or the contiguous zone. Further, Article 15 insists that baseline of its territorial sea would be “established” by itself, a move hinting towards its future expansionism.
Later, in 2011, China submitted in the UN a Note Verbale on the SCS speaking about its “indisputable sovereignty over the islands in the South China Sea and the adjacent waters”. Nonetheless, the terms “historic rights” and “adjacent waters” do not appear in UNCLOS, and there is no recognition. Further, the use of illegal terms serves the purpose of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) by expanding the scope of its 'grey zone tactics' and hence are a distraction to the well-established international norms and principles. China zealously guards the SCS, which was recently evident when China illegally stopped a German warship from entering it.
Accompanied by the regularisation of such words, its mention of phrases like ‘offshore defence’, 'distant sea defence' and its 'interests aboard' truly reflect its hegemonic behaviour that is set to expand to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Its nuclear submarines are regularly sighted in the IOR and the Arabian Sea by the Indian Navy. The presence of Chinese submersibles is a clear-cut violation of Article 20 of UNCLOS, which states that “in the territorial sea, submarines and other underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface and show their flag”. China may be collecting critical undersea hydrological data from the IOR to plan action in case of a limited conflict or a full-blown open war with India. Such moves are a detriment to India's core security objectives. China counters its presence by putting forward a lame excuse with its nuclear submarines to counter the piracy in the Gulf of Aden. One can only wonder how a nuclear submarine can counter piracy.
On the contrary, in the SCS, China explicitly maintains that all the naval vessels of the other countries and research ships seek prior permission before they enter the territorial waters of China. The same duplicity has been evident in its recent amendment to China's Maritime Traffic Safety Law. It now includes five types of vessels- "submersibles, nuclear-powered vessels, ships carrying radioactive materials, ships carrying bulk oil, chemicals, liquefied gas or other toxic substances" that need to report minute details to the Chinese authorities. The cargo ships are thus now questionable and more prone to sabotage through "hot pursuits".
Further, Article 11 of the same law asserts that "Non-military vessels of foreign nationality may not enter the internal waters". Additionally, the “military vessels of foreign nationality may not enter the territorial waters”. Thepertinent question that arises is what are the limits of its "territorial waters"? As per the UNCLOS, itextends upto 12 nautical miles from the baseline of a coastal state. In the case of Beijing, will it start measuringsuch limits from the artificial islands that it has builtin the SCS? Then in such a case, the Spratly and Paracel Islandsrepresent a “sea grab”, similar to a land grab. Does it not then amount to infringing the freedom of navigation of other states? Such illegal occupation affects the trade routes and supply chain lines. Such dual standards need to be exposed and at various regional and multilateral levels.
China's land reclamation activities in Feydhoo Finolhu Island leased out to Beijing by the Maldives in 2016 are China's emerging footprints in the IOR.This comes in addition to its military intelligence and surveillance activities in the Coco Islands and Greater Coco islands of the Eastern Indian Ocean.The existing geostrategic realities of Chinese hegemonic intentions in the IOR are visible through China's OBOR and its attempts to remould the Asian security order in its favour. China's recent outreach to the Taliban in Afghanistan can increase its tactical manoeuvrabilityon land. On the other hand, Chinese nuclear submarines, illegal fishing, and surveillance activities in the IOR are set to become a significant threat to Indian security interests.
Suppose China would be successful in having land-sea dominance encircling India, in such a case, it will not only threaten India's immediate and long-term security interests, but it will also adversely affect India's economic and cyber security. China might use the “cabbage tactic” in the Indian Ocean Region in the same way as in the South China Sea. In this direction, the nation should appreciate the establishment of the Andaman Nicobar Command and the re-orientation of the battle commands, which will have joint operability of the Army, Navy and the Air Force. In the present circumstances, India's further shift towards QUAD and AUKUS shouldn't be a surprising development and should be welcomed by the nation.
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)
