Even after seven decades of Independence, the actual reason that drove the British out of India remains unknown. We must revisit history and recognise the INA’s role in the freedom struggle
After prolonged indifference to the contribution of the Provisional Government of Free India (PGFI) and its armed wing, the Indian National Army (INA), on October 21, 2018, the Prime Minister hoisted the tricolour from the Red Fort in recognition of their contribution to the freedom struggle. But that ‘action’ per se coming so late, and essentially symbolic, is not helpful to enable Indians appreciate the enormity of their role. It is imperative, therefore, to revisit the contemporary political activities in mainland India, where their contributions were buried deep due to various political interests, motivated by insecurity and partisan gains.
The Cambridge dictionary defines ‘revolution’ as “a change in the way a country is governed usually to a different political system and often using violence or war.” The INA alone can be credited to have brought the only ‘revolution’ in India. No previous attempt, including the 1857 mutiny, succeeded. Having begun with the INA trials and ended with the announcement of the Cabinet Mission, its duration can be considered between August 1945 and February 1946. It spanned across India to unite religious denominations, civilians and military against the British rule.
How the INA revolution worked: The rebellion was born from patriotism and sacrifice of the INA that fought a four-month gruelling war along in the Assam border in 1944. Subhas Chandra Bose fervently hoped this would lead to a massive uprising in India. Instead, either a stony silence or opposition from Indian political parties greeted them; while the masses were kept unaware. After thousands of INA soldiers sacrificed their lives, the joint force had to retreat to Burma. However, the very next year, the INA spirit arrived in India with war prisoners and quickly transformed into a revolution. The spirit connected directly with the masses and political parties were rendered irrelevant. In such circumstances, instead of using the ‘revolution’ for broader national interest, individual parties sought to use it for narrow gains .
In several communiques, Viceroy Wavell wrote to the Secretary of State (SoS) how leaders of the Congress were delivering violent anti-British speeches by leveraging mass sympathy for the INA. On October 9, 1945, he wrote: “There were talks that Jawaharlal Nehru’s plan was to make use of the INA and the large quantities of arms smuggled into India from Burma, to train Congress volunteers and use them against the Government. On October 22, 1945, he communicated his aggravated fear that the Congress may suborn the Army, which would be the most dangerous development in the near future.”
Governor of Central Provinces and Berar, Joseph Twynam, felt that the campaign against the Government was like the Irish revolution in the UK. On November 16, 1945, Bertrand James Glancy, the Governor of Punjab, wrote to the Viceroy noting rising sympathy in favour of the INA men in Punjab and suggested that trials in the future should be reduced only to a few. On November 27, North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) Governor George Cunningham advised the then Government to not initiate any further proceedings against anyone as he felt that Indian opinion was clearly against the INA’s trial.
Remission of the transportation for life sentence in the Red Fort trial was followed by large-scale Naval mutiny and then a series of sympathy strikes in the Air Force and the Army. Hints that Britain was considering leaving India were reflected in Lord Halifax’s statement on February 2, 1946: “India’s best interests demand that complete transfer of responsibility from the British to Indian hands should be made in good order if that is humanly possible.” Decision of the imperial Government on February 19, 1946, to send a team of three Cabinet ministers was the formal admission of British inability to continue to rule India. This marked the victory of the INA revolution.
The revolution and domestic politics: The INA revolution not only mortally wounded the British regime but also challenged both the Congress and the Muslim League. It presented a golden opportunity to secure freedom for undivided India from the falling grasp of the British. This, however, challenged the League’s idea of a “separate homeland for Muslims”. The party strove to communalise the INA issue in every possible manner to tackle this challenge. On the other hand, the Congress faced an additional and existential challenge to its claim of the ideology of ‘non-violence’ as the sole driver of India’s freedom. This made the party engage in a process of ideological engineering. The process began institutionally in the Bombay AICC session on September 1945.
The AICC, in a resolution expressing sympathy for the INA men, berated their method as: “…and in view of the termination of the war, it would be a tragedy if these officers, men and women, were punished for the offence of having laboured, however mistakenly for the freedom of India. They can be of the greatest service in the heavy work of building up a new and free India.” This indicated the party’s plan to exploit the INA issue by subjugating it to the ideology of non-violence.
Ideological engineering: Congress leaders found the 1942 movement as the only one which could be claimed as their own while possessing attributes of revolutionary character. It was significant that in the same AICC session, leaders paid glowing tributes to 1942 and called it the real “revolution”. Incongruity of its violent character with non-violence was rationalised citing self defence.
Nehru defended the 1942 violence saying: “The people organised themselves, found their own leaders and own methods… The events in Satara, in Bihar, in Midnapore and elsewhere in Bengal and in the united Provinces, have added a glorious chapter to the history of the people’s fight for independence.” Sardar Patel compared 1942 with 1857 showing the will of the people to be free. He said that the country in general rose in self defence: “I cannot see anything wrong in this. We are after all human beings.”
The party seemed to bring a distinction between violence for self defence and violence for liberation of the motherland. It put its seal of approval for the former but dubbed the latter as mistaken. The ideological engineering reached a crescendo in the Meerut annual session of the party in November 1946, when the primacy of 1942 was established irrevocably. In his presidential address JB Kripalani said: “I believe that if the Congress had not taken up the challenge of British imperialism in August 1942, we would not be occupying the position we do today…our representatives and leaders have broken into the citadel of power. This is not the end of foreign domination but it is surely the beginning of the end…” A resolution in the Subjects Committee also gave a vaunted place to the constructive work of Mahatma Gandhi. In a nutshell, the Congress’ ideology of ‘non-violence’ was rehabilitated without any acknowledgement to the real revolution that the INA had brought.
Meek surrender: Despite usurping the contribution of the INA revolution, the Congress faced a crisis on the issue of freedom for undivided India. Through mischievous provisions, the Cabinet Mission proposals intended to facilitate greater Pakistan. There were repeated stalemates in the ‘transfer of power’ on Constitutional issues, following which the League indulged in a series of communal riots with the complicity of the British to bully others on the issue of Partition. The Congress needed courage and acceptability among all sections of Indians — Muslims in particular — to challenge this British League conspiracy. Here, the party appeared vulnerable. This was in sharp contrast to the indomitable courage and unflinching commitment to the cause of undivided India which was the hallmark of the INA. Top Congress leaders spoke spiritedly but failed to live up to the expectations.
In the Meerut session, Nehru declared, “I am not afraid of bloodshed. The present civil strife in the country has no doubt moved me but it has to be faced with a brave heart… The Congress has faced many a danger in the past and will not shirk its responsibilities in a crisis like this even though some of us may have to lose our lives.” Kripalani said: “It is quite possible that to avoid immediate trouble we may accept principles that cut at the root of nationality and democracy. If we do so, we shall not only be betraying the nation, but ultimately, the Muslim and other communities…” However, belying countrywide expectations, the party easily surrendered to the British League intrigue and settled for Partition of India.
INA’s rightful place: It has been a national tragedy that the Congress, being the leader of the nationalist forces, not only failed to prevent Partition but also did not acknowledge the contribution of the INA revolution to the freedom struggle of India. Thus, the true reason for the British winding up their rule over India remains unknown to many Indians even after seven decades of Independence.
Rather, powers and resources of the rulers of independent India have been used to reinforce and perpetuate the theme of the non-violent struggle having fetched freedom. Such perceptions cannot be removed by acts of symbolism or token gestures such as hoisting of tricolour at the Red Fort on the anniversary day. It is necessary to revisit history without a preconceived mindset, re-assess and recognise the impact of the INA revolution on India’s freedom struggle.
(The writer is a columnist and an author)
