How the long shadow of ‘Operation Epic Fury’ is shaping India’s strategic autonomy
The 2026 U.S.-Israel “Operation Epic Fury” that ended with the death of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in Tehran has shifted the regional landscape in the Middle East in ways few predicted even a year ago. It has forced India to navigate an unprecedented era of volatility.
What started as the horrific Hamas attack on southern Israel in October 2023, claiming roughly 1,200 lives and taking hundreds hostage, quickly proliferated. Hezbollah opened a second front from Lebanon on 8 October, Iran-backed militias launched missiles and drones from Syria and Iraq, and Yemen’s Houthis turned the Red Sea into a shooting gallery by striking Red Sea shipping from November 2023 onward.
The March 2024 Houthi missile strike that killed three crew members on a cargo ship forced the Indian Navy into an emergency evacuation of all 20 Indian sailors aboard. It was the moment that brought the crisis straight into Indian landscape. By late 2025, the conflict had transformed into open Israel-Iran warfare. Early 2026 saw American and Israeli jets pounding Iranian targets. Tehran hit back with ballistic missiles aimed at Israel and Gulf capitals. The region is now juggling multiple simultaneous crises, and India, despite being geographically distant, find itself uncomfortably close to the fallout.
For India, the ongoing crisis is not a distant geopolitical development but a matter of direct strategic consequence and it is a stark reminder that strategic calculations in geopolitics is shaped by realism. New Delhi’s response has been characteristically measured yet firm, a principled display of its long-standing diplomatic doctrine of strategic autonomy and balanced engagement. Prime Minister Narendra Modi publicly affirmed Israel’s “right to self-defence” and told the Israeli Knesset in February 2026 that India shares its “zero tolerance” principle for terrorism.
At the same time, India has repeatedly called for de-escalation, unimpeded humanitarian corridors in Gaza, and respect for every country’s sovereignty. Modi also backed the U.S.-proposed Gaza ceasefire, describing it as a possible path to peace for all people in the region. These Middle East conflicts have several explicit implications for India’s interests. Energy security remains the most immediate concern. India still imports about 85 per cent of its crude oil, largely from the Gulf.
Every spike in oil prices hits the current account deficit, which is 1.2 per cent of its GDP, roughly by 50 basis points wider for every $10 rise per barrel, consequently putting fresh pressure on the value of the rupee. Strategic petroleum reserves and diversified suppliers such as Russia, the U.S., and African producers have helped New Delhi cushion the blow so far. However, prolonged Strait of Hormuz disruption could still pose a risk. Fertiliser prices that are already volatile would climb sharply if shipping through the Gulf is blocked. It will push the subsidy bill further and squeeze farmers at a time when rural distress remains politically sensitive
Maritime security has moved from a background concern to a front-page priority. Red Sea disruptions have forced shipping companies to reroute around Africa, adding 10-14 days and thousands of dollars per voyage.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), once promoted as India’s answer to China’s Belt and Road, now looks vulnerable. With the regional transit route destabilized, New Delhi may be forced to re-evaluate its reliance on land- bridges through the Levant. Policy makers in New Delhi are dusting off plans for the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC) again. Even though Iran’s internal instability makes that route uncertain.
The diaspora and economic dimension is equally pressing. More than nine million Indians live and work across the Gulf. Remittances from the region make up nearly 38 per cent of India’s total inward flows, with the UAE alone accounting for almost half of that. When Israel, Qatar, Iran, Iraq and several Gulf states closed their airspace in rapid succession, hundreds of thousands of Indian travellers were stranded. Dubai, Abu Dhabi and Doha, three of the world’s busiest aviation hubs, halted air operations that connect Europe, Africa and West Asia.
This showcases the connectivity disruption around the globe. The Indian Embassy in the UAE issued urgent advisories about avoiding unnecessary travel, remaining vigilant and following safety guidelines. New Delhi also arranged special flights. Any prolonged instability threatens not just remittances but also the crucial three pillars of India- and Gulf ties, that is, money, mobility and aviation connectivity.
This current development in global politics could also have ripple effects domestically in India. The Union Home Ministry has sent circulars to all states asking them to monitor pro-Iran radical preachers and inflammatory sermons that could spark communal tension. Protests and mourning gatherings after Khamenei’s death were closely watched.
The power vacuum in Tehran adds another layer of complexity. India has contributed considerable resources to the Chabahar Port project. It’s a strategic gateway to Afghanistan and Central Asia that neatly bypasses Pakistan. With Iran’s leadership in flux and sanctions possibly tightening, protecting those investments while keeping the port operational has become a crucial diplomatic priority. At the same time, India’s deepening defence partnership with Israel (drones, missiles, intelligence sharing) is under fresh scrutiny. Any perception of “choosing sides” could complicate relations with the Gulf monarchies that have themselves normalised ties with Israel under the Abraham Accords.
Looking beyond the immediate crisis, the turbulence carries longer-term lessons. It has accelerated internal conversations in India about reducing oil dependence from faster renewable capacity addition to serious exploration of green hydrogen corridors with Gulf partners. It has also reminded policymakers that diversified supply chains are not optional extras but national security imperatives. And it has strengthened the case for greater Indian naval presence in the western Indian Ocean, a trend already visible in the growing frequency of joint patrols and anti-piracy missions.
In the end, the 2026 West Asian crisis is not peripheral for India; it sits at the intersection of energy, trade, diaspora welfare, domestic harmony and great-power balancing. New Delhi’s calibrated diplomacy of condemning terrorism without burning bridges, safeguarding sea lanes without over-committing militarily, and diversifying energy sources without abandoning old partners shows both the resilience and the limits of strategic autonomy in an era of cascading crises.
As the dust in Tehran settles (or doesn’t), India’s task remains the same to keep the oil flowing, protect its people abroad, prevent regional fires from reaching its shores, and stay useful to all sides in any eventual peace process. India needs to have balanced engagement with all stakeholders while contributing constructively to long-term stability in West Asia.
The writer is Professor at Center for International Politics, Organization and Disarmament, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University ; views are personal
