Did dislike for the monarchy trigger the transformation of Nepal into a Republic or was it the monarchy that contributed to the bad blood between mainstream political parties, leading to instability in the neighbouring country, asks RAJESH SINGH
A nation’s destiny is often shaped by the collective wrong decisions its leaders take. This appears to be starkly the case with Nepal, whose tryst with real democracy — which began nearly a decade ago — has remained wobbly at best and gone horribly wrong at worst. Such is the situation that the lawmakers have repeatedly failed to even draft a Constitution that is broadly acceptable to all political factions.
Prime Minister Sushil Koirala and his deputy Bamdev Gautam have not been seen on the same page over the shape of the Constitution and the federal nature it will ensure. But the malaise runs deeper and beyond these two leaders. To understand this, and the various other issues that have blocked Nepal’s transformation into a genuinely inclusive democracy, one need not go further than read Prashant Jha’s excellent book, Battles of The New Republic.
At the release of the book in New Delhi, well-known journalist Karan Thapar asked former External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid — who was among the panelists on the discussion — why the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh didn’t pay a single bilateral visit to Nepal. Khurshid’s answer, that the visit could have sent the wrong signals, brought forth the dilemma that New Delhi has faced in its relations with its Himalayan neighbour: “Damned if you do, damned if you don’t”.
The interventions that India made or didn’t, as Jha narrates in the book, were as critical to that country’s political fortunes as the internal politics by Nepali leaders. In that sense, the book is as much a critique of New Delhi’s policies as it is of the local leaders’ erroneous calls in critical moments and their rare moments of sincerity.
The high point of the book is not the depth in the breadth and scope of its narration; this was expected given Jha’s intensive understanding of the subject and the fact that he has been diligently covering it for several years, first as a reporter in Nepal and thereafter from his base in India. The book scores in being non-judgmental without being neutral. The author’s soft corner for Maoists, many of whom eventually joined the political mainstream, is evident — and he acknowledges it too. But this has not prevented Jha from being blunt in his criticism of their policies and decisions. In the same vein, the author may have relatively few words in praise of the Nepali Congress, the country’s most prominent centrist party, but he has been fair to them when the occasion demanded.
Since this is a book on the contemporary political history of Nepal, the role of the monarchy forms the core of developments that shook up the country and are narrated at some length. It is tantalising to wonder whether a dislike for the monarchy — respected by the people in the earlier decades but not much in the years that preceded its demise — triggered the transformation of Nepal into a Republic or that the monarchy contributed to the bad blood which developed between the mainstream political parties, particularly between the Nepali Congress and the mainstream Maoists led by Baburam Bhattarai and Pushp Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’, which has led to the instability. Perhaps both are true, and none can run away from such accountability. Jha certainly ensures this in his book.
The author offers another interesting prospect, though he leaves it in the realm of speculation: What would have been the situation had Prachanda refrained from his belligerent conduct after he became the Prime Minister in August 2008IJ Did he not let go of the golden opportunity the voters had provided him by needlessly confronting the Army in sacking its chief and needling India whom he desperately needed on his sideIJ Did he go overboard in trying to too hastily integrate his comrades of the People’s liberation Army (PlA) into the regular Nepalese Army ranks without taking into account the concerns of the institutionIJ After all, Prachanda had received New Delhi’s backing overtly and covertly for some months before he assumed prime ministership, and his visit to India after he became head of the Government had been hailed as a fairly successful trip. Why did he give up on all the goodwill he had built with such care and effort over the yearsIJ
Jha writes that the mercurial though charismatic Maoist leader admitted to three mistakes that he had made after entering open politics and winning the election. “The first was not supporting Girija Prasad Koirala for the post of the first President of the Republic in 2008.” The second blunder Prachanda says he committed, in Jha’s words, was “seeking to dismiss General Rukmangad Katawal in 2009 — this had sharpened the Maoists’ differences with India, led to their exit from Government, and derailed the political process”. And the third mistake was “not putting up the contentious constitutional issues to vote in the full CA (Constituent Assembly), which had led to the collapse of the CA without elected representatives even getting a chance to resolve differences through democratic mechanisms”.
These are as candid admissions as there can be, and demonstrate not just the pragmatic side of Prachanda but also his democratic credentials. We must acknowledge that he chose the ballot over the bullet (unlike the Maoists in India). On the other hand, the decline in his image over the years since May 2009, when he had to quit as Prime Minister, also has to do with negative perceptions that people developed of him. The author writes, “Tales of Prachanda’s wealth, his luxurious lifestyle, and his debauched son reminded citizens of the old king. ‘Naya raja aayo’ (we have a new king) was a popular refrain when the Maoist chairman’s cavalcade passed through the streets of the Capital.”
Jha devotes considerable space to New Delhi’s role in the political affairs of Nepal. This is understandable because India’s interventions have decisively determined the fate of that country’s politics and its leaders. But the author has mixed feelings about these interventions.
At one stage, he is rather harsh. Writing of India’s strategy to deal with mainstream Maoists, he writes, “Engage, coerce, divide, frustrate, exhaust, corrupt, lure, repeat the cycle, and give nothing… It had created a situation where the (Maoist) leadership could deliver nothing to the cadre, frustrating them and increasing the gulf between the top and the bottom.”
And yet Nepal, including the Maoists, had not just welcomed but actively sought India’s involvement in its affairs when it suited them. A couple of months after he had resigned, Prachanda was in london where he met officials of the Research & Analysis Wing and tried to convince them that Maoists were committed to democracy and that the fiasco over the sacking of the Army chief, in Jha’s words, was “a result of internal pressures” and the Maoists “cherished the special relationship with India”.
Jha writes about the “Maoist doublespeak” when it came to India’s role. In the early years, both Prachanda and Bhattarai, like the rest of the Maoist cadre, had been indoctrinated to view India as an ‘enemy’. They used this ideology to whip up passions against New Delhi when they felt the political need to do so. The author observes, “The former rebels had raised the rhetoric about Indian interference only when they realised that Delhi had taken a stern position that went against the Maoists’ stand on Katawal. At key moments — during the insurgency when top leaders stayed in the Indian capital, while entering the pact with other political parties in Delhi, during the peace negotiations, in the run-up to the elections, and while forming the Government after polls when the old fox GP Koirala was refusing to step down — Maoists had been happy to engage with India, and seek favours from it.”
So, the dilemma is both ways. For India, it is: Should it have intervened less on certain occasions and more on othersIJ For Nepal, it is: Should it have heeded New Delhi more on certain issues and less on the othersIJ The situation seems to have even affected the author. He writes, “There are legitimate questions about whether India could have done more in mediating a pact between Nepal’s political parties. After all, they had invested enormous capital in pushing the peace process and conveying the need to dismantle the PlA. Why were similar efforts not made with regard to the Constitution-writing projectIJ
It’s still not too late to do so, given that the lawmakers there are still struggling to shape up the Constitution. But is the public and political opinion there in favour of an active and dominant role by New Delhi in this regardIJ
