The next flashpoint in global geopolitics

With the Strait of Hormuz under strain, the Malacca Strait has emerged as the world’s most strategically significant maritime chokepoint, reshaping Indo-Pacific security, trade and great-power competition

The ship tracker in Kota Kinabalu, where I am — on the eastern edge of Malaysia — shows that 281 ships passed through the Malacca Strait on July 14, compared with 134 ships which used to cross the Strait of Hormuz daily before the blockade. Four countries — Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand and Singapore — monitor and regulate traffic across the Malacca Strait. Before its twin blockades by the US and Iran, the Strait of Hormuz was free for international passage. Iran has found it can use the choke point as leverage and even impose tariffs. As I write, the issue over passage rights remains unresolved despite tit-for-tat bombings and a fragile ceasefire. Not since the Suez Canal crisis of 1956, which led to a geopolitical tsunami, has another choke point rediscovered its importance.

The 900 km long and 65 km wide Strait of Malacca is flanked by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, with which PM Modi signed a landmark BrahMos deal this week; it carries 24 per cent of global sea borne trade, 45 per cent of sea borne oil and 23 per cent of cargo shipments, and contains the world’s most critical port infrastructure: Singapore’s Port Klang, which is the world’s second busiest container hub, one of the busiest container trans-shipment points and the world’s largest ship refuelling hub. That the Malacca Strait remains free of disruption is critical for China, the US, India and Japan especially, and ASEAN; notably for the four custodian states, for whom control or leverage over it is necessary. They have been working on keeping the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean that the Malacca Strait connects, open and tranquil.

Tensions in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait are magnifying after the ongoing Gulf War, as Chinese coastguards have introduced new sea patrols off Taiwan’s eastern coast. China’s claims over the entire South China Sea are in violation of an UNCLOS ruling in 2016, which was re-endorsed by the West last week but rejected by China. For Beijing, Taiwan is an inalienable and vital component of its One China policy. China has maritime disputes with seven ASEAN countries but enjoys cordial relations with all; North Korea is its only good-weather friend. China has long delayed accepting a South China Sea code of conduct first sought by ASEAN in 2003, and, like hedging with India over delineation of the LAC, China has dodged ASEAN over the code until it was nailed to a 2026 deadline by the ASEAN chair, the Philippines. Chinese President Hu Jintao, during an economic conference in 2003, first mentioned Beijing’s “Malacca dilemma”, as 80 per cent of crude oil, 70 per cent of gas and $1.5tn of its exports pass through it. As its disruption would be catastrophic for China, it has been searching for alternate routes to reduce dependency on it.

First, detours from the south of the Malacca Strait through the Sunda and Lombok Straits within Indonesian waters. Maritime, geological and time and cost overrun issues have discounted these routes. Second, constructing oil and gas pipelines: the USD 62bn China-Pakistan Economic Corridor connecting Xinjiang with Gwadar Port; the USD 2.5bn China-Myanmar Economic Corridor from Kyaukphyu Port in the Indian Ocean to Yunnan, which are operational but in disuse due to civil war in Myanmar. In addition, oil pipelines from Kazakhstan and Russia are available. At this month’s World Peace Forum in Beijing, the centrality of the Malacca Strait was amply discussed.

Stung by its failure to keep open the Hormuz Strait, the US is taking no chances in ensuring freedom of passage across the Malacca Strait. On April 14, 2026, the US and Indonesia, the key watchkeeper of the waterway, announced a major defence cooperation partnership, strengthening their military ties. After renaming the US Department of Defence as the Department of War, it has reverted from the US Indo-Pacific Command to the old nomenclature, US Pacific Command — deleting “Indo” — and undertaken several defence and security projects with allies and partners in safeguarding the Malacca Strait. Indonesia’s vast archipelago sits astride the Malacca Strait and other vital sea routes of the world. The narrowest portion of the Malacca Strait is the 2.8 km Phillips Channel near Singapore, which is a vulnerable point. Contingency plans for keeping it free of disruption are available and are being augmented by the new entity “ASEAN Maritime Centre for Protection of Strait of Malacca and South China Sea from Encroachment by Major Powers”, set up in May 2026. This will be similar to the Information Fusion Centre for the Indian Ocean Region at Gurugram, India.

On June 18, 2026, Thailand’s Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul highlighted the criticality of strategic maritime choke points like the Malacca Strait. ASEAN countries were all affected by the closure of the Hormuz Strait except Petronas-rich Malaysia. Thailand announced on 18 June the revival of the pending USD 36bn land corridor project connecting two deep sea ports - Ranong in the Andaman Sea, Indian Ocean, with Chumphon in the Gulf of Thailand, South China Sea in the Pacific Ocean.

China, one of the investors, would be a key beneficiary of this alternate route. The corridor will reduce logistics costs by nearly 30 per cent and cut transit time by 14 days, especially for large cargo containers. But Singapore will lose its pivotal position as the infrastructural hub along the key waterway.

India sits 40 nautical miles on the 6-degree channel covering the western approach to the Malacca Strait. The controversial USD 5bn Great Nicobar Project, involving construction of a deep-water port at Galathea Bay, will become the pivotal hub of global shipping and a new international container trans-shipment port near the entrance to the Malacca Strait. On July 4, former naval chief and LG of Andaman Adm DK Joshi and Nicobar Adm DK Joshi examined its strategic value with advisers. INS Baaz, India’s southernmost air and naval base, is close by but the runway is still not fit for large jet aircraft.

I recall my visit with Defence Planning Staff in 1989 when Indonesia protested India’s proposal to enlarge the air base and the issue became a Time magazine cover story. PM Modi’s recent visit to Indonesia has turned the tide. Many ideas have recently been floated about blunting Chinese advantage along the LAC by augmenting China’s Malacca dilemma, should India have the political will and military finesse for it.

PM Modi’s recent visit to Indonesia has turned the tide. Many ideas have recently been floated about blunting Chinese advantage along the LAC by augmenting China’s Malacca dilemma, should India have the political will and military finesse for it

The writer, a retired Major General, served as Commander, IPKF (South), Sri Lanka, and was a founder member of the Defence Planning Staff, now the Integrated Defence Staff; Views presented are personal.