Need for a course correction in child protection Jurisprudence

In recent years, a deeply concerning pattern has surfaced in the adjudication of sexual violence against women and children. Courts have, at times, diluted charges, discounted survivor testimony, or relied on hyper technical reasoning under the guise of legal caution. In some cases, minor survivors have been disbelieved for using vernacular language to describe abuse. In others, responsibility has subtly shifted toward the victim. When interpretation distances itself from lived reality, the justice system risks ceasing to be a shield for the vulnerable and instead becomes a barrier they must struggle to overcome.
This concern reached its most troubling expression in March 2025, when the Allahabad High Court modified charges in a child sexual abuse case. The Court held that grabbing the child’s breasts, forcibly pulling down her clothing, and dragging her beneath a culvert did not amount to “attempt to rape.” At the very threshold, the gravest charge was diluted. What was presented as definitional caution carried profound implications. It risked narrowing the meaning of attempt and weakening deterrence in crimes against children.The settled doctrine of criminal law is clear. Attempt begins where preparation ends. When overt acts are undertaken directly in furtherance of the intended offence, and completion is prevented only by external interruption, the law recognises it as an attempt. In this case, the accused forcibly assaulted the child, removed her clothing, and dragged her to a concealed location. The act was interrupted only by the arrival of a passerby. The intent was evident.
The steps were direct. The interruption was external. The law, by its own standard, required recognition of attempt.Equally troubling was the procedural failure preceding this interpretation. Despite the gravity of the offence, no FIR was registered for nearly four years. The child’s mother approached the police authorities repeatedly, wrote to the Superintendent of Police, and ultimately invoked Section 156(3) of the CrPC (Now 175(3) of the BNSS). Yet the burden of pursuit fell upon the victim’s family.
Meanwhile, the child dropped out of school, lived in proximity to the accused, and endured continuing fear and psychological trauma. Delay in justice is not a mere procedural inconvenience, in cases of child sexual abuse, it compounds harm and deepens vulnerability.For Just Rights for Children, this was not a mere disagreement over a narrow interpretation of the law. It was a question of whether the justice system would permit dilution to define deterrence. More than 270 partner organisations across India supported a Special Leave Petition before the Supreme Court of India.
The pursuit was grounded in a simple constitutional belief that the law must protect the child and must be feared by those who violate her dignity.On 10 February 2026, the Supreme Court of India delivered a landmark judgment. The controversial order of the Allahabad High Court was set aside. The Court reaffirmed the foundational principle that justice must prevail over narrow and hyper technical interpretation. It held that the accused were liable for attempt to rape, emphasising that the crime remained incomplete only due to third-party intervention. The dilution of charges was found to be contrary to settled principles of criminal jurisprudence and inconsistent with the protective framework of child protection law. The judgment does more than correct a legal error. It restores coherence to child protection jurisprudence. It reinforces that courts must interpret sexual offences through the lens of harm, dignity, and statutory purpose, not through hyper technical thresholds. It affirms that judicial accountability is intrinsic to justice delivery and that interpretation must strengthen deterrence rather than weaken it.
By requesting the National Judicial Academy to constitute a Committee of Experts to examine ground realities and frame guidelines for adjudicating cases involving vulnerable victims, the Court elevated judicial sensitivity and accountability from aspirational ideals to institutional obligations.Inconsistent interpretation, personal bias, and absence of institutional accountability have too often resulted in re-victimisation.
Survivors are subjected to scepticism, minimisation, or blame instead of protection. Many withdraw from the pursuit of justice not because truth is absent, but because endurance becomes impossible. This judgment marks a decisive course correction for future generations. It restores balance between procedure and purpose, interpretation and justice.It also affirms a fundamental truth.
The burden of shame never belongs to the survivor. It belongs to the perpetrator and to any system that fails to protect the vulnerable.Justice is measured by how firmly it stands with the most vulnerable. In reaffirming that principle, the Supreme Court has not merely set aside a judgment. It has strengthened deterrence, restored faith in the rule of law, and ensured that child protection jurisprudence remains anchored in dignity, accountability, and justice.
The writer is General Counsel, Just Rights for Children; views are personal















