Population growth: Contradictions & challenges

Till 2050, India will have demographic dividend, After that demographic window will close and indian population will become old

The central argument of this article is that despite declining fertility, as evidenced by NFHS data released last month, there is no threat of a declining population, at least for the next two to three decades. The real and immediate challenges of population trends come from a lack of investment in human capital and continuing differentials in fertility by region, religion, caste and class. The population of India in June 2026 is 1,475,693,542 (Worldometer, internet). This estimate is based on projections made by the UN With this population size, India ranks first among all countries. As much as 17.79 per cent of the world’s population lives in India. With a comparatively smaller share of the world’s land area, India is one of the most densely populated countries in the world, with a density of 497 per km², which still seems likely to benefit from a further reduction in the population growth rate.

It must be pointed out that this large population is still growing at the rate of 0.87 per cent per year, or more. The growth rate summarises the current status of the birth rate, death rate and net migration rate (immigrants minus emigrants). Sample Registration System data (SRS Bulletin 2026) show that in 2024 the difference between the birth rate and death rate in India was 11.9 per thousand population. Since the net rate of international migration in India (-440,456) is rather negligible, SRS figures suggest that India may still be growing at a rate of 1.19 per cent per year. For a developing country, this places a great burden on resources.

In May 2026, the fact sheet of the National Family Health Survey (NFHS-6) was released. It refers to the survey year 2023-24. The report shows that the Total Fertility Rate (TFR) of India has remained at 2.0 and, during the period between 2019-21 and 2023-24, it has not changed at all. In some instances, such as in the state of Jammu and Kashmir, it has actually increased. Demographically, a TFR of 2.0 indicates that if the present age-specific fertility rates remain unchanged, then an average woman is likely to produce 2.0 children in her lifetime. For technical reasons, a TFR of 2.1 is considered to be the “replacement level fertility”, i.e., a level that would lead to zero population growth only in the long run. However, due to a relatively younger age distribution, even at this level of TFR, the overall population continues to grow for a generation or more, a phenomenon known as demographic momentum. Ironically, the Indian population presents a contrasting case of “below-replacement fertility” with a high rate of population growth, and both issues have to be tackled simultaneously.

The decline in fertility rates is caused by several factors. Some important ones are rising aspirations, improvements in socio-economic status, a decline in the infant mortality rate, and government policies aimed at meeting the unmet need for family planning. The latest data (NFHS-6) suggest that there has been an all-round improvement in socio-economic conditions, infant mortality has declined to a rather low level (around 24 per thousand live births), there has been an improvement in child mortality, and the government is committed to providing birth-control facilities to all those who do not wish to have an additional child or who wish to have a child after some interval. According to NFHS-6 data released last month, 91.5 per cent of people have access to family planning methods if they want to stop childbearing or wish to have a child after some gap. Yet, even today, 20.1 per cent of women and 15.9 per cent of men marry below the legal minimum age of marriage. We need to act on this. Readers must be told that although overall fertility has moved below the replacement level, TMFR (fertility among married women) still requires intervention.

Although a population size above the optimum level leads to diseconomies of scale, the present scenario has some advantages too. Since the proportion of the elderly population (aged 60+ or 65+) has only recently begun to increase, while fertility started falling sometime in the late 1970s, from 2005 onwards we have had a situation in which the proportion of young people is declining but the proportion of older people has not yet increased significantly. In demographic language, this is called the demographic dividend. Until 2050, India will have the advantage of a demographic dividend, ie, a high proportion of people in the labour force. After that, the demographic window will close and the Indian population will become old, as is the case in most developed countries. Only then will it become stationary. Economists say that to reap the benefits of the demographic dividend, we need to invest in skill development among young people and make economic investments in creating jobs for them. Countries that lack economic and human capital but have a higher proportion of people in the labour force face a demographic nightmare, not a demographic dividend. Thus, a more pertinent question is: how do we prepare for an ageing population while still benefitting from the demographic dividend?

Moreover, there are many other challenges posed by population trends in India. There are significant differences in TFR by region, religion, caste and class. NFHS-6 data have not yet been analysed, but NFHS-5 data showed that states such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar have much higher TFRs than southern states, especially Kerala. The political issue of people’s representation is linked to the delimitation of seats based on the 2011 Census data.

Likewise, Muslims have the highest value of mean number of children (4.8) and Jains and Sikhs the least (2.0 and 2.5 respectively). So, the proportion of Muslims in the overall population of India is going to increase further and that of Jains and Sikhs is going to decrease. This explains why between the 2001 and 2011 censuses, the Muslim population grew by 24.6% while Jain population grew only by 5.4%. There is evidence to believe that the 2027 census would not repeat the same experience. Since the modern politics world over is now based on identity, such facts will have critical implications for democratic politics.

The population does not grow at the same rate among different regions, religions, and classes. There is predictably an inverse relationship between fertility, and caste, status and class. USSR once faced the same situation (high fertility among Asian Muslims and low fertility among European Christians) and in spite of their commitment to communism, they decided to go for regionally differentiated population policy. We need to learn from them. India requires reducing regional and social class demographic disparities in fertility and family planning practices.  

Besides, India needs to manage urban sprawl and the ensuing infrastructure needs. In the beginning of the previous century only one-in-ten Indians lived in urban areas and the overall population was fluctuating. In year 2026, 37.61 percent of the whole population of India is living in urban areas and the population base is also growing fast. Sociologically, even the remaining rural population is subjected to high degree of “urbanism”. Consequently, the absolute population of urban areas is growing very fast and it will deteriorate the quality of urban infrastructure further.

In sum, the fear of declining population in India is only a myth. The urgent need is to reduce fertility further in those regions and sections of society where TFR continues to be high and prepare for bigger challenges such as demands to be created by ageing of population, lack of capital, fertility differentials, and urban expansion. A universal policy to incentivize fertility for the whole nation or a whole state would further aggravate the differentials and any such attempt on the part of the state must be critiqued carefully.

India’s population control attempts

Coercive Measures (1970s)

The Emergency: During the 1975-1977 Emergency, the Indian government implemented a forced sterilisation campaign under which over 8 million men and women underwent vasectomies and tubectomies. The backlash was severe. Since then, no federal government has attempted to repeat forced sterilisation.

Shift to Voluntary Family Planning (1990s - 2010s)

National Population Policy (NPP) 2000: The government replaced forceful targets with the National Family Welfare Programme, which was redesigned to prioritise maternal health, child survival, and voluntary family planning choices.

Mission Parivar Vikas: Rolled out to focus on the 146 highest-fertility districts in states like Uttar Pradesh and Bihar. It widened the contraceptive basket (adding injectables and postpartum IUCDs) and compensated acceptors for loss of wages.

State-Level Incentives and Disincentives

Two-Child Norms: Several states (Rajasthan, Andhra Pradesh, and Uttar Pradesh) enacted policies barring individuals with more than two children from contesting local government elections or receiving certain state benefits.

Recent Reversal: Some states are rolling back these two-child policies-such as Andhra Pradesh and Rajasthan-recognising that declining birth rates could lead to future economic and demographic challenges.

Demographic Realities & Current Focus

The “North-South” Divide: States in the south (Kerala, Andhra Pradesh) have fertility rates well below replacement (around 1.4 to 1.8), causing local anxieties about an aging population. In contrast, northern states (e.g., Bihar) still have slightly higher fertility due to lower female literacy.

Arun Kumar Sharma is first professor in India to develop online courses on population and sociology and taught demography in IIT Kanpur. He is also a member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the ISS Journal Sociological Bulletin; Views presented are personal.