The Taliban attack on a US base in Afghanistan has raised many questions. Kabul, which will be profoundly affected by any peace agreement, must be prepared for the worst

On December 7, the US and the Taliban resumed peace talks, which President Donald Trump had pronounced on September 9, 2019, to be “dead.” His statement had followed a Taliban attack that had killed 12 people, including an American soldier. On Wednesday, December 11, at least two civilians were killed and 73 others wounded in a car bombing and subsequent assault at Bagram Air Base by the Taliban. Two questions arise here. Why did the Taliban launch Wednesday’s attack? What would happen now?

As to the first, two pat answers are likely. First, the Taliban want to spike the talks. Second, they want to test the resolve of the Americans to hold their ground. Third, they are divided and one of the sections opposed to the resumption of the talks has mounted Wednesday’s attack in the hope that Washington, DC, will walk out of the talks.

Those opposed to the first assumption would argue that the Taliban could not have wanted to sabotage the talks they were participating in. One can also say that their desire for a settlement is further underlined by the prisoner swap on November 19, under which the Taliban released an American and an Australian scholar as well as 10 members of the Afghan security forces held by them, while the Afghan Government released three Taliban leaders.

All this, however, would overlook the possibility that the Taliban believed that this time the Americans would not abandon the talks despite provocations. Their reasoning may well have been that the very fact that the Trump administration had resumed the talks shows its keenness, bordering on desperation, to work out a peace agreement enabling most, if not all, American troops to be brought home. The desperation, they may have further felt, should be all the greater when Trump is facing impeachment proceedings and the 2020 US presidential elections are drawing closer. A peace agreement, which he can stick to his hat as a feather, and the return of American troops would give a significant thrust to his bid for a second term. It is, thus, quite logical for the Taliban to feel that if they continue to go through the motions of talks, the Trump administration would give them the agreement they want if not soon then as the presidential elections draw near.

The question springs up: What kind of an agreement would they want? First, they have made clear that they would not accept the present Afghan Constitution adopted by a Loya Jirga (a grand tribal council with legislative functions) in 2004. On their part, they issued, in 2005, their Order of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a document closest to a Constitution they have produced. It is fundamentally different from the Constitution in terms of the political systems they stand for. This will be clear from a brief look at them, which is what one can do here given the paucity of space.

The Afghan Constitution has set up a democratic system of Government in which a popularly-elected President is the head of State and Government. The Taliban order, by contrast, proclaims Afghanistan as an Islamic Emirate under Mullah Mohammad’s leadership. The legislative and judicial branches of the two systems differ significantly. The Afghan Constitution has established a bicameral National Assembly in which the lower house is directly elected and the upper house consists of a mix of indirectly elected and presidentially appointed senators. The Taliban order, by contrast, establishes a single chamber Islamic Council as the highest legislative organ, whose members are appointed by the Amir ul-Momineen (Commander of the Faithful) based on their familiarity with the principles of jihad and Shariah. The order does not mention how the Amir ul-Momineen is to be selected or how long an individual may serve in this role. It does, however, specify that he must be a male Muslim follower of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence.

It is difficult to imagine how the basic contradictions between the Afghan Constitution and the Order of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, which clearly seeks to establish a fundamentalist Islamist theocracy, can be resolved. This, in turn, gives a sharp edge to the question whether the Trump administration would accept an agreement that makes for the replacement of the Constitution by the Order. One cannot rule out the possibility that it may. It had, in July 2018, started seeking direct talks with the Taliban, abandoning its insistence that the Afghan Government should be a participant in the talks while the Taliban had long been insisting that they would first discuss peace with the Americans. And now it has resumed talking to them even though they had continued being aggressive on the ground. 

Wednesday’s attacks have to be seen in this context. At one level they might have been aimed at observing the American response for an indication as to whether the US desperation could be pushed to a point where it accepts a peace settlement that enables the Taliban to march into Kabul and take over Afghanistan with the support of Pakistani Army and the Air Force. At another, it might have been a part of their continued effort to undermine the morale of the Afghan Government and security forces and progressively reduce their ability to resist the offensive mentioned above. And, of course, it could have been both.

One cannot, of course, rule out the third possibility — that the Taliban are divided and one of the sections opposed to the resumption of the talks had mounted Wednesday’s attack in the hope that Washington, DC, will walk out of the talks. Whether this is so will be clear in a few days when the circumstances of the attacks become better known.

Of course, the Afghan Government, which will be profoundly affected by any peace agreement, has to prepare for the worst — an American withdrawal that leaves it fending for itself. For this, it must first get over the deep fissures that divide it — a fact that is strikingly underlined by the fact the results of the presidential election in the country, held in September, 2019, remain stalled in the midst of a bitter dispute between the incumbent President, Osman Ghani, and the principal challenger, Abdullah Abdullah. Both leaders must remember that a Taliban takeover would mean a return to medieval savagery, which besides reducing women to domestic slavery, would rob life of all gaiety and entertainment.

Meanwhile, India, which has serious stakes in Afghanistan, needs to assess its options. It must be prepared to render any assistance it needs to, including the supply of military hardware, to the Afghan Government to hold its own.

(The writer is Consultant Editor, The Pioneer, and an author)