If the pre-results exuberance turned out be unwarranted, it follows that the post-poll assessment of widespread rural distress and disinterest in national affairs must also be appropriately discounted

Statistics can often be a wonderful consolation prize. According to an analysis by the Hindustan Times, just 6,887 extra votes strategically spread across six constituencies would have given the BJP the majority it narrowly missed in Haryana. This is as tantalisingly close as the 4,337 votes spread across 10 constituencies that deprived Shivraj Singh Chouhan and the BJP a record fourth term in power in Madhya Pradesh in 2018.

Unfortunately, consolation prizes have no worth in politics. This is something that Amit Shah — much more than his boss Prime Minister Narendra Modi — realises only too well. It is one thing to attend to political and organisational deficiencies from a position of power and quite another thing to do so being in Opposition. This is why it made eminent sense for the BJP to rush through a post-poll alliance with Jannayak Janata Party leader Dushyant Chauthala whose 10 seats made all the difference between a fragile Government dependent on defectors and a more stable dispensation for Manohar Lal Khattar. This was also the logic behind the BJP contesting a lesser number of seats in Maharashtra and firming up its pre-poll alliance with the Shiv Sena, a strategy that paid dividends. In hindsight it was a prudent calculation since — and this fact was singularly absent from much of the instant post-poll analysis on TV — the Opposition in Maharashtra in the form of the Congress and Sharad Pawar’s NCP fought the elections together.

As of today, despite the predictable hiccups over the Shiv Sena’s ridiculous demand for a revolving door chief ministership in Maharashtra, it would seem that the status quo has prevailed in both the States that voted on October 23. Both Maharashtra and Haryana remain in the grasp of the BJP and NDA. What explains the perception that the BJP suffered a major jolt are four factors.

First, there is the undeniable fact — demonstrated many times in the past — that the vote for the BJP, particularly under Narendra Modi, witnesses a big surge in the Lok Sabha polls and experiences a dip in the Assembly elections when more local concerns take centre stage. Apart from being a phenomenon, it also demonstrates that the BJP is far better in painting a national picture than having a distinct regional profile. When it was the dominant party, the Congress experienced this as well.

Secondly, the defeat of a large numbers of BJP Ministers, particularly in Haryana, suggests that the ability to digest power at the local level has not been smooth. In Haryana, for example, the BJP was a bit player in State politics — dependent on its status as a junior partner in a formation led by a regional party — until the general election of 2014. In the Assembly election of 2014, taking advantage of the growing resentment against the overweight of Jats in local politics, it successfully crafted a broad non-Jat alliance. It also took advantage of the fact that the support of the dominant caste was split between the Congress and Om Prakash Chauthala’s INLD. This split was in evidence this time too but there appears to have been a greater consolidation, perhaps tactical, at the constituency level. Thus, BS Hooda emerged as the foremost Jat leader and Dushyant Chauthala as the inheritor of the Devi Lal mantle.

It would seem that many local BJP leaders who rose from complete obscurity to fame after 2014 weren’t able to entirely digest their new status. A micro-analysis by the party will reveal the entire picture but the first impressions suggest that many of the BJP Ministers (by no means all) were punished by the electorate for their swagger and arrogance. When the party distributes tickets in Jharkhand where polls are due before Christmas, it must pay greater emphasis on chaal and charitra. This is also true for West Bengal where the discontent against the arrogance of Mamata’s Ministers may well be offset by the swagger of BJP local leaders who rose from complete obscurity after the spectacular showing in the general election.

Thirdly, the BJP strategy for growth has depended on increasing membership of the party and maximising turnout during election. Both are inter-related, a reason why the BJP makes an organisational distinction between member and active member. In this round of elections, the turnout was below that of the 2019 general election and the Assembly elections of 2014. It would seem — on first reading — that there was a measure of complacency in the ranks of the BJP that stemmed from a feeling that victory was assured, not least because the Opposition appeared dispirited.

Finally, the public perception or, rather, the perception of the media, of how the ruling party actually fared has been shaped by the exit polls that predicted a resounding sweep. Why the exit polls got it so horribly wrong is for the pollsters to analyse. However, it does point to the dangers of putting inordinate faith in a media that is exposing its shortcomings with every passing day. A political party has to manage the narrative but it has to take equal care that it is not led by the nose by a media that has its own priorities.

The post-poll perceptions have to be treated with a measure of scepticism. If the pre-results exuberance turned out be unwarranted, it follows that the post-poll assessment of widespread rural distress and disinterest in national affairs must also be appropriately discounted.