Even if the Doha talks result in a ceasefire and a pact leading to a Taliban takeover, it may not ensure a conflict-free Afghanistan
Two important developments occurred last week which bode ill — if that is any longer possible — for Afghanistan and its people. The first was the conclusion of the eighth round of talks between the United States and the Taliban at Doha, capital of Qatar, on August 14. The second was the suicide bombing of a wedding in Kabul on August 17, which left 63 people dead and 182 wounded. There are indications that the talks are close to yielding a ceasefire and a peace agreement. According to a recent report by Shereena Qazi in Al Jazeera, a Taliban representative, who is a part of the organisation’s negotiating team told the channel, “This round of talks has been very productive and we are near to an agreement that will be finalised and hopefully announced in the next coming weeks.”
Further, Qazi’s report quotes the United States Special Representative for Afghanistan, Zalmay Khalilzad, as saying in a Twitter post, “They (the talks) were productive. I am on my way back to (Washington) DC to consult on next steps.” All this may have been regarded as a welcome indication that peace would be coming soon to war-devastated Afghanistan, but for the strong possibility that the outcome of the talks would mean defeat for the United States and a victory for the Taliban who would, sooner than later, take over Afghanistan.
There are three reasons for believing that it would be so. First, the US President Donald Trump’s determination to withdraw from Afghanistan at all cost suggests that he may agree to a peace settlement that is tantamount to selling the present democratically-elected government in Kabul down the river. That this is likely to happen is suggested by the fact that his administration has abandoned the resolutely-held US position that the talks would have to include representatives of that government. On the other hand, the Taliban, who have steadfastly refused to have talks with the Kabul government on the ground that it was a “puppet regime,” have had their way. Third, the US continues the Doha talks notwithstanding the fact that the Taliban continue to launch vicious ground attacks and terror strikes.
The Trump administration’s holding of talks with the Taliban without the Kabul government’s participation has further eroded the latter’s already diminished authority caused by the Taliban’s sustained large-scale offensives from their bases in Pakistan, with the full support of the Islamabad government. According to a report by the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), as of January 31, 2018, 229 districts were under the Afghan government’s control, which is about 56.3 per cent of the total. Fifty-nine districts, approximately 14.5 per cent of all, were under the Taliban’s control. The remaining 119 districts, about 29.2 per cent, remained contested — controlled by neither the Afghan government nor the rebels. Even if the Afghan government is still able to maintain its grip over 229 districts, it is to a large extent because of the security umbrella provided by the presence of 14,000 American and 17,000 troops from 39 countries which are the US’ NATO allies.
Understandably, the Taliban want these troops out even though they are in a non-combative role. According to Qazi’s report, the Taliban representative it had cited had further stated, “The main part of the discussion is the withdrawal timeline and the technicalities of it.” The Taliban, according to another report, have made it known that they will make no commitments unless a timeline for troops withdrawal within months is announced. Of course, there still are hurdles in the way. The Taliban are not a monolith. Its military leaders may push for a delay to secure a more favorable situation on the ground. Its more fanatical factions, divided by leadership rivalries and professions of varying degrees of fanaticism, may not want any deal at all unless it is on terms that enable them to re-impose on Afghanistan the fundamentalist Islamist nightmare that had characterized their earlier incarnation in power, which had ended with their military defeat in 2001. Also, the Afghan government may not agree to the settlement on offer.
Besides, even a ceasefire and a peace agreement leading to a Taliban take-over may not ensure a conflict-free Afghanistan. Some of the more fanatical Taliban groups may continue fighting to restore the pre-2001 order which reduced women to domestic slavery and banished all forms of entertainment. Also, the Islamic State has established a growing presence and mounted a number of attacks including that on the Kabul wedding on August 17. Its bitter rivalry with the Taliban is well-known and it is unlikely to leave a government led by the latter in peace.
Far from becoming a land of peace, Afghanistan may, post a “peace settlement,” turn into battleground of contesting Islamic fundamentalist groups each with its own sphere of influence. Given their intense hatred for the US, some of these areas may well turn into launching pads for strikes against it. While they may not be able to strike mainland America, they may target Americans and their interests worldwide. In that case, a peace agreement signed by the Trump administration in haste may turn out to be a cause for profound regret later.
(The writer is Consultant Editor, The Pioneer, and an author)
