There are interesting tales about Burhan Wani, but this may not be the truth. Chatter picked by intelligence would suggest, he was let down by his supreme commander Salauddin and the Hizbul Mujahideen's benefactor, the ISI

In this age of television-dictated 24-hour news cycles with channels competing to grab the eyeballs of the lowest common denominator among viewers (that’s where ratings come from) and newspapers scrambling to outdo the idiot box, popular perception of events tends to be shaped by moving images and purple prose that tell only selective bits of the real story. At times this is by design to craft a narrative that is straitjacketed by (usually shallow if not hollow) ideological leanings; largely it is by default, mostly on account of lazy journalism.

And so it is that recent events and incidents in the Kashmir Valley have been reported with dull familiarity over the past fortnight. This is not the first time separatists, especially the Hurriyat leaders, have used the death of a Kashmiri terrorist to manufacture anger. This is not the first time Islamists have used mosques to fuel that anger and call believers to arms. This is not the first time vicious stone-pelting with intent to maim and kill security forces has been organised for a fee. This is not the first time Pakistan has exulted at and applauded the performance by the ISI’s puppets in the Valley.

We have seen it all before. We will see it all again. let’s not live under the illusion of a quick-fix solution to a long festering problem. Merely suturing open, bleeding wounds won’t do; they need to be healed and the causative factors cured.

Meanwhile, it would be useful to remember that not everybody is out on streets and Jammu & Kashmir is not only about the Kashmir Valley, nor can policy be tailored to address imagined grievances alone. As MJ Akbar, the newly inducted Minister of State in the External Affairs Ministry, said in Parliament, we are fighting a battle in Jammu & Kashmir, and we have been fighting this battle since October 1947. At one level it’s a battle against those inimical to India’s unity and inflicting a thousand cuts on its integrity, at another is a battle for upholding the very foundational spirit of India that militates against Mohammed Ali Jinnah’s pernicious two-nation theory.

So here’s some sobering perspective. This year, starting January 1 up to July 17, according to data published by South Asia Terrorism Portal, 86 terrorists have been killed in Jammu & Kashmir; 31 security forces personnel have died in counter-terror operations; six civilians have lost their lives in crossfire. These figures do not include the 46 deaths in protests that erupted after Burhan Wani, the deceptively chocolate faced 22-year-old (21 according to some reports) commander of the murderous Hizbul Mujahideen, was killed in a meticulously planned operation by security forces on July 8, 2016.

There have been multiple reports as to how the security forces, which were looking for Burhan Wani, wanted in at least 15 cases of terrorism, for the past couple of years, tracked him to his last hideout where he was neutralised along with two of his associates. Some newspaper reports say that Burhan Wani was quite a Casanova and a woman he had slighted squealed on him. Separatists accuse his associate Sartaj’s uncle of being a police informer. These are interesting tales but may not be the truth.

Chatter picked up by intelligence agencies would suggest Burhan Wani was let down by his supreme commander Salauddin and the Hizbul Mujahideen’s benefactor, the ISI. In the past, Salauddin, based at Muzaffarabad in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and chief of the so-called United Jihad Council, has ruthlessly got rid of commanders who had begun to gain popularity and threatened to overshadow his stature in the terrorist organisation.

The ISI, which midwifed the birth of Hizbul Mujahideen with the help of the Jamaat-e-Islami, has been complicit in Salauddin’s efforts to remain the sole leader. The ISI can control the Hizbul Mujahideen so long as he remains the unquestioned boss. Any emerging local commander who gets carried away by his newfound popularity, as Burhan Wani no doubt was, does not fit into the ISI’s scheme of things.

Ironically, Burhan Wani was handpicked by Salauddin to give Hizbul Mujahideen a makeover. In an age where dextrous use of social media plays a dominant role in promoting and propagating terrorist agendas and ideologies, Burhan Wani was an excellent choice. He was young, had the perfect ‘DP’, knew the tricks of Facebook, could effectively use a smart phone. He was the perfect antidote to an ageing leadership (Salauddin is pushing 70; SAS Gilani is tottering at 85).

What Salauddin and his ISI handlers had not factored in was the potential of Burhan Wani gaining runaway popularity among the under-twenties and even the 20-somethingsIJ—IJthe Facebook generation. And possibly becoming over ambitious. If Hafiz Saeed is being honest about his claim that Burhan Wani was in touch with him, then that would not have found favour with either Salauddin or the ISI. What was he up toIJ Was he trying to independently strike out with the help of the lashkar-e-TayyebaIJ

A second factor that went against Burhan Wani was the agility with which he escaped security dragnets repeatedly. Those who pick up the gun in the Valley know they won’t live long. But Burhan Wani lived longer than many others who had opted to tread the path of terror. This likely made Salauddin and his ISI mentors suspicious. What also had them thinking was the spurt in successful strikes by security forces: 113 last year, 86 this year. Was one of their own leaking crucial information to the security forcesIJ Who was playing informerIJ Could it be Burhan WaniIJ Was he getting rid of local competition while smartly buying time and escaping capture or death, again and againIJ

Terrorist organisations through history and worldwide are remorselessly cruel in weeding out internal challengers. They are either killed or marginalised, depending on the level of threat they pose. The Hizbul Mujahideen was launched to marginalise and defang the JKlF. Since then there have been many purges with factions being put down and too-hot-to-handle local commanders being got rid of through the expedient means of leaking information, through stooges and professional informers, about their whereabouts. Unhappy bosses of terror organisations leaking information about those they want out, and vice versa, is standard practice. That’s how Israel succeeds with targeted assassinations.

We will never know the truth. But if there is a conspiracy behind the security forces zeroing in on Burhan Wani’s hideout with absolute accuracy, then the conspirators are in Muzaffarabad and Rawalpindi.

(The writer is Commissioning Editor and commentator at ABP News TV.)