War you do not, and cannot, see

As the Iran-Israel-US war disrupts nations, as well as transport and logistics in the Middle East, there are quiet, somewhat invisible, battles that confront maritime analysts, airline pilots, and infrastructure experts. Over the past two weeks, they have observed growing interference with the satellite navigation systems, which are crucial to guide global trade and transport. Across the Persian Gulf’s shipping lanes, on the digital navigation charts, the sailing tankers and vessels have appeared to be located at places where there were not, or could not be. Many appeared as if they were on land. Some were located near the airports. A few were clustered together at identical coordinates.

Each of the possibilities did not exist, or was impossible as the vessels were on the sea, and miles apart from each other. Initially, the experts felt that these were software glitches, or malfunctions that coincidentally emerged simultaneously, and that too in the area where an aggressive war was on. But when maritime intelligence firm, Windward, detected over 1,100 ocean vessels that experienced GPS-related anomalies within 24 hours, and as the number rose to more than 1,600 in the following week, the narrative changed. Analysts were convinced that these were cases of deliberate and sustained electronic interference in one of the world’s strategic shipping corridors.

Obviously, the locations of the digital disruptions were significant. They occurred around the Strait of Hormuz, which used to carry 20-21 million barrels of oil per day, and accounted for close to a fifth of the global crude consumption. When navigation signals begin to behave unpredictably in such a corridor, the consequences extend far. Analysts identified this phenomenon as GPS-spoofing, or a form of coordinated electronic attacks that manipulate satellite signals, rather than block them outright. It was being used by some sides in the Middle East war to confuse the enemies, or so-called friends of the enemies.

GPS-spoofing occurs due to the inherent weaknesses in how the satellite navigation systems operate, and which can be easily exploited. GPS satellites orbit 20,200 km above the Earth, and transmit signals that allow receivers to calculate positions using precise measurements. By the time the signals reach the ships, aircraft, or your smartphones (remember you use GPS almost all the time), they are faint, which makes them vulnerable to interference from any ground-based transmitters. If someone is hellbent to confuse and confound those who receive the signals, it is not too difficult to do so.

Electronic disruptions occur in two forms. Jamming blocks the satellite signal, and leaves the navigation systems unable to determine their positions. Spoofing is a more sophisticated technique, which broadcasts counterfeit signals to imitate the real satellites. The genuine receivers continue to function normally, or seem to do so, but their calculations go awry, and provide the incorrect locations. Spoofing is considered more dangerous because the operators and receivers may not immediately realise that something is wrong. A vessel or aircraft can appear to navigate normally but its digital position and location can drift hundreds of km away from its true location.

As mentioned earlier, the evidence of this phenomenon repeatedly appeared across the vessels plying in the Gulf area. Foreign news agency, Reuters, reported that dozens of French commercial vessels were affected by the disruptions. This led to the heightened security conditions in the Gulf, according to French transport officials, as the vessel crews struggled with unreliable navigation signals. For captains navigating one of the world’s busiest oil corridors, inaccurate positioning data is not merely inconvenient. It raises the risk of collisions, delays, and congestion in the shipping lanes, which handle the movements of hundreds of tankers movements each week.

Ami Daniel, CEO, Windward, told Reuters that the Gulf historically saw little satellite interference but the pattern changed sharply. Shipping is one part of the system that is affected. Aviation saw the scale of the problem. The International Air Transport Association reported that airlines logged more than 46,000 incidents of GPS interferences, which affected commercial aircraft in 2023. Many occurred in regions that were experiencing military conflicts. Pilots in the Middle East region, and over the Black Sea reported that they either lost the satellite signals, or saw navigation systems temporarily display incorrect positions. They had to resort to backup systems.

Investigations by Wired magazine documented cases where the GPS interferences near Iran disrupted mapping platforms and delivery services, and caused vehicles using navigation apps to appear in incorrect locations. A study by the Center for Advanced Defense Studies found that more than 9,000 ships experienced GPS spoofing near the Russian ports between 2016 and 2019. These incidents highlight how satellite navigation is embedded in infrastructure. The signals that guide ships and aircraft provide the timing used across telecom networks, financial trading systems, and electricity grids.

Shipping firms that operate in the Gulf region have begun to adjust their behaviour in response to the interference instability. Some vessels slow down during the transits through sensitive areas, or temporarily alter routes as operators assess the navigation reliability. War-risk insurance premiums for ships in the region have increased, which reflects the uncertainty surrounding it. Even small disruptions can have outsized consequences. Delays in tanker movements affect refinery supply chains in Asia, Europe, and North America. They influence freight costs, insurance pricing, and energy markets.

Given that 90 per cent of the global trade moves by sea, according to the UN estimates, navigation reliability is not just a technical issue. It is a core component of the infrastructure that supports global commerce. The economic dependence on satellite navigation is substantial. A study by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology estimated that a 30-day disruption of GPS services can cost the US economy about $1 billion per day. The most exposed and vulnerable segments include the telecom networks, financial markets, power grids, logistics and manufacturing, and transportation systems, among others.

Imagine this is an estimate for a single nation, albeit the largest economy. A worldwide or regional disruption in the GPS signals can wipe out billions of dollars. The frequency of satellite interference has begun to attract the attention beyond the defence community. Infrastructure planners, regulators, and tech firms are increasingly examining how dependent the modern systems and networks have become on a single positioning, and timing network. Policy-makers and researchers are exploring alternatives, alt-PNT systems, or short for alternative positioning, navigation, and timing technologies. These include systems designed to operate independently of GPS.