India’s strategic blind spots

At 92, Narendra Vohra is strapping fit in body and mind. He is the most experienced and versatile bureaucrat India has produced. What K Subrahmanyam, present Foreign Minister S Jaishankar's father, was to strategic thought, Vohra is to defence and security. I got to know both of them fairly well during my stint with Defence Planning Staff. Vohra has been organising seminars serially on national security for many decades, the last of which was held recently at IIC Delhi and was probably the most engaging and unusual as  speakers contradicted  one another over fundamental issues at a time when liberal expression has become so rare. A Service Chief, an Army Commander, two Defence Secretaries, a Foreign Secretary, all retired, constituted the panel.  Former Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran, not new to the theme, chaired the discussion.

Vohra began by enunciating the fraught state of civil-military relations, an unresolved malaise of growing intensity as civilian assertion of military control has become vital for the ruling establishment. Indian generalship has progressively allowed the diminution of its power, perks and prestige lately through the diversion of its intellectual resources towards shedding  colonial legacy.  Even  the unprecedented politicisation of the military is being accomplished with the cooperation of higher military leadership principally by the Army. Compliance has become the pass word!

Vohra reminded ; that 'defence of India and every part thereof' is governed by Rules of Business 1961 under authority of MoD - inclusive of Defence Minister, Defence Secretary and lately Department of Military Affairs under CDS. Despite tinkering with the rules, the integrating armed forces still have separate Army, Navy and Air Force Acts. Further, CDS is not an appointment backed by legislation , neither is   NSA's,  made in 2019 and 1991. Though India's defence budget has grown 40 times since 1991 it is still below 2 per cent of GDP when targets for Nato and Indo Pacific are 3.5 per cent of GDP to be met by 2030. The recent resignation of UK Defence Secretary, John Healey was over 'insufficient funding' which had made Britain 'less safe'. 

For long , Vohra, along with former NSA Shivshankar Menon and Shyam Saran have emphasised the a necessity for a national security policy. They said that at least six drafts of NSP are gathering dust with NSA Ajit Doval. Vohra pointed out that Lt Gen Hooda who was a panelist had recently authored an NSP paper for the Congress party. Another panelist, former Defence Secretary Sanjay Mitra categorically rejected the requirement for NSP saying that India had handled Doklam, Balakot, Galwan and Sindoor without one. This 'chalta hai' approach is supported by others too notably the retired CDS Gen Anil Chauhan who had publicly stated that an NSP was not required.

The fiasco along the LAC in 2020 could have been avoided had we a documented national security strategy. Surprisingly the Integrated Defence Staff has produced several tri-service doctrines sans an NSP. Incidentally one of the issues raised by IAF opposing theatrisation is its 'immaculate conception'. Adm Arun Prakash is a recognised voice of the military. He has not shied away from pointing to several anomalies in civil-military relations especially about progressive degradation of  the military in civil services/police-military equation, the most glaring during periodic Pay revision Commissions. Here again, silence on the part of the Generals is key to diminution which is self-inflicted. Prakash noted how delayed decision-making in acquisition of platforms has made India less safe. He dismissed the phantom of 'atma-nirbharta' saying India is unable to produce a jet engine for aircraft and gas turbines engines for warships. These are being imported from US and Russia as the indigenous Kaveri jet engine programme begun in 1987 has failed to take off. The Kaveri engine unfit for combat aircraft is likely to be used in drones and some non-military projects.

The second point made by Prakash related to lack of interface, leave alone rapport, between political and higher military leadership. In the past Service Chiefs could access the Prime  Minister as and when required though this route was rarely followed. After the inception of CDS though single service Chiefs technically still have access to PM by virtue of their remaining operational and administrative heads of their service, it has never been used. The CDS though not in the operational chain of command is the principal military advisor to PM/RM. This has created an unarticulated anomaly. Nevertheless, PM Narendra Modi has not made it convenient for himself to periodically interact with his Service Chiefs. He has made Services shift their annual days and parades to other states and cancelled the traditional  receptions held at residence of Service Chiefs when the President, the Supreme Commander of the Services, Cabinet ministers and other dignitaries would attend. It was a grand civil- military ceremonial occasion which cannot be replicated outside Delhi. The PM used to address and interact with Service Chiefs twice a year during single Service Commanders conference and combined Commanders' conferences. He now officially meets them once in two years at the Combined Commanders' Conference. Remote control of military leadership by political authority must be replaced with more frequent operational interactions. 

Gen Hooda reinforced the issue of political leadership's lack of familiarity with military operations especially during crises like Sindoor and Balakot. Unlike in the West, especially UK and US, where politicians have done stints in Iraq, Vietnam and Afghanistan their Indian counterparts have barely read  military history. Hooda said military crises with Pakistan and China will occur and  escalate more frequently and called for institutionalising crisis management. The response during Op Sindoor took 14 days whereas institutionalised contingency gaming would have compressed the time frame. 

Former Defence Secretary Sanjay Mitra was not in sync with most of the ideas presented by other panelists, concluding that defence acquisition should be left to the military. The widely criticised Agniveer scheme prevails as neither CDS nor Service Chiefs have spoken out against it as it is the PM's pet project.  Generals must keep national interest above their own and not fear to rock the boat.