Fertile failures in fertile farms

Every now and then, even the smartest of political rivals of Prime Minister Narendra Modi seem to miss the irony behind some of the grand official intentions and announcements. Recently, Modi toured West Bengal and Assam to woo voters for the forthcoming assembly elections. In Assam, he talked about a new, upcoming million-plus-tonne fertiliser plant in Dibrugarh district. He flaunted the project as one of the major achievements of his three regimes, and among the Make-in-India, success stories.
Strangely, his rivals failed to point out a simple fact that at least when it comes to the successes of agriculture production, and the Make-in-India scheme, fertilisers are a loose end. Modi, BJP, or NDA cannot take credit. The fact is that after oil and gold, fertiliser has emerged as the third-largest imported product. In October 2025, India registered a record $41 billion trade deficit. One of the key reasons, apart from oil and gold, was urea imports as the country scampered to ease the huge domestic shortages.
A few months ago, I wrote about farmers’ distress, particularly in Madhya Pradesh, parts of eastern Uttar Pradesh, Orissa, and Andhra Pradesh. Farmers, and their families waited for 12-20 hours in long queues to buy fertilisers during the sowing season. Of course, officials denied any hints of shortages, and claimed that the supply exceeded, or matched the demand. A former civil servant explained that the queues were not because of the shortages but because the supply shops invariably opened the outlets late, and created confusion.
So, without much ado, let us turn to the facts. According to the available statistics, India needs 70 million tonnes of fertilisers (both urea and potassium varieties). At least a quarter of the demand is met through imports because there are not enough domestic production facilities. India has managed a few joint ventures abroad, where its businesses pump in money, and buy the entire or bulk of production. This makes the country the second-largest importer in the world. It is critical to put this in perspective.
India produces close to 370 million tons of food grains, and about 380 million tons of horticulture every year. Without adequate fertilisers, this output is not possible. Mercifully for India, despite the talks of organic farming, and policy measures to encourage it, the farmers still depend on fertilisers, new varieties of seeds, and other chemical input. Or else, we may face a situation like Sri Lanka, which banned fertilisers as it felt that organic farming is healthier, more beneficial, and more sustainable for the nation, and farmers. The result: A major collapse in the agriculture sector, which impacted the economy.
In any case, let us return to the main issue. The shortfall in fertilizer production, and dependence on imports is a pain-point for the growers. Past and present policies are responsible for the scenario. True, one cannot blame the Modi regimes since they did not initiate the earlier policies. But the truth is that they did not reform them. For decades, states such as Punjab, Haryana, and parts of Uttar Pradesh were considered the predominant food baskets. Not surprisingly, supply chains of agriculture inputs, and procurement of food, cereals, and fruits were concentrated in these parts.
Farmers in the other states were neglected, not deliberately but by default. This was evident during the recent fertiliser shortages, which were more visible not in Punjab but the other states. Punjab is among the top five farm producing states. Yet, it is not the top one, and may soon find itself out of the top five. Hence, there was a need to change, and properly manage the supply chains to ensure that farm inputs reached the farmers in other states, where production was on the upswing. The same was true of procurement.
Sadly, past regimes, including the Modi ones, ignored this reality, not deliberately but due to the inability to think 10-20 years ahead. Another irony is that Modi and BJP got away with such policies because their rivals took time to catch up to the realities, and criticise them for genuine shortcomings and failures. The agriculture sector, despite the comfort level in food grain production, remains a critical sector. It cannot be ignored, and neither can the fertiliser segment. Indeed, if one compares the Indian scenario with that of China, the story of fertiliser production is one of fertile failure.
In 2025, India paid a heavy price because China imposed restrictions on varieties of specialty fertilisers. The Russia factor worked in its favour, as it is a significant and diversified supplier across urea, phosphatic, and potash inputs. Recently, during Russia’s Vladimir Putin visit, the two nations inked a deal to build a 2-million-tonne urea plant in Russia to ensure adequate supplies in the future. Oman is another crucial supplier for urea. So is China, and others such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Jordan, and Canada.
Indeed, although imports constitute a fifth of urea demand, the percentages are higher in case of phosphatic (50-60 per cent), and potash (100 per cent) inputs. Apart from win-win joint ventures abroad, India hopes to enhance the domestic production to more than 60 million tonnes a year, and meet more than 85 per cent of the demand. But this realisation has sunk in later. Since the BJP has been in power for 11 years, indigenous supply could have been boosted earlier. The dependence on imports could be curtailed.
According to media reports “In just four months from July to October (2025), fertiliser imports were more than $8 billion, up by a whopping 143.67 per cent, mainly due to record imports of urea in a short span. According to official data, urea imports rose by 228.43 per cent in the July-October period to 49.79 lakh tonnes from 15.16 lakh tonnes in the year-ago period.” Lower levels of domestic stock amid rising demand, which forced the Government to resort to immediate purchases in the global market. This pushed up prices.
In July 2025, as news of shortages poured in due to higher acreages under paddy and maize, coupled with good monsoons, India rushed in to buy the requisite fertilisers. It imported six million tonnes within three months, a figure that was higher than the entire 2024-25. This was unfortunately the time when the global prices were at their peak. Urea was nearly 40 per cent higher than its price in November 2024 before it settled down to 10 per cent higher.
The author has worked for leading media houses, authored two books, and is now Executive Director Voter Foundation; views are personal













