The best bet for the Chinese is to seek organic support for ‘reunification' with the main land from the Taiwanese themselves. A coercive posture and rough language would not help

Contrary to Chinese assertions, insistences, and sensitivities to what it unilaterally calls ‘Chinese Taiwan’ or ‘Taiwan, China’, the Republic of China (ROC) or Taiwan has its own functional democracy, constitution and approximately 3,00,000 combatants protecting its territorial sovereignty. With mainland China claiming to represent One-China as the legitimate power, the battle of wits tilted in favour of mainland China in 1971, when the United Nations switched diplomatic recognition onto mainland China. Since then, mainland China has flexed its patent admixture of financial, military, industrial and diplomatic power to bludgeon support in its favour. Today, the fast-receding number of countries that recognize Taiwan has fallen to a meagre 12 countries. Even this list includes relatively ‘lightweight’ nations like St Vincent and the Grenadines, Eswatini and Tuvalu, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, Palau, Nauru, Holy See, Marshall Islands etc.

Chinese President Xi Jinping has repeatedly warned against “Taiwanese independence separatism” and promised that Taiwan would “surely be unified”. Xi’s rhetoric is deeply suggestive and intimidatory. However, audio-visuals of choreographed brinkmanship aside, such a belligerent move would be anything but a cakewalk in terms of consequences for the Chinese. Practically, Chinese sabre-rattling is part of deliberately postured nationalism that is vital to buttress the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party(CCP) regime, as the main lever of legitimacy i.e., socio-economic upliftment of the Chinese, is now under extreme stress. In the absence of economic prosperity, muscle-flexing against Taiwan distracts and galvanises the Chinese masses.

The disproportionate Chinese military strength to Taiwan’s militaristic preparedness on paper notwithstanding, the near-certain international reactions of sanctions and embargoes onto the Chinese if they were to attack Taiwan, would break the proverbial camel’s back, in terms of further economic sufferings for the Chinese masses. It could lead to unsustainable economic regression and societal discontent. It is a price that Xi Jinping simply cannot afford, especially as the economic upside of a forcible integration, would pale in comparison to the downsides of a plausible invasion.

Besides, Taiwan is extremely well-fortified with missiles, early warning systems, precision-strike weapons, underwater mines, and other counterattack capabilities that could inflict significant damage on any invasion attempt, irrespective of the ultimate result. In any case, the Chinese would have to mount a significant fleet and accompanying wherewithal which could easily alert of an impending invasion – a discreet and sudden Chinese attack, is next to impossible. Even the fact that a potential Chinese invasion would involve breaking through large urban squalors and cities, it would entail deadly urban warfare that has tested the skills of even hardened Israelis and Russians in recent times, let alone the untested Chinese PLA soldier. Urban warfare and associated ‘costs’ could lead to the undoing of any residual support the Chinese may have amongst the Taiwanese. The famed Taiwanese ‘porcupine’ strategy is predicated on making a heavily laden Chinese invasion fleet face a prickly proposition and based on defensive survivability. The fact that such an invasion could draw the committed US forces would have its own resultant algorithms.

So realistically the best bet for the Chinese  is for organic support for ‘reunification’ with the mainland Chinese, by the Taiwanese themselves. This is not an unfathomable situation, given the existence of ‘pro’ China and ‘anti’ China sentiment amongst Taiwanese political parties. While the recent Taiwanese Presidential elections have brought back the decidedly ‘anti-China’ forces of the Democratic Progressive Party(DPP) with 40.05% of the popular vote (third successive victory), the fact that the other two parties have varied shades of ‘pro-China’ anchorage i.e., Kuomintang (KMT) and Taiwan’s People Party(TPP), garnered 33.49% and 26.46% respectively, shows faultlines. It could be credibly argued that while the Taiwanese were aligned with DPP’s nationalistic stand, there must have been anti-incumbency on local issues like low wages, unaffordable housing etc., that led to significant support for KMT and TPP.

However, the competitive race of identities in Taiwan has led to a steady assertion of locals identifying themselves as just ‘Taiwanese’ as opposed to ‘Both Taiwanese and Chinese’ or plain ‘Chinese’. Yet, post the electoral results the Chinese foreign ministry reiterated, “Whatever changes take place in Taiwan, the basic fact that there is only one China”, clearly signalling the continuation of stalemate and tensions. If the Chinese were to overdo the further sanctioning against provisions of an existing free trade agreement with Taiwan (or even suspend it altogether), it would lead to painful hardships for the Taiwanese, but also to further anti-Chinese sentiment that clearly cannot be countered by military superiority or plausible invasions. The best bet for the Chinese is to have the local Taiwanese perceive more socio-economic merit in ‘unification’ as opposed to ‘independence’, a battle that puts Beijing on the backfoot given stories coming out of Hong Kong or Tibet. So, the Chinese battle-rattle-tattle for crossing the straits in a purported invasion will continue, however, the costs to walk the talk will remain prohibitive.

(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. The views expressed are personal)