Can South Asian capitals have one voice on issues related to climate diplomacy? Our neighbours would respond otherwise. The primary reason for their response would be India’s own climate diplomacy patterns, which has followed a distinct trajectory since 2010. Indeed, some climate watchers would argue that the Indian posturing on climate issues post-COP-21 has changed the pitch of the South Asia voice from a more revolutionary to a more reformist version.
Even though India has reiterated its voice on climate vulnerabilities and its position is close to the position of the Least Developing Countries with regards to climate finance, particularly adaptation needs and preservation and resilience of communities and natural habitats, the Indian policy discourses in the public domain suggest otherwise. This becomes visible as one traces the debate on mitigation and adaptation.
At the international level, India has been a part of the G-77 group, the BASIC group and the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LDMC) group. Except the BASIC group, all South Asian countries are part of these groups. India is also part of discursive space on emerging economies making its presence in the BRICS and the Emerging 7. Further, it has been regularly invited to G-7 summits.
While in all these groups, India has strongly reiterated its commitments to the Common but Differentiated Responsibility and Related Capabilities; with regards to climate change and adaptation needs of developing countries, it has also made voluntary commitments to fighting global warming, as a responsible climate leader, opening up space for mitigation reforms.
Significantly, at the domestic level, there has been a clear shift to a distinct Green Industrial Policy, and India is no longer just relying on Clean Development Mechanism and Export of carbon credit. In fact, one sees a bold shift in India’s position post-2015 primarily towards mitigation through the green growth debate. This green growth debate, seen in terms of the smart city campaigns, plans to move towards green ammonia and hydrogen, vocabularies being inspired by green innovation ideas and increasing role of state in being potentially more active in environmental regulation.
Further, there has also been a diversification of policy ideas around the green growth debate, where there is optimism that environmental protection and economic growth are compatible, and India can make it possible through domestic reform. Some of the specific policies that India has taken at the domestic level are its commitment to the net zero target by 2070, transition to clean energy by 2030 where the focus on sustainable transport has been identified as one key means, and reducing the emission intensity to GDP by 45 per cent. Meanwhile State Action Plans are being updated, and the race to net zero target campaign is being encouraged.
However, while the goals are optimistic, there is scepticism also. The skepticism comes from the big elephant in the room which is climate finance. Currently, much of the climate finance in India stems from domestic sources. The promise since the Copenhagen Summit which matured in the Paris Summit was to mobilise 100 bn USD by developed countries for climate financing. As per some Indian estimates, only 2.2 million is the credible estimate. It has been argued that India would need 1 trillion USD of foreign support to reach net zero. As the debate on conditional carbon sequestration is very much dependent on climate finance, much of the green vision stands on slippery ground.
Meanwhile, on their part some South Asian neighbours feel that through these policy articulations India is putting its wrong foot forward as it is diverting attention away from the broader principle of Common but Differentiated Responsibilities. They argue that the western countries should be made accountable to cap their Green House Gas (GHG) emissions, not developing countries.
In between the desirability and feasibility of these climate goals, a missing discourse on the international climate diplomacy is the Hindukush Himalayas (HKH) region, where climate vulnerability is a looming issue. Scientists claim that a 1.5 degrees Celsius rise is too hot for the glaciers in the Himalayas, which are the sitting time bombs. In fact, it has been repeatedly pointed out by climatologists that in a 1.5 degrees Celsius world, warming will be 0.3 degree Celsius higher in the HKH region.
While the countries are responding to the international climate discourse through domestic responses such as Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC), which are conditioned on climate finance, a regional initiative and discourse seems to be missing in substantive terms in the public domain. One way for India to foreground the climate diplomacy at the regional level is to shift the gaze and discourse regarding climate finance to the location of these climate vulnerable countries. The HKH hosts river systems and has also been considered as a pulse of South Asia. More importantly, the region is sustainable to cascading hazards often making the people inhabiting this region vulnerable. While common-sense would demand that the South Asian countries join their hands and heads together in climate proofing this seismically sensitive ecological zone, which is prone to Glacial Lake Outburst Floods (GLOFs), landslides, earthquakes, riverine floods, flash floods, etc, partnership on the ground and cross-border ecological cooperation remain a tall order.
For instance, in the past India objected to a 35 million USD proposal financed by UNDP through GCF to mitigate Glofs in northern Pakistan, claiming the status of the project was a big problem as it was a space of territorial contestation. Further, the fencing along the LoC has also posed some collective action challenges. For instance, forest fires have not only endangered the habitat of wildlife species but have also triggered several landmine explosions in recent years, thus challenging the effectiveness of booby traps as a defensive weapon.
Climate change is conspicuously absent from the Indus Water Treaty, which needs to be updated. The institutional arrangement that exists between India and Pakistan, the Indus Water Treaty also needs to be updated.
The stories with the eastern neighbours are also not different. While in comparison to Pakistan, the degree of cooperation is greater and dense, particularly given the agency that civil society actors have, an ecological- integrated approach has been missing in the existing bilateral engagement. A good case in point are the bilateral water treaties which witness implementation challenges and need to be updated when it comes to responding to climate issues, being hazard resilient. Against this backdrop three suggestions are offered, which can help India firm its approach on climate diplomacy.
First, the countries need to adopt a river basin approach, as there are strong upstream and downstream interlinkages in the HKH. These interlinkages identified through a river basin approach will also help identify potential projects for international climate finance. While there has been a focus on structural approaches towards disaster resilience in the past, non-structural measures as a part of adaptation diplomacy needs to be prioritised.
Second, operational issues associated with land and water management, land zoning, flood proofing and retention measures based on nature-based solutions are needed.
Last, but not the least, the lens of the global common approach should be highlighted to decenter the geopolitics in the high Himalayas. Given the independence between the socio-ecological systems, one needs to have a minimal understanding of the upstream areas of HKH as global commons. This will not only help the communities and the ecosystem of the HKH, but also help invite climate finance for critical areas which are intrinsic to a more resilient South Asia.
(The writer is Associate Professor, Department of international relations, South Asian University, New Delhi)
