A ‘peace deal’ with an organisation still on the UN's terror list is a precedent of grave concern that opens up a Pandora's box for the world community
The international community has witnessed a paradigm shift in global security and geopolitics during the last three weeks. With the deal between the US and the Taliban and the subsequent capture of Kabultoincreasing convergences between some states and the Taliban, international politics will never be the same again. There would be profound changes in the manner in which diplomacy and inter-state relations would henceforth be conducted.
The most immediate question is whether state representatives can sign peace agreements and deals with terrorist organizations knowing their intentions to seize territories through violence and terror mechanisms? Primarily, we have heard of an “understanding” between different players, but a "peace deal" with an organization still on the UN's terror list is a precedent of grave concern that opens up Pandora’s box for the world community.
Today, through various sources such as Qatar and Pakistan, the Taliban is sending messages that negotiations and engagements mustbegin if the world does not want Afghanistan to be the terror hub. Such statements certainly are not in the form of requests and amount to tactical blackmail to seek recognition and financial aid with the ulterior motive of infiltrating various international and regional organizations. The example of Pakistan has proven that financial flows do not sway away the actors (both state and non-state), facilitating their sinister agendas such as Jihad.
In proverb terms, the wolf feels the need to wear the sheep's clothes. The dilemma that the world faces currently is that the Taliban has taken control over the territory unlawfully and forcibly, and to function as a “legitimate” heir, it has to present itself to the world as a de jure entity. China, Pakistan, Russia, Iran and others have been sent an invite to the “government formation” process in which atleast half of the “ministers” are designated terrorists pushing forward the agenda of radical Islam and Jihad. The pressures on the international community, especially the donor countries like India and Japan, to initiate diplomacy, aid and trade with the Taliban and assess them on their ‘acts’ will only bolster the tactics of "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds”.
The countries must come out of the paradoxicalmentality of financing and aiding the failed states like Pakistan and Violent Non-State Actors (VNSA) like the Taliban in Afghanistan in expectation ofstability in the region. While the US concludes that force is not the predominant factor in deciding the future course of actions, the same power of force would be encouraged if such VNSA is either “engaged” or “aided”. Acceptance of the blackmail, as in this case, is not a long-term solution to the polyarchic tendencies that have gained prominence. It will only encourage the behaviour of probably what can be called “gunpoint diplomacy” akin to the Chinese tactics of “gunboat diplomacy”,wherein blackmailing is used for tactical and strategic manoeuvrability. Likewise, the talks with the Taliban, even by other countries, create new precedents in the domain of international law, the consequences of which the world may have to face for the rest of this century.
The issue of “recognition” or “cooperation” to the Taliban Afghan in return for their display of actions in “compliance with the international norms” is thus tricky. There is a difference between what India expects and what the other powers expect from the Taliban. We are primarily left to fend for ourselves. Even the slightest show of “normalcy” or “diplomacy” will affect India. What will happen a year or two from now is in the realm of the unknown. Even on some conditions, an “engagement” with the Taliban will be taken as a diplomatic recognition to it, having domestic consequences and create wrong precedents. Suppose India opts for talks with the Taliban, a few months down the line, we might seethe Taliban representing Afghanistan sitting across the Table in UNGA or other regional organizationscommenting upon our internal matters.Would not India be then tricked by China and Pakistan in the same way as the US was downplayed? Sometimes, not making a decision is much more desirable than taking decisions promptly under coercion, aslater times can seldom reverse them.
Second, the feeling of being left out on the part of US allies will affect future alliances. In the current problem, India's immediate interests weresidelinedwhen the US left Afghanistan, leaving behind a cache of arms thatmay have already been transported to Pakistan only to be used against Indian interests in areas bordering Pakistan. As the vested interests of China and Pakistan "blossom" with the support of Iran and Russia, a pertinent question is how India would deal with the issue. Some backdoor communications channels (not diplomacy) have to be maintained at a fundamental level until the last Indian citizen exits Afghanistan. We must learn to differentiate between negotiations for evacuations and recognizing a form of “government”.
Third, as the US introspects its policies, there are chances that it might adopt an approach of 'democratic realism'that Charles Krauthammer suggested in 2004 that commits its “blood and treasure” only at places of “strategic necessity”. In such a case, what strategic and tactical commitments do the US have towards India needs to be demonstrated? If India is considered an ally, the onus of proving itself a credible partner lies on the US. The same standards are applicable for Russia too.
Further, diplomatic engagements now seem to be turning towards a new kind of power relations devoid of any long-term commitments. In trends like this, countries do not hesitate to extend their outreach through VNSA. Further, adverse powers also team up for short-term or long-term gain, and, in the process, either sideline or resolve their existing issues. When China and Pakistan have shed their cloak of pretence, and the US is not going ahead with its previous “policing role” for advocating democracy, New Delhi should adopt an Indo-centric approach as a solution to this new great game.
From India's perspective, we should question whether Afghanistan becomes a terror hub of different factions of proxy organisations or will it serve as an exclusive ISI extension working solely against India? Owing to the geopolitics, the Haqqanis have been included in the so-called “government”. There is no doubt that the Indian interests would be affected. Taliban's “spokesperson” Suhail Shaheen has already stated that Kashmir is next. The Taliban stated that it would not “interfere” between Pakistan and India a few days later. The two statements released within a week have no credibility. Which statement can India trust? Moreover, why should India trust the Taliban if Pakistan's active role is already evidenced?
The consequences of the churning of the Afghan problem will probably start appearing when it becomes the new epicentre for emerging rivalries and partnerships. The world might witness more chaos and terror, but not for long as resistance will come up against such tendencies. They might be in the form of alliances, partnerships, or at the international forum, but certainly, “gunpoint diplomacy” would not continue for long.
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)
