The possible transfer of sophisticated Chinese bio-medical technology to Pakistan would be an upcoming threat for India and the world
Recent news of the China-Pakistan Health Corridor (CPHC), in collaboration with Pakistani and Chinese medical universities, research institutes and biotechnological firms,is more than a routine, academic and scientific exchange. The fact that five million Chinese will be associated with CPHC and working in Pakistan in the next four years is startling, making one wonder about the type of collaboration in the works. There are no precedents yet in academics of such a large number of people from one nation gathering in a host country in a short period of time to undertake 'scientific research'. There could be more than what meets the eye.
An article in PLA Daily recently asserted that "talent cultivation, commanding system and armaments development should proceed in coordination", a tactical move that can trigger different kinds of permutation combinations in the defence studies. In this respect, President Xi Jinping had previously declared that "In circumstances of increasingly intense global military competition, only the innovators win". In the last two decades, China has immensely modernised its military apart from absorbing the R&D of civilian sectors.
China's Institute of Military Medicine has reportedly made much progress in active anti-biological warfare. These dual-purpose advancements include laser and biotechnology, space, apart from artificial intelligence. Such advancements outpace the international regulatory framework of biosecurity. The development of any new pathogens through the CPHC could bypass the existing and evolving medicine system and hence should be a health security concern. The possible transfer of such sophisticated bio-medical technology to Pakistan would be an upcoming threat for India and the world.
The 'gunpoint diplomacy' that Pakistan has initiated against India could escalate. The role of the new and evolving technologies coupled with Artificial Intelligence (AI) and an active collaborative Sino-Pak threat has broadened the horizons of conventional and hybrid warfare. For instance, artificial intelligence medical robots used for surgeries can be resized to evade military detection. Bio-inspired AI weapons are already in place with a few countries. With the ability to carry harmful pathogens, they could broaden the asymmetric warfare. Their potential use as delivery mechanisms for a biowarfare purpose aimed to target the people, crops or livestock animals can create havoc.
Biological agents can also be directed against India's food security through agro-terror to create social unrest and economic devastation. Emerging plant and crop diseases or livestock diseases thus have to be watched for through a novel 'sector management' system in which the border and coastal areas can be divided into sectors and kept under constant surveillance for the changes in the soil and water properties or any other new and emerging diseases. India should be cooperating with the US and Israel in this domain since these countries have included food and livestock security in their overall security outlook.
Hypothetically assuming the case that the current pandemic was an "accidental leak" do not mitigate the risks of future "accidental" or deliberate leaks. Pakistan's single-pointed anti-India approach in its foreign policy has reduced its stature positioning as a pawn in the hands of China. At a domestic level, the Talibanisation of its society makes the country an active security threat to India and the world. China is not yet proven innocent concerning the pandemic. Also, the report of Australian journalist Klan in 2020 pointed out the Sino-Pak bio warfare agent's nexus and the manipulations of pathogens apart from helping Islamabad develop its lethal and drug-resistant viruses.
Pakistan's belligerent status and China's habitual secrecy and duplicity, along with its anti-India posturing, are collaborative threats. Democratic countries should demand of a no confidentiality clauses in the upcoming agreements related to CPHC. The facilities and the research institutes should be mandatorily open for international inspection. The details of the number of P-4 level safety or high containment labs and their research staff should be made available to the international agencies for regular inspection. WHO should be watchful of the imports of health equipment and the raw materials related to bio-medical research. Such steps are essential to avoid Pakistan's development of offensive biological weapons and anti-biological weapons safety programs under the garb of 'scientific research'. The role of the US Center for Disease Control and Prevention thus will have an important role to play.
The Indian Government needs to ask questions at an international forum. How will the labs/research institutes' security be ensured, especially when there are dangers to Islamabad's internal security? How will the world community ensure that the facilities or pathogens do not fall into the hands of Islamic fundamentalists in the Pakistani army and society? What will the two countries do to ensure no artificial manipulation and subsequent weaponisation of the pathogens that will be the subject of research? There are possibilities that such labs or their output might be used by Pakistan to militarily intimidate India to leverage the conventional or even nuclear superiority.
"Accidental leaks" can be equally devastating. What mechanisms will be in place to ensure that the people who handle the labs report their sickness? Does a developing country like Pakistan have facilities to filter the bio-medical waste, including its water, before leaving the facility? The Arabian Sea may be more prone to dumping waste that might reach the Indian Ocean and damage the fisheries. Contamination of fisheries will eventually jeopardise human health.
Additionally, China's policy of reverse engineering of weapons could be applied to the pharma industry too. CPHC might also aim to punch the US position in the biopharma industry. Currently, the active Chinese presence in the US through their biotechnology R&D firms in Boston, San Francisco, and Research Triangle Park in North Carolina pose dangers of technology replication and sale in the global market at cheaper rates. As Beijing has access to new technologies, it can bring back the structural make-up of new drugs and undermine its intellectual property regime apart from sharing it with Pakistan and other rogue States.
From another perspective, various international agencies have often pinpointed that Uighur Muslims have been illegally detained and used for human experiments. There are possibilities of Uighur Muslims being transported to Pakistan for human experiments to circumvent the attention of the international agencies. The Sino-Pak-Taliban nexus raises doubts over the subjects of human experiments for gene editing being broadened to include minorities in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Taliban and Pakistan have been infamous for organ trading and human trafficking. Thus, the international community should be keeping a watch on their population fluctuations and should be allowed access to the inner areas of northern Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the western province of Xinjiang to verify and assess the situation.
The Indian security agencies have to broaden the range of the threat spectrum, which should now encompass radiological, biological and AI weapons. New approaches that could be flexible, comprehensive, and essentially Indo-centric have to be brought within the narratives of the security domain to detect and neutralise the threats.
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)
