Anti-Americanism brings China, Pakistan, Iran and the Taliban together but, given one another's self-serving politics, how long will the relationships last?
The Chinese backing of the Taliban, Pakistan, and Iran presents to the world a new 'arc of instability'. It is highly unlikely that the European Union, the US, and its allies would recognize the Taliban's brutal regime. Developments such as Iran-Russia missile sales agreement, Pakistan-Iran pipeline, and Russia's military cooperation agreement with Pakistanset the tone for a new convergence of interest:anti Americanism. However, today, both Pakistan and Iran seem to be approaching their diplomatic endgame.
In 2010, Pakistan was able to capitalize on the differences between the US and Afghan governments when it convinced the latter to remove anti-Pakistan Afghan spy chief Amrullah Saleh and Interior Minister Hanif Atmar from power. In 2011,Islamabad asked the Karzai government to disengage with both India and the US, and give Haqqani network an upper hand in its intelligence and security agencies. In return, Pakistan spoke of Taliban's adjustments by politically accommodating some elected representatives.
Similar demands were put forth to Ashraf Ghani. Although initially refused, Ghani eventually recognisedthe Taliban as a political party, and Saleh was again ousted from the government. Those demands of Pakistan have now been fulfilled, and, with an anti-India approach, Pakistan will aim for destabilising Kashmir. The statement of Pakistan's Tehreek-e-Insaf leader Neelam Irshad Sheikh on the Taliban and Kashmir echoes their larger sinister plans. The strategic axis between China, Pakistan, the Taliban,and Iran might ensure that the important routes to Central Asia and Eastern Europe which India aimed for bypassing Pakistan may now be no longer available or even if they are, through other possible routes, would be more prone to sabotage.However, this phase might not last long.
The Taliban regime is not yet recognised and its initial euphoria of an 'Islamic Emirate' may soon fizzle out. Pakistan's ambition to carve out a space for itself from the shadow of Saudi Arabia and OIC seems to have reinforced its anti-Americanism and a pro-Taliban stand. Today, Saudi Arabia has strengthened its defence relations with India and is largely unwilling to support Islamabad's case on the Kashmir issue. Wearing the blinkers of an 'India centric' approach and following the killing of Osama Bin Laden, it did foresee the deterioration of its relations with the US and its allies. Raising slogans of Jihad from the UNGA platform, sanctions of the Trump administration, the non-recognition of Israel, and the UAE-Israel deal are the other factors that have cut short Islamabad's strategic manoeuvring at a regional level. By attempting to normalise its relations with Iran, it has tried to capitalise on the Saudi-Iran rivalry.Once the western evacuation is complete, the West will have no strategic inclination to continue their favourable policies for Pakistan. Thus, FATF blacklisting and the termination of its Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP +) status is definitely on the cards.
Islamabad faces serious uprisings in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (former NWFP) and Balochistan. There are increasing chances that coordination between anti-Pakistan establishments such as TTP, BLA (Balochistan Liberation Army), BLF (Balochistan Liberation Front) and BRA (Baloch Republican Army) might increase and become a single,focused force. Afghanistan may now be a sanctuary for anti-Pakistan forces too. On the other hand, the increasing grip of its 'good Taliban' (Haqqani Network, Quetta Shura Taliban etc.) may choke the domestic society and perhaps may even endanger the "democratic regime" of Imran Khan. Once its strategic utility of the recognition is over, Taliban in the coming few months may attempt to establish itself as a political party in Pakistan and get the support of its armed forces and ISI?
Whether Pakistan is ready to transform itself into an 'Islamic Emirate' from being an Islamic Republic is a question for the future. Will the international economic backlash and growing political restlessness result in another military coup in Pakistan? In both situations, China will try to benefit geo-strategically.
Concerning Iran, the new strategic uncomfortable accommodation of the Taliban is all set to change the geopolitical equations of West Asia. First, the economic viability of dealing with the Taliban and Pakistan is going to prove costly for Tehran. In 2020, Kabul and Tehran agreed on a shared vision "to support peace and stability in both countries and the wider region" which had included Iran. Later that year, Afghanistan and Iran inaugurated the Khaf Herat Line that sprung from a previous agreement between Iran, Afghanistan, and India to develop Chabahar. Iran invested around $666 million in it as Tehran aimed to integrate itself with the world. Today, as it finds itself in China's geo-economic embrace, there are more chances that its precious raw materials will soon find their way to China via this line. Moreover, with Beijing's circular lending, there will be no financial transfers to Iran and neither will Iranians get the jobs in the BRI Projects. Iran might just serve the geographical utility of connecting to China via Afghanistan and Pakistan. The same fate awaits Afghanistan. The three countries might just serve the purpose of transporting Chinese finished products to Eastern Europe. This has been the larger geopolitics of China wherein it has reaped advantages on one common ground -- anti-American sentiment -- of two countries via a terrorist organisation.
Secondly, Iran is all set to lose its leadership role of the Shias in the region. Iran would probably not be comfortable to align with Pakistan for a longer time. Tehran is fundamentally opposed to an 'Islamic Emirate' for it challenges its political and religious role in the region. Its aspirations to continue as the leader of a 'Shia Crescent' will take a backseat with Pakistan's and Afghanistan's Talibani culture.
In such circumstances, how long will Iran continue to provide oil to Afghanistan remains the big question.Do the Taliban have the resources to pay for the oil and food imports? Further, the Turkish-Pak cooperation will ensure that Iran would play a minimal role in its immediate neighbourhood and they might together downplay the Shia interests in the region.
Turkey'srefusal to adjust theAfgan refugees and the construction of its wall on its border with Iran is all set to destabilise the region further. How does Iran then financially manage the refugees? Most of the able Shia refugee men might opt for being a part of Iran-led Fatemiyoun brigade or other proxy war organisations, yet, given its volatile economic situation, it could probably end up being another client state of the dragon.
During the "peace talks", the Taliban had previously provided guarantees that they wouldnot prosecute the Hazara community once back in power. In early 2021, Taliban leaders had visited Tehran and that had drawn a lot of criticism in the country. The people and the religious leaders have still not forgotten the inhumane treatment given out to the Shia community during the reign of the Taliban from 1996-2001. So, for how long can this 'trust' factor continue? With the tables turned, such promises seem tobe far from reality.
In these circumstances, the sharp polarisations within Asia can end up compromising security of the region, particularly in India. The 'New Great Game' is thus all set to be replayed with different players and alliances.
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)
