India has strengthened its position not only militarily but strategically as well. Therefore, it needs to stand firm and retain its control over the LAC
In the ongoing battle for supremacy between the US and China, the latter let loose its “wolf-warriors”, signifying Beijing’s new and aggressive diplomatic response to countries blaming it for the Coronavirus pandemic. “Wolf-warrior diplomacy,” named after two Chinese movies, describes offensives by its diplomats to defend China’s national interests, often in confrontational ways. However, the global anger against Beijing was so much that anti-China sentiments gained momentum and the “wolf-warrior diplomacy” failed to make an impact. Saner voices at home began to call for restraint but they went unheeded as China today is ruled by the all-powerful Xi Jinping and his diktat prevails.
So China displayed its aggressiveness in South China Sea (SCS) by sinking a Vietnamese fishing trawler near the Paracel Islands in early April. In mid-April, the Chinese Ministry of Natural Resources and Ministry of Civil Affairs jointly announced the naming of 80 islands, reefs, seamounts, shoals and ridges in the SCS, triggering angry protests from other claimants. China was using the global fight against the Corona to pursue its territorial ambitions as part of its traditional expansionist policy.
The Chinese actions in SCS were checkmated by US intervention as India continued to pursue its strategy of balance. But was the Chinese belligerence in the SCS a warning to India which it failed to read? India’s change in FDI rules to stem Chinese predatory trade practices didn’t go down well with Beijing. Neither was China happy with India joining the comity of nations backing a draft resolution at the World Health Organisation (WHO), nor was it happy with the likely shift of global companies from China to India. The final straw for China was the chairmanship of the executive board of the World Health Assembly by way of which India could take to task both Beijing and the WHO. China felt threatened by India though New Delhi made it clear that it wants to avoid power politics.
So China soon made India the target of its “wolf warrior-diplomacy” too. First through Press statements, harsh articles and accusations of unfair trade practices. Then it decided to shift the scene to the Sino-Indian border.
Two of the three incursion points chosen had traditionally been undisputed in the past. China once again dared India but knew very well that it was not the same India of 1962. It was trying its usual technique of messaging and signalling to coerce New Delhi, least realising that India had learnt its lessons well at Doklam. China’s recent provocations on the Line of Actual Control (LAC) have strategic messaging rather than tactical. These are not the usual summer time intrusions and are almost simultaneous. Naku La in North Sikkim, Galwan Valley in Sub-Sector North (SSN) and Pangong Tso (PTSO) in the Middle Sector of Eastern Ladakh.
The scuffles had very little to do with border disputes because both Naku La and Galwan were never disputed by the Chinese earlier. It wanted to send signals to India that it wants negotiations, maybe to get out of the global mess it finds itself in, a leverage against the global pandemic inquiry. China is scared of losing its status as the “global factory.” China has also tried to provoke Nepal by asking it to raise a boundary dispute with India in the Lipulekh and Kalapani sectors. China is using Nepal as a pressure point as part of its coercive strategy.
While the incursion in North Sikkim was resolved using the existing border management protocols, the same failed to resolve the tension in Eastern Ladakh. In fact, China is reported to be strengthening its positions and also some movement has been reported opposite Demchock in Sub-Sector South (SSS). The tactical dimension of these moves revolves around China’s assertive and coercive policies to maintain dominance over adversaries in the areas of conflict.
As part of its War Zone Campaign (WZC) doctrine, China has rapidly developed infrastructure right up to the forward posts, to create military asymmetry to gain advantage over the adversary in a short or localised conflict. However, it objects strongly and reacts with force to India’s attempts to do the same on its side of the LAC. In the current scenario, too, the bone of contention is the newly-constructed Leh-Shyok-DBO Highway, which has not only removed the asymmetry but placed Indian troops at an advantage.
Coupled with this is the activation of a number of Advanced Landing Grounds (ALGs) by the Indian Air Force (IAF). The Chinese sensitivities in the area lie in Aksai Chin and Karakoram Pass, both of which have become easily accessible to Indian troops.
That is the reason the Chinese side is focussing on the Galwan stand-off, painting India as the aggressor. In an article, its official Global Times newspaper accused Indian troops of crossing over into Chinese territory. In typical Chinese style, they predicted India would regret its actions. “The Galwan Valley is not like Doklam because it is in the Aksai Chin region in southern Xinjiang of China, where the Chinese military has an advantage and mature infrastructure. So, if India escalates the friction, the Indian military force could pay a heavy price”, it says.
To understand the Chinese belligerence, one needs to understand the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Unlike the Indian Army, the PLA is not a national army. It is the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with the primary role of ensuring supremacy of the CCP. Unlike a national army dedicated to the defence of a State and its people, the Chinese military’s purpose is to create political power for the party. The PLA is guided by the “political warfare” doctrine of the CCP which includes “Three Warfares” or “3Ws” encompassing, public opinion warfare, psychological warfare and legal warfare.
The first of the “3Ws,” media or public opinion warfare, attempts to shape public opinion both domestically and internationally. If the domestic element sounds odd, it is because the PLA believes that energising or mobilising the Chinese public is useful for signalling resolve and deterring foreign incursions on Chinese interests. The second warfare attempts to influence foreign decision-makers and how they approach China policy. The third seeks to shape the legal context for Chinese actions, including building the legal justification for Beijing’s actions and using domestic laws to signal Chinese intentions. All of these fall under the broader umbrella of political warfare. The party leads and the PLA follows.
It would be of interest to note that both Doklam and the current stand-off were synchronised with the important political meetings of the CCP, which are held periodically to critically examine the efficacy of the Government, Xi Jinping in the instant case.
The military strategy of the PLA is based on the famous concept of “winning without fighting.” Even today CCP believes in the famous quote of Sun Tzu, “To win hundred victories in one hundred battles is not the acme of skill. To subdue the enemy without fighting is the acme of skill.” Coercion remains the basic philosophy for resolving political differences. In military terms it’s called “shi”, calibrated power display with limited forces on the borders in order to seek Sino-centric solutions. China believes in coercing the adversaries to submit to its will or face consequences. Psychological warfare is an important component of Chinese war fighting doctrine. It also believes in creating adverse political pressure through a disturbed neighbourhood. Nepal’s recent hostile attitude and Pakistan are the two examples of the same. Another terminology often used to explain Chinese warfare doctrine is “Unrestricted Warfare.” The ultimate aim of all these is to secure victory over the adversary through aggression and coercion without the need to fight a war. Exaggerated figures of troop deployment, pitching of dummy tents, deployment of heavy machinery, verbal aggression, propaganda, a no holds barred hate campaign, threatening statements through State-controlled media, cyber-attacks, misquoting laws and interpreting them to its own advantage are all the tricks of the trade employed by China.
India understands the Chinese brinkmanship very well. India’s stand till now has been not only politically and militarily correct but aggressive as well. China also understands that its international image is at the lowest in the contemporary era. It would not be able to browbeat India so easily. China is scared that with changed military equations in the sector, India may become aggressive about Aksai Chin like it has done in the case of Gilgit-Baltistan. In geo-strategic terms China today has many vulnerabilities like Taiwan, Hong Kong, Tibet, Xinjiang and the SCS to name a few.
India has strengthened its position not only militarily but strategically as well. Therefore, India needs to stand firm and retain its control over the LAC. The dragon has made a mistake this time by daring the tiger. India’s dominant location in the Indo-Pacific bestows upon it a strategic advantage which it must not lose. The fact remains that both sides need to negotiate an exit strategy and a beleaguered China — if thinking to use this as a bargaining strategy to strengthen the geopolitical image of the CCP at home — may have to concede more than India.
The best way to face the dragon is to tame it. That is exactly what India is doing. The proverbial Chinese dragon is supposed to be peaceful unlike its fire-spitting version.
(The author is a Jammu-based veteran and political commentator)
