It’s ironical that the military is treated as an appendage by those very institutions that ascended to power post-Independence after collaborating with the British

On July 5, 1943, at the Padang (Square), Singapore, Netaji Subhas Chandra Bose, who had just arrived and taken over as the head of the Arzi Hukumat-e-Azad Hind, or the Provisional Government of Free India, and commander-in-chief of the Azad Hind Fauj, formally reviewed his Army. In his address to the troops, he exhorted them: “Give me your blood and I will give you freedom.” He concluded by raising the “Delhi Chalo” slogan. It took over 71 long years for independent India to finally fulfill his pledge and formally bestow on four veterans, representatives of that Fauj, the honour of being escorted in a procession to the ramparts of Delhi’s Red Fort during Republic Day. Undoubtedly, it was a red letter day for the members of the Indian National Army (INA) and recognition of their immense sacrifice to India’s freedom.

That it took the Modi Government the better part of five years to take this initiative is indeed surprising as there is little doubt that the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty and its business empire, the Indian National Congress, would have never allowed such an initiative to go through. That this initiative as well as the premature commencement of celebrations of Mahatma Gandhi’s sesquicentennial birth anniversary were organised on the eve of the forthcoming general election, in which the Prime Minister found his chair threatened by a resurgent Congress, is certainly no coincidence. It is obviously unadulterated politics as it should be, given the fact that both Gandhiji and Netaji were politicians first and statesmen later. What is indeed fascinating is that Modi has been able to skillfully weave two opposing ideologies together — one promoting ahimsa and the other violence — to enhance his own appeal as a nationalist.

Also, by their inclusion in the parade, an event organised by the armed forces, the military hierarchy has finally been forced to recognise and accept the contributions of the Azad Hind Fauj in the independence movement, something that has actively been denied all these years. We must remember that of the 43,000 men and women, who volunteered to join the INA, a vast majority of them were members of the British Indian Army. They were taken prisoners during the fall of Singapore and the retreat from Malaya and Burma. It is not surprising that their shift of allegiance from loyal subjects of the king-emperor to opposing him was considered as an act of treason by our British masters. This thought was drilled into the minds of the 2.5 million Indians, who served in the British Indian Army, Navy and Air Force. 

This perception of the Azad Hind Fauj soldiers being disloyal and untrustworthy as promoted by the British was unquestioningly accepted by former Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and his cabal at the time of Independence. That Nehru saw in Netaji and those who had joined him, a likely obstacle to his own political ambitions and aspirations must certainly have been an important factor in his actions that ensured that the senior hierarchy of the INA was left out in the cold after Independence. Thus those who had served the British loyally found themselves at the helm of the military and it was in their interest to perpetuate this perception subsequently — a view that continues to be accepted by some to this day.

In fact, Modi’s initiative has been criticised by some who believe that this will further politicise the military. Critics suggest that by condoning the “indiscipline” of the INA, a precedent is being set and incidents of mutiny over time can also be justified on similar grounds — a comparison that is wholly ridiculous and illogical given the vast difference in circumstances; unwilling subjects of a colonial power versus armed rebellion against a legally elected Government in a democracy. Interestingly, while they may have fostered this narrative for their own advantage, the British didn’t fall for it as they became increasingly convinced that as the exploits of the INA came to be known, there would be increasing disaffection within the British Indian Army. Documentary evidence suggests that this distrust of the military led to rapid disengagement and departure.

Finally, one cannot help but point out that among a vast number of institutions, forces and constabularies that the British Empire established to keep control over their dominion, it was primarily only the soldiers who willingly took on them by force, despite being aware of the consequences of our fight for independence — be it the Vellore Rebellion, the First War for Independence or the actions of the Azad Hind Fauj. Ironically, it is the military which finds itself disempowered and treated as an appendage by those very institutions that ascended to power after Independence by having collaborated with the British.

(The writer is a military veteran, a consultant with the Observer Research Foundation and Visiting Senior Fellow with The Peninsula Foundation, Chennai)