As India prepares to become a major power, it needs to take a comprehensive look at the Indo-Pacific, where it is balancing two trilaterals — Russia-India-China and US-Japan-India — that have opposing principles, aims and interests, writes NIDHI PRASAD
The linking of the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean in the great powers’ strategic calculations has affected the way countries think about their geopolitical locations and interests. China is re-drawing its maps with its Maritime Silk Road initiatives. The US is strengthening its alliance to help ‘pivot’ to the Pacific (now called the re-balance). And Japan is investing politically by actively contributing to security affairs.
While delivering the Fullerton lecture at the International Institute for Strategic Studies on ‘India, the United States and China’, Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar said, “India looks to transforming itself from a balancing power to a leading power”. This narrative of continuity and change in the Indo-Pacific calls for innovative leadership and tactful diplomacy. Of all the countries in this grand strategic pursuit, India is yet to publically declare its own.
India will face its biggest diplomatic challenge in balancing its interests between the Russia-India-China trilateral and the US-Japan-India trilateral. The Russia-China-India trilateral attends to Eurasian integration while the US-Japan-India trilateral attends to managing security and sustaining peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s participation in both serves its respective continental and maritime interests. But India can no longer segregate its national interests and diplomatic engagements.
The Russia-India-China trilateral supports the norms and values articulated by the UN but during the trilateral summit in February, the members agreed to abide by the ‘Chinese values’ of security. These values were discussed by Beijing at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia summit, where China promoted the platform for a ‘new Asian security concept for new progress in security cooperation’. Apart from setting up the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and Silk Road initiatives, China hopes to build a regional architecture in Asia based on new principles of security.
The US-Japan-India trilateral is expected to be upgraded soon, to include visits by Foreign Ministers. The trilateral consists of democratic countries who share the same values of transparency, openness, and accountability in international relations. They re-affirm principles of freedom of navigation, and rule of law. They also agree on issues relating to managing the global commons: Counter-terrorism, cyber security, maritime piracy, and opposition to weapons of mass destruction proliferation.
India enjoys strategic and strong relations with the US and Japan. None of them share any disputed boundaries. India’s Act East policy, Japan’s Proactive Contribution to Peace and the US’s re-balance underline the goals of the trilateral.
It is in the same Indo-Pacific region, where India subscribes to a new international order with other emerging powers (China, Russia and Southeast Asian nations) that it has also been shaking hands and heads with status quo powers (the US and Japan), defending against maritime aggression and freedom of navigation. And this is where India’s interests in the maritime and continental domains, the Eurasian and Pacific spheres meet head-on.
During the Cold War, India successfully navigated the ideological rivalry between the US and the erstwhile Soviet Union and even helped assimilate the third block (non-aligned movement). But this time, if India wants to capitalise on its major power status, then, in Mr Jaishankar’s words, it must move from reacting to shaping and driving international relations.
These challenges have already come knocking on India’s doors. Beijing’s willingness to include India (along with Pakistan) as full members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation can help India integrate into Central Asia and the Eurasian heartland. But the growing Sino-Pakistan nexus is detrimental to Indian interests. The docking of a Chinese submarine in Karachi, undetected by India, worried the strategic community. Pakistan, because of its proximity to Afghanistan and Central Asia, is an important player in the geopolitical interests of both the US and China.
Beijing’s call to include India in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation is a gesture of deepening synergy. The Asian Society Policy Institute, a US think tank, and the Confederation of Indian Industries have set up a task force to realise Indian membership in Apec. Additionally, India and the US have renewed their defence framework agreement for another 10 years. While India looks to purchase US-2 amphibious aircrafts from Japan, the US is keen on helping India build its new aircraft carrier.
There is no mutual exclusivity between these trilateral groupings yet, but there is an exclusive understanding of leadership, and the organisation of the global order. India’s claims to major power status, begs the question if it is now time to take a concerted look at the Indo-Pacific, before becoming a blip in China’s machinations or a pawn in the US’ counter-balancing strategy towards China.
(The writer is a contributing analyst at the Asia Pacific desk at Wikistrat)
