In the 2014 Parliamentary elections, the country, once again, did not witness any serious debate on the foreign policy front. As the new Government assumes office, it should explore modes of foreign policy preparations

In the run-up to Indian elections, political parties release their election manifestos which rarely generate more than a passive curiosity. Admittedly, at times, some issues or agenda generate discussions but largely manifestoes are considered merely a ritual; promises made are rarely or at best partially kept.

In the 2014 Parliamentary elections, the country, once again, did not witness any serious debate on the foreign policy front. The only exception seemed to be the debate on the nuclear doctrine of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

The section of the manifesto on “Independent Strategic Nuclear Programme” pledged:

“BJP believes that the strategic gains acquired by India during the Atal Bihari Vajpayee regime on the nuclear programme have been frittered away by the Congress. Our emphasis was, and remains on, beginning of a new thrust on framing policies that would serve India’s national interest in the 21st century. We will follow a two-pronged independent nuclear programme, unencumbered by foreign pressure and influence, for civilian and military purposes, especially as nuclear power is a major contributor to India’s energy sector.

BJP will:

• Study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine, and revise and update it, to make it relevant to challenges of current times.
• Maintain a credible minimum deterrent that is in tune with changing geostatic realities...”

While this section generated some debate, interestingly, some of the ideas or perceived changes were not even mentioned in the manifesto, even though these ideas were echoing in discussions in the Indian strategic community. The ‘No First Use’ (NFU) was one such issue. When the BJP desired to revise the doctrine in its manifesto, it was immediately believed that its primary target was the ‘No First Use’ (NFU).

Quite significantly, the initial reaction came from some of the central office bearers of the BJP. later, both the party President, Rajnath Singh, and the Prime Minister designate, Narendra Modi, denied that the party had any design to change the ‘No First Use’. Now, the country has a BJP Government. The nation and the world will look forward to the new Government, with a convincing majority, to know whether the promises made in the 2014 manifesto on nuclear doctrine will be like any other campaign promises, not to be kept, or the new Government will be truly serious and make changes as promised.

The BJP Government must implement this section of its manifesto. The section — Independent Strategic Nuclear Programme — is quite balanced and it does not ask the Government to take any aggressive posture to disturb the global or Asian nuclear order. It is merely promising to adjust the doctrine to the current or changing geo-strategic and security reality. The very idea of the development of the nuclear weapons programme was to ensure and assure security to India and its citizens. The nuclear doctrine was an integral component of India’s security policy.

Some status quo elements (read serving or retired officials) who were possibly involved in the drafting of the January 2003 release of the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on operationalisation of India’s nuclear doctrine may mislead the new Government not to change or revise the doctrine because it was drafted in the Vajpayee era. This is a weird argument. The January 2003 release is the first basic official public pronouncement on the Indian nuclear doctrine. The subsequent statements and pronouncements are based on this fundamental document.

This very document is titled ‘CABINET COMMITTEE ON SECURITY REVIEWS PROGRESS IN OPERATIONAlIZING INDIA’S NUClEAR DOCTRINE’. It mentions review of operationalisation of nuclear doctrine thrice in the text. Clearly it meant that the Vajpayee Government did not have problem whatsoever in reviewing the doctrine and the public document establishes that it was reviewed at least once or possible more than once after the 1998 nuclear tests. The Modi Government will not do anything wrong by reviewing it after more than a decade.

Some argue that the BJP manifesto wants to ‘revise’ and ‘update’ without reviewing the doctrine. This observation is factually incorrect. The same line that mentions the terms: ‘revise’ and ‘update’ does mention ‘study in detail India’s nuclear doctrine’. For all practical purposes, studying a document properly is no less significant than reviewing a document. What is important is that the Government should not act in haste in pronouncing the revision or updating it.

The new Government should take its own time to study or review the doctrine. Unfortunately, the quick pronouncement by some BJP office bearers has already done the damage. It forced the party President and the incumbent Prime Minister to close the option on No First Use. The debate triggered after the release of the manifesto is already helping in its review or study. The BJP could have taken a more nuanced position on No First Use posture to safeguard India’s security interests. Now, as the Government, the task is not completely impossible, but certainly, more challenging.

The BJP Government needs to refine and revise some ugly conceptual terms used in the 2003 India’s nuclear doctrine. The phrases — ‘First Use’ and ‘First Strike’ — have specific meanings in strategic studies. The ‘First Use’ refers to operational or tactical use and the ‘First Strike’ refers to use of strategic weapons. The way it has been used in the 2003 doctrine conveys complete lack of conceptual understanding. The related sections need to be rewritten. It has nothing to do with the Vajpayee Government or his strategic cultural heritage. Currently, three terms or phrases — nuclear safety, nuclear security and nuclear safeguards are being used. Safety refers to prevention from accident, security from sabotage and safeguards from diversion from peaceful to military purposes. The loose use is always annoying. 

During the debate or even before, there was a consensus in the Indian strategic community and the Indian Government, that the Indian nuclear weapon programme should not be aggressive. Therefore, the Indian nuclear doctrine should not appear aggressive. However, the people responsible for the release unnecessarily burdened it with American garbage. The American doctrine links the use of nuclear weapons with the use of chemical and biological weapons.

The 2003 release unnecessarily made the ‘no first use’ and ‘no use against non-nuclear weapons countries’ conditional and lost all the advantages. The linkage has no strategic or security value addition. If the idea is to target terrorists, it certainly needs better and different formulation. The promised revision of the doctrine may have a new formulation for Weapons of Mass Destruction terrorism or countries sponsoring such terrorism. Besides, the new revised doctrine may remove clutters such as nuclear disarmament and export controls. These are not relevant for a nuclear doctrine.

When the BJP Government revises the nuclear doctrine, the most important lesson it must learn is from the experience of the Vajpayee Government that the nuclear programme or nuclear doctrine is not a partisan phenomenon. The Vajpayee Government worked hard to make it non-partisan. In this regard, on May 27, 1998, it laid down a paper — ‘Evolution of India’s Nuclear Policy’. The paper acknowledged the contribution made by the previous Governments. In fact, this approach sustained the Indian nuclear programme, policy and doctrine even when the BJP was out of power, and more significantly, later even the left parties supported the need for conducting a nuclear test if it is required.

Together the political class may convey a strong message to its adversaries that it is united when it comes to addressing national security. The consensual or broad-based approach serves national interest better. A detailed and updated nuclear doctrine, possibly in the national security strategy paper, may gesture the arrival of a new India prepared to assert its position in the 21st century Asia.

The writer is a Senior Research Associate at IDSA where he specialises in nuclear issues and strategic matters