Israel’s security cooperation with Egypt has strengthened in the past two years, and a mutual dissatifaction with US policy has brought it on the same page as Saudi Arabia. Will the Jewish nation’s ties with its neighbours finally blossom in the Arab SpringIJ
In his address to the Winter Session of the Knesset earlier this month, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made an important comment that has gone largely unnoticed. He said: “For the first time since the establishment of the State of Israel, a growing understanding is taking root in the Arab world, and it is not always said softly. This understanding, that Israel is not the enemy of Arabs and that we have a united front on many issues, might advance new possibilities in our region.” The statements were made in reference to the tremendous upheaval that the region has witnessed since 2011 and placed against the background narrative of radical Islam gaining ground in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Prime Minister Netanyahu now believes that this narrative is flawed; that radical Islam’s assumption of power is “neither inevitable or nor irreversible”, as the common man doesn’t support the extremists.
While only time will tell if Mr Netanyahu’s assessments (which many believe to be a tad bit too optimistic) are correct, and more importantly if Israel will be able to leverage these shifts in regional power equations to push for a less-hostile neighbourhood, there is, however, some reason to hope for the better. We see this primarily in Israel’s relations with Egypt and to a lesser extent with Saudi Arabia.
In the case of Egypt, Israel’s peace with the world’s largest Arab nation has held strong despite the tumultuous changes that have taken place in that country since 2011. In fact, when the autocratic but relatively secular regime of President Hosni Mubarak was ousted, there were concerns that the Egypt-Israel peace treaty that has been the anchor for regional stability for four decades now, would fall apart. These concerns gained strength especially after the Muslim Brotherhood, which barely recognises Israel’s right to exist, was voted to power last year and Mr Mohammed Morsi became President. And his removal from office earlier this year did little to assuage those fears.
Yet, despite all of this, the treaty has not fallen apart — as many had feared. Instead, it has paved the way for unprecedented military and strategic cooperation between Israel and Egypt in the past two years. As Ehud Yaari at the Washington Institute notes, “Israeli and Egyptian officers hold almost daily meetings and have established an efficient system of communications. This cooperation stems from a mutual interest in curbing the terrorist factions that have emerged in Sinai over the past decade, threatening both the Israeli border and the Egyptian control over the peninsula.”
A good example of this kind of cooperation, and the mutual trust that it quietly engenders, lies in the fact that earlier this year when Egypt wanted to temporarily deploy its troops in areas of eastern Sinai where they are generally not allowed, Israel agreed. This was an especially big deal because the sanctioned deployment was in excess of what the peace treaty provides for.
Zack Gold, who studies Israeli-Egyptian security cooperation in the Sinai Peninsula, has also observed that “Jihadi action over the past two years has purposefully attempted to embarrass the Egyptian military, expose Israeli-Egyptian cooperation, and draw Israel into a cross-border response.” In an attempt to inject bad blood between Egyptian and Israeli troops, terrorists in fact raided Israeli targets wearing Egyptian uniforms.
Yet, in spite of these many challenges, the treaty has proved to be resilient much like it had during previous times of turbulence — such as the two Palestinian Intifadas, the two lebanon wars and rounds of fighting Israel-Hamas fighting in the Gaza strip. While the treaty may have failed to forge greater socio-economic cooperation between the two countries of the kind that had been envisaged at the end of the Yom Kippur war, the last war waged by an Arab nation against Israel, its strategic benefits cannot be overstated. Not only has it fostered a ‘cold peace’ between the two nations, protecting lives and territory, it has also now seemingly encouraged Israeli-Egypt cooperation on the global platform.
For instance, after the Egyptian military ousted President Morsi from office, Israel lobbied hard with Washington, DC, to not label it a coup — even though that was exactly what it was. Terming it as such would have immediately ended the flow of all American aid to Egypt and upset the generals in Cairo. Of course, the Obama Administration has since then still partially suspended its hefty aid package to Egypt, its biggest Arab ally, at a time of widespread instability in the Maghreb and Mashreq, and no doubt the decision has come under intense scrutiny from several quarters.
Some experts, such as Princeton scholar Sharanbir Grewal, believe that it was the Obama Administration’s “smartest possible option”. Writing for a Washington Post blog, he notes that by halting cash assistance and delivery of large-scale military systems such as F-16 fighter jets, Apache helicopters, M1A1 tanks, and Harpoon missiles, while leaving support for counter-terrorism programmes and economic assistance untouched, Washington, DC, has demonstrated “resourcefulness in maximizing what little leverage it has over Egypt.” He argues that the US has hit the generals where it hurts them the most (the boys in Cairo love their big, shiny, toys) while causing almost no damage to American national interests.
But most policy-makers and security analysts do not share his optimism. While some have criticised the Obama Administration for cutting too much aid that will only lead to further erosion of Washington’s leverage in Cairo, others believe that it has cut too little and, therefore, exposed itself as a toothless tiger desperate for Egyptian support to maintain its influence in the Arab world. And then are others who believe that the partial cut sends out yet another muddled message of the kind that has come to characterise the Obama Administration’s Arab Spring policy. Ultimately, though the strongest criticism of America’s decision to cut aid to Egypt has come from what many would consider to be an unlikely quarter: The State of Israel.
Irrespective of the merits of the debate on US aid to Egypt, the point to be noted here is that it was yet another instance of diverging Israeli and American interests in the region. Washington’s decision to cut aid to Egypt came around the same time it chose to respond positively to Iranian President Hasan Rouhani’s peace overtures. This has sent alarm bells ringing in Jerusalem, where Prime Minister Netanyahu has warned against his counterpart in Tehran being a wolf in sheep’s clothing, and also in Riyadh where the royals have made clear that the US is violating the terms of their protection racket by warming up to Tehran. Clearly, mutual dissatisfaction over US foreign policy has brought Israel and Saudi Arabia closer than ever before. It is, of course, still unclear if Israel in the near future will be able to have peaceful ties with its Arab neighbours but a sliver of hope seems to be emerging.