It didn't require rocket science to realise that the resounding verdict in Karnataka against the BJP had everything to do with the quality of administration, the venality of those associated with the party and the vengeful conduct of those who felt that they had been unjustly treated by a cabal that drew its power from Delhi. In short, it was a protest against bad governance and worse politics.
What I found strange throughout last Wednesday — or, at least until the afternoon when the Supreme Court judges prevented the Congress from celebrating its re-conquest of Karnataka — was that the BJP leadership seemed completely dismissive of the larger political message from its erstwhile southern bastion. Thus, a great deal of importance was attached to the fact that at least one-third of the vote share of the BJP was taken away by BS Yeddyurappa's KJP — something which gave the Congress a natural advantage.
Equally, many of the party's spokesmen (both official and self-appointed) made great play of the party's resolute commitment to principles. Projecting themselves as martyrs, they painted themselves as hapless victims of the battle to cleanse the party from within.
Both arguments need to be rubbished. First, even assuming that every vote for both the KJP and the BSR Congress (the outfit floated by the bent and beautiful of Bellary district) had gone in favour of a united BJP, the Congress would still have squeaked through, albeit not so conclusively. The fact, after all, remains that the Congress outpolled the combined votes of the BJP, KJP and BSR Congress by a whopping six per cent.
Stressing the clear advantage the Congress enjoyed in popular votes is important, if only to demolish the myth that the BJP's defeat was mainly on account of arithmetic. Unfortunately, arithmetic is preceded by politics and the fact that the BJP suffered a double-digit truncation in its vote share suggests that the party had lost the match even before the first ball had been bowled. It approached the election fully mindful that victory was out of the question and that the task before it was to salvage an iota of self-respect.
I doubt if even that modest objective was sanctioned by the results. From being the majority party, the BJP had to be satisfied with being joint runners-up with HD Deve Gowda's Janata Dal (S). And, while Yeddyurappa failed to win more than six seats, he successfully ensured the BJP's defeat in some 36 seats. The needless feud that resulted in Yeddyurappa walking out of the party he had helped build, resulted in the Mutually Assured Destruction of both the BJP and the KJP.
The BJP has often boasted that those who have left the party have never prospered. They point to Kalyan Singh, Uma Bharati, Keshubhai Patel and sundry other odd-balls. (Predictably, they don't mention Babulal Marandi whose party may well emerge as the single-largest party in Jharkhand in the not-too-distant future.) It is entirely possible that Yeddyurappa will be added to the list. But the point isn't so much whether or not the KJP has a long-term future or not. The larger question the BJP has to confront is why mass leaders of the stature of Kalyan Singh and Yeddyurappa were forced to seek their fortune outside the so-called ‘parivar'.
The thoughtless explanation is that local rivalries are to blame. Therefore, Kalyan Singh's departure after the party's poor showing in the 1999 lok Sabha polls and his removal as Chief Minister is attributed to the combined assault of the RSS and the Brahmin-Thakur lobby led by Rajnath Singh. likewise, Yeddyurappa's exit is attributed to the unrelenting hostility of the Bellary brothers who entered into an unlikely alliance with Ananth Kumar. A section of the RSS also encouraged this rift.
On the face of it, both theories are correct. Yet there is a significant omission: Neither Kalyan Singh nor Yeddyurappa would have felt it necessary to actually jump ship had they not felt totally scorned. Their sense of desperation stemmed from the realisation that their local opponents had the unqualified backing of tall central leaders against whom they could not win.
The hostility to Kalyan Singh enjoyed the complete patronage of Atal Bihari Vajpayee who was then Prime Minister and who never concealed his Brahmanical disdain for the outspoken lodh from Aligarh. Yeddyurappa was not merely contesting Ananth Kumar and the Bellary moneybags, he was ranged against the powerful might of lK Advani and Sushma Swaraj. Would the Reddy brothers have stood a chance had they not received enthusiastic backing from DelhiIJ
It was the same in Jharkhand. Babulal Marandi was fully capable of coping with Arjun Munda and even having an uneasy co- existence, but he made up his decision to leave the BJP the day Rajnath Singh was appointed the national president in 2006. He just knew — just as Kalyan and Yeddyurappa knew — that he couldn't fight the High Command culture of the BJP.
At one time, it even seemed that the very same set of circumstances would drive Vasundhara Raje into forming a regional party. And, if Narendra Modi's ability to use the system to his advantage had been even marginally less pronounced, he too would have been heading a regional party by now.
That, in a nutshell, is what the story of the BJP's Karnataka debacle was all about. Advani wasn't fighting a battle of principles in wanting to edge Yeddyurappa out: He was a co-participant in a factional battle. The BJP's decimation in Karnataka is a triumph of his brand of vanity, just as the party's relegation to number three in Uttar Pradesh was a victory of Vajpayee's upper caste conceit.
What the Karnataka results suggest is not merely that people expect decency and integrity in public life. Far more important are the lessons to the High Command brand of politics. Unless political parties move fast, the cliques in Delhi will prevent the emergence of authentic, responsible grassroots democracy. Must the BJP emulate the Congress so blindly and so slavishlyIJ
