With traditional parties in decline and new alliances emerging, this election may spring surprises. The outcome will determine Sri Lanka’s capacity to address its urgent challenges
Sri Lanka faces a pivotal moment in its political history as it prepares for the presidential election this Saturday, 21 September. This election, the ninth for the executive presidency, unfolds amid severe political polarisation, sharply contrasting with the last election in November 2019. The decline of traditional political parties and the rise of various political alliances are prominent features of this election, with three main candidates competing in a manner distinct from the two-horse races of previous presidential contests. The fragmentation of political parties, the absence of anti-defection laws, and the formation of new alliances driven more by personal interests than by cohesive agendas pose significant risks to democratic stability and governance.The 2019 presidential race featured two main candidates and a notable but relatively minor third-party candidate. It saw a record voter registration of 15,992,096 and a turnout of 83.72% (13,387,951), surpassing previous highs of 81.52% in 2015 and 81.06% in 1982. Despite this high turnout, 135,452 votes were invalid, leaving 13,252,499 votes as valid. Gotabaya Rajapaksa of the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna won with 52.25% of the valid votes (6,924,255), while his main opponent, Sajith Premadasa of the National Democratic Front, received 41.99% (5,564,239). Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the National People’s Power secured a mere 3.16% (418,553 votes). In the subsequent general election on 5 August 2020, Premadasa and Dissanayake faced off again for parliamentary seats. Premadasa won 305,744 votes, while Dissanayake received 49,814 votes.
In the 2015 parliamentary elections, Premadasa garnered 112,645 votes from Hambantota, whereas Dissanayake, contesting from Colombo, secured 65,966 votes.Ranil Wickremesinghe, one of main three main contenders, in this year’s race but absent from the 2019 presidential election, leads the United National Party. His party received 249,435 votes (2.25%) in the general elections, including 30,875 from Colombo and 28,282 from Gampaha. Although his party did not win a parliamentary seat, Wickremesinghe was appointed to a national list position. Amid severe social upheaval caused by economic mismanagement, which resulted in the resignation of both the President and Prime Minister, Wickremesinghe, a seasoned politician and six-time Prime Minister, capitalised on the moment to make his comeback. After Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa was forced to resign, Wickremesinghe was appointed as Prime Minister.
However, protests demanding the resignation of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa led to his dramatic escape, first to Trincomalee by navy ship, then back to Colombo by air force chopper, and finally to the Maldives by air force cargo flight. Rajapaksa officially resigned on 14 July 2022. Subsequently, Prime Minister Wickremesinghe was appointed as President by the constitutional process.Wickremesinghe’s appointment highlights the complexities of Sri Lanka’s political system.
According to the constitution, the President must appoint a Prime Minister who commands the majority’s confidence in Parliament, illustrating the considerable unchecked powers inherent in the executive role. Rajapaksa’s assumption that Wickremesinghe, who came to Parliament through the national list, was the candidate who earned the majority’s confidence reflects the intricate dynamics of Sri Lankan politics. However, Wickremesinghe has effectively stabilised the situation after the social upheaval. In this context, Wickremesinghe has emerged as a major candidate, yet the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna has nominated its candidate, Namal Rajapaksa.
Reports suggest that Rajapaksa’s ambitions to secure the prime ministership were opposed, leading a faction of his party to break away from Wickremesinghe. Rajapaksa’s candidacy appears more focused on maintaining his family’s political lineage rather than presenting a genuine bid for leadership. Nonetheless, his endorsement of supporting Sajith Premadasa, where he appeals to supporters to cast their second vote for Premadasa, could be a decisive factor in the election outcome.Meanwhile, the NPP, initially opposed to the public uprising that led to Rajapaksa’s removal, has become a significant political entity.
Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who ironically led his political party into alliances with traditional parties to secure ministerial positions over the past few decades, has skilfully capitalised on widespread dissatisfaction with corruption and the growing anger towards conventional politicians to bolster his standing. His alliance’s emotionally charged propaganda has infiltrated every corner of society, despite its lack of deep ideological substance.The Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), his original party, has skilfully harnessed this discontent to challenge the status quo.
However, Dissanayake’s path to victory remains uncertain, especially with three major candidates in the race. Voter statistics reveal additional obstacles: with 17.1 million registered voters and an anticipated 80% turnout (13.7 million), a candidate would need approximately 7 million votes to secure the presidency in the first count.
The NPP’s past performance shows limited success, receiving 418,553 votes (3.16%) in 2019 and 445,950 votes (3.84%) in parliamentary elections in 2020. The party faces challenges in Tamil-majority districts like Nuwara-Eliya, Jaffna, Wanni, Batticaloa, and Trincomalee, and in areas with lower voter counts, such as Polonnaruwa and Matale. To succeed, the NPP must secure substantial votes from Colombo, Gampaha, Kalutara, Kandy, and Kurunegala, requiring an estimated 700,000 to 800,000 additional votes.
Given these dynamics and the competition among three candidates, the NPP or JVP may struggle to achieve significant success in this election. However, the election remains crucial in determining the country’s social and governance structure.
Conversely, Sajith Premadasa appears to have significant potential to garner a majority of the votes, while Wickremesinghe has also gained substantial ground. Therefore, it is unlikely that any candidate will secure over 50% of the vote in the first round of counting, which may necessitate counting the second votes.
This uncertainty could trigger a new wave of political instability if major alliances and key candidates fail to manage the results effectively and refuse to accept the people’s verdict.Despite flashy manifestos and hefty campaign budgets, none of the candidates have provided a clear plan to tackle the staggering $100 billion national debt. They all parrot the same old IMF rhetoric, yet almost none offer a concrete strategy beyond this worn-out solution.
The situation in the island nation is dire, and there’s no straightforward path for the incoming leader to steer the country out of its deepening crisis. As of 1 July 2024, about 24.8% of Sri Lanka’s population lives in poverty, with rates varying dramatically between districts—3.5% in Colombo versus 44.2% in Nuwara-Eliya.
Poverty in rural areas has surged from 15% to 32%, while urban poverty has tripled from 6% to 18%. A recent survey revealed that 31% of the population is impoverished, with 33% skipping meals and 47% cutting back on meal sizes. Malnutrition affects nearly one-third of children under five, and over 40% of women aged 18-60 are overweight or obese, reflecting severe economic and health issues.
Regardless of the election's outcome, Sri Lanka's entrenched political divisions threaten to entrench a fragmented legislative body, where effective governance and decisive action may become increasingly elusive.
Such divisions risk entrenching a cycle of delays and inefficiencies, potentially leading to a state of perpetual gridlock that hampers national progress. Antonio Gramsci’s notion of passive revolution becomes pertinent here, warning of significant changes that merely preserve existing power structures. Hannah Arendt’s insight that “The most radical revolutionary will become a conservative the day after the revolution” cautions against decisions driven by emotion over reason.
Thus, the question looms: can this election transcend emotional politics to instigate genuine reform, or will it simply entrench the status quo? Regrettably, the candidates' manifestos seem to hint at the latter.
(The writer is a journalist and author. Views expressed are personal)
