Saudi Arabia and Pakistan have a strong bond based on expediency; Pakistan needs Saudi money and the Sheikhdoms its military to defend them
Former Saudi spy chief, Prince Turki bin Faisal, described the Saudi-Pak relationship as, “one of the closest relationships in the world between any two countries without any official treaty”. But there is a transactional quid pro quo cementing the self-assumed and postured guardianship of the two holiest mosques, as romantically claimed by Pakistan i.e., Islamabad desperately needs financial support, and Riyadh has always needed somebody to defend the oil-rich state. This desperation for each other’s ability to address the other's specific concerns has led to a mutually gratifying equation that can be packaged under the cover of ‘Ummah’ reciprocities.
Pakistanis readily trained and even flew sorties to thwart Yemini aggression on Saudi Arabia in the late 60s, posted over 15,000 soldiers in the 80s and even during the Gulf War. They jointly created the Afghan mujaheddin. Today the former Pakistani Army Chief, Raheel Sharif, leads the Riyadh-based multination military alliance under the aegis of the Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition (IMCTC). However, it is the Saudi-funded and Pakistan-developed ‘Islamic Bomb’ project that personifies the trust and efficacy of strategic security afforded by the Pakistanis that ensures the regular Saudi doles to sustain Islamabad’s faltering economy.
Irrespective of the deep divides within all Pakistani political parties (even counting other institutions like the Pakistani Military or even the clergy) within Pakistan, relations with Saudi Arabia remain robust. Pew Research Centre survey records the most favourable perception (9 out of 10) of the Saudis, amongst Pakistanis. The life-sustaining financial doles from Saudi have assumed even more significance, as the freefall of Pakistan seems imminent, otherwise.
In the uniquely Pakistani narrative of the extra-constitutional mandate assumed by the Pakistani ‘establishment’ (read, Military), the Pakistani Chief, General Asim Munir held a four-hour meeting with Pakistani businessmen! Confirming the worst-kept secret of the Pakistani Military to be a ‘State within a State’, the Army Chief shared details about assurances given to him by the Saudi Arabian Prince, Mohammad Bin Salman (MBS), regarding investments up to $25 billion via Special Investment Facilitation Council (SIFC). The surreal details shared by the Pakistani Chief included a specific request to set aside $10 billion to tide over the depleted foreign exchange issues – and similarly so, with his meetings with United Arab Emirate rulers. As if on cue, he assured the audience of such largesse from other Sheikhdoms like Qatar and Kuwait, additionally. Whether it was optimistic grandstanding or even genuinely confirmed investments towards the beleaguered Pakistanis, one thing is clear the only worthwhile thing that the Pakistani Army Chief can offer to these Sheikhdoms in exchange, is even more enhanced security imperatives and guarantees.
Beyond a point, no amount of arms purchased by these Sheikhdoms can replace boots on the ground. The ragtag Yemeni Houthi militias had made a mockery of the multi-billion dollar worth of the supposedly impregnable THAAD and Patriots systems, with their relatively crude drones and rockets. Taking on the likes of Houthis or other groups inimical to these Sheikhdoms requires physical troops in battleground – who are better than the financially desperate Pakistanis?
To put numbers in perspective, the annual defence budget (for 2023) of Saudi Arabia and UAE is approximately $70 billion and $15 billion, respectively (which for India is about $69 billion). For these cash-flush Sheikhdoms to reallocate financial ‘support’ towards Pakistan in return for security guarantees, does not seem implausible, or even impractical. Given that the latest threat perceptions of the Sheikhdoms do not necessarily come from Israel anymore or even from the traditional sectarian rival and sanction-hit Iran, but instead come from societal dissonances within e.g., ‘Arab Spring’, or from armed militias like Houthis, ISIL, Hezbollah etc., all of which require conventional soldering responses on-ground. Such a quid pro quo will need the Pakistanis to overcome the hesitation of committing themselves to some sectarian issues e.g., they had earlier refused to commit troops to aid Saudis against Yemeni Houthis in 2015, fearing backlash in their backyard, given that 25% of Pakistanis, are Shias. The luxury of selectively picking the battles in which they would want to partake may not continue, going forward. On their part, the Pakistanis know that the Chinese investments have been realistically maximised and banked. Equally, the IMF conditionalities are so stringent and unpopular, that accepting their terms invariably makes the government even more unpopular.
So, the Sheikhdoms are the only money lenders left and the Pakistani Army Chief is the only viable ‘businessman’ in Pakistan who does have something of value to offer i.e., security wherewithal.
All other platitudes of Arab capitals buying Pakistani cotton, machines, or basic food items in exchange for money lent or repayment in ‘rupees’, are pure diplomatese. Sheikhdom money is the only money that comes without strings attached and everyone from General Asim Munir, the Sheikhdoms, and even Washington DC, knows that. This arrangement will enable Islamabad to posit its religious diplomacy and duty confidently, yet potentially tide over its financial mess.
(The writer, a military veteran, is a former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry. The views expressed are personal)
