It would neither be logical nor feasible to reunite India and Pakistan. Unlike the two Germanies, the very idea is fraught with unspeakable dangers
Some recent writings have spoken of the desirability of merging Pakistan with our country. That, in their opinion, is to save our neighbour from disaster. Howsoever noble sounding this might be, its implementation would be fraught with national suicide. While ardently pursuing his advocacy for a separate state for the subcontinent’s Muslims, Pakistan’s founder Qaid-e-Azam Jinnah had categorically declared at Lahore that “the two communities (meaning Hindus and Muslims) cannot coexist in one country”. He had gone on to back up his demand with an appeal for an exchange of populations. Such an exercise had been done in 1923 by the League of Nations (predecessor of the UNO) wherein Muslims in Greece crossed over to Turkey, whose Christians shifted to Greece in an organized manner.
As it happened, only a few Muslims crossed over to Pakistan, whereas almost all the Hindus were chased out of there; the remaining being ethnically cleansed. Nevertheless, in the light of history, Partition proved to be a blessing because India’s population remained in balance. To upset that balance would be to commit national suicide. In any case, the people of Pakistan have grown up under three successive constitutions, all of which confer sovereignty to Allah the Merciful.
One particular newspaper article published recently was emphatic in its comparison with the reunification of Germany at the end of the Cold War. Such comparisons are not only misplaced but are grossly misleading as well. For one, all Germans are the same people; virtually all of them Christian, who were torn apart by the Cold War between the West and the Soviet Union. Not a single German had demanded this partition on the morrow of WWII. Uncannily, Marshall Josef Stalin, the Soviet dictator, might have accepted a united Germany provided the whole of Deutschland would have come under the Soviet roof. Stalin indeed did cherish this rope; had President Roosevelt lived longer, and not been replaced by Harry Truman, who cherished no illusions about Stalin being a reasonable partner for peace.
To return to Pakistan, Jinnah had promised the Muslims in 1946, “I assure you that once were free of the clutches of these Hindu Banias, we shall make Pakistan the most prosperous country in the world”. As luck would have it, not long after Partition, the country became a member of the Baghdad Pact (which later became the CENTO) and also SEATO based in Thailand. As an ally of the USA, aid in dollars began to pour in. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, Pakistan became an ‘indispensable ally’.
Naturally, there was no shortage of aid; how much was spent on the military and how much for civil society cannot be known, as probably no accounts would be available today. However, one did get to hear of milk and honey flowing in that country in the closing years of the twentieth century. There were also reports of Pakistan’s per capita GDP overtaking India’s. The American withdrawal from Afghanistan has had a cataclysmic effect on the Pakistani economy because its utility as an ally has petered out.
Jinnah was a brilliant lawyer who not only pleaded effectively but could also persuade an unwilling litigant to take up a cause—in this case, it was that of a separate Muslim homeland. The Muslim-majority provinces like Bengal, Punjab and Sind were happy with their majorities; legislators and ministers, and always had a Muslim premier. So, why Partition?
The Muslims, in the provinces where they were in a minority, needed the warmth of a Muslim state, but could not obtain it, because they were in a thin minority. Jinnah, therefore, brought out the concept of an exchange of population from his bag of arguments. The minority Muslim population in the non-Muslim majority provinces could emigrate to the proposed New Medina. Students of the Aligarh Muslim University were very active in canvassing for a New Medina.
The last Caliphate had been abolished in 1924. Jinnah argued that the Muslims in the subcontinent would be outnumbered by the Hindus. They, i.e., the Muslims were less educated and their elite were mostly landowners, lacking industries or trade and commerce. Jinnah with his eloquence in English (he could not orate in any other language) was able to convince most of them that the challenge before them was “Pakistan or Perish”.
The Qaide-e-Azam was an introvert who did not mix with the masses. His social circle was the Parsi and Gujarati elite, mostly from Bombay, a city that the Qaid loved dearly. He was barely familiar with Islamic theology. His father’s name was Poonjabhai, grandfather Premjibhai and great-grandfather Meghjibhai Thakkar. The family was pushed into Islam as the Lohana community—Jinnah’s caste—would not tolerate trading in fish, which Jinnah’s grandfather Premjibhai had to take up.
All in all, Jinnah was a brown Englishman who wore expensive Saville Row suits and loved fraternizing with the English. Street and maidan politics, which were Gandhi’s forte, were not Jinnah’s cup of tea. He accepted the life presidentship of the Muslim League to get even with Gandhi. Partition was a mistake, as unfolding events are proving. All Jinnah was obsessed with was his place in history, no matter what the cost was.
(The writer is a well-known columnist, an author and a former member of the Rajya Sabha. The views expressed are personal)
