The Popular Front of India (PFI), a radicalised Islamist organisation that operated for the last three decades, has been proscribed along with its associate organisations by the Government of India.

The PFI took various forms in carrying out its radical activities before it was slapped with a ban last month. Accused of carrying out violent activities and playing crucial roles in whipping up the anti-CAA and pro-hijab fury, the PFI had been under scanner by law enforcement agencies which arrested hundreds of the PFI members across India.

However, just a week after the ban, writings have emerged on the roads in Dakshin Kannada, claiming the return of the PFI. The ban on the PFI has triggered protest by the members of the outfit and the sympathisers. These coordinated protests raise a couple of pertinent questions: What are the socio-political implications of the ban?, and, Will the ban on the PFI curb religious radicalisation in India? The answers to these questions, to a great extent, lie in the genesis and the activities of the PFI.

Genesis of PFI

An enquiry into the genesis of the PFI takes one to three erstwhile Islamist outfits. They were the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), the Islamic Sevak Sangh (ISS), and the National Democratic Front (NDF).

Several members of the PFI who used to be active members of the SIMI were associated with the ISS. Once the ISS was banned, these members formed the NDF in 1993. Along with aggressively propagating radical Islam, the NDF was also involved in several violent activities such as the infamous Marad massacres in January 2002 and May 2003. With the SIMI being proscribed in 2001 and the NDF defamed because of its violent activities, the NDF members planned to form a new organisation to avoid surveillance and a likely ban by the State. Accordingly, before the PFI was banned, the members of the NDF and two other like-minded outfit — the Karnataka Forum for Dignity from Karnataka (KFD) and the Manitha Neethi Pasarai from Tamil Nadu — met twice (January 25-26, 2004 in Bengaluru and November 26-27, 2005 in Hyderabad) under the banner of South India Council to decide on the formation of a new outfit.

Since its formation in 2006, the PFI has been working in association with several organisations in many States of India. They are the Citizens’ Forum in Goa, Nagarik Adhikar Suraksha Samiti in West Bengal, Community Social and Educational Society of Rajasthan, Karnataka Forum of Dignity (KFD) in Karnataka, Liong Social Forum in Manipur, and the Association of Social Justice in Andhra Pradesh.

An important aspect of the PFI and its associate organisations, which often goes overlooked, is its clandestine effort to avoid any Islamic title to the organisations. This camouflage helps the PFI and its associate organisations masquerade as “neo-social organisations” working for the upliftment of the downtrodden and thus preclude surveillance by the law enforcement agencies. It is evident from several front organisations through which the PFI carries out its radical activities. The camouflaged names of these front organisations are: the Social Democratic Party of India (SDPI), Campus Front of India (CFI), National Women’s Front (NWF), Rehab India Foundation (RIF). and the Empower India Foundation (EIF). It is pertinent to mention that the CFI, the student wing of the PFI, played a crucial role in the Hijab row initially in Karnataka and subsequently in some other States of India.

Going by the allegations made by the law enforcement agencies of Kerala and some other States, the violent activities of the PFI include the cutting up of the hand of a teacher in Kerala in 2010, the killing of Hindu organisation members in Karnataka, active role in the anti-CAA and the Delhi riots in 2020 and manufacturing the Hijab fury recently. While a politico-legal action in terms of banning the PFI is needed, it would certainly not suffice in delegitimising the ideology and curbing radicalisation.

What lies ahead?

Drawing from the evolution of the PFI through multiple incarnations in the past, there is no guarantee that it would not incarnate in a new form in the future. Radical groups such as the PFI often function through a victim narrative that helps them easily connect with the limited but vulnerable sections of the Muslim community.

The proscription of SIMI is an important case in point. Several members of the SIMI who were arrested following the ban were acquitted of all charges since the legal system of India did not find merit in the claims of the law enforcement agencies. Their acquittals after a substantial time behind bars were capitalised by the PFI to whip up their supposed indignation. The manipulation of the victim narrative helps them garner support even from the otherwise non-radicalised members of the community.

The well-organised PFI will make every attempt to play the victim and might emerge with a new name and organisational structure. As mentioned earlier, a politico-legal action will have temporary success in terms of putting an immediate check on the activities of the outfit. However, to delegitimise the radical ideology, there is an urgent need for the State to invest at the social level. It is at the social level that most radical and extremist organisations garner their support and sustain. Considering the deep-rooted communal divide in India, the organisations like the PFI will not find it any difficult to mobilise a section of the Muslims to bat for it. Hence, the Central and State governments need to reach out to the Muslim society through well-meaning civil society organisations to win them away from the nefarious objectives of PFI-like organisations. In the absence of investing and working at the social level, legal action of banning an outfit will hardly contribute to curbing radicalisation in India.

(The writer is Associate Professor, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru)