Beijing might resolve to disable Taiwan’s communications and operational systems, making the resistance very low and a war relatively bloodless
Historically, China has clashed with the former Soviet Union and Vietnam, intervened in the Korean War, and waged a full-fledged war with India in 1962 despite adopting the foreign policy ‘principles of peaceful coexistence’. Today, Beijing has increased its strategic footprints worldwide, especially in Africa, through UN Peace Keeping Operations. Its support to the Taliban has been a cause of worry to many liberal states. Additionally, it is involved in disagreements and maritime territorial disputes in the South and East China Sea and boundary disputes with India and Taiwan.
Concerning India, the Galwan valley clashes and border incursions along with President Xi Jinping’s state visits to India strategically communicated its intent to be recognised as an economic and military power. Recent border intrusions in two states simultaneously- Uttrakhand and Arunachal- and negatively commenting on the Indian Vice President’s Arunachal visit raise questions about China’s intent. A refusal to disengage beyond a certain point with India apart from repeatedly stressing its “peaceful reunification” of Taiwan by intruding into the air defence zone reflects its high running aspirations to be recognised as a great power. Further, its opaque debt trap policies pose severe challenges to the liberal world order.
The last few decades have seen China’s financial and military growth which has translated into its aspiration to fulfil its ‘China Dream’ and has ignited its desire for hegemony. Beijing aims to attain a ‘droit de regard” or “special interests” in its neighbouring areas in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean region.
The questions that many ponder are will China use force against India or Taiwan? Is there a military conflict in waiting, a few days or months from now? The answer is most probably yes, but in accordance with China’s suitability and its place of preference. The reason is not related to its insecurity viz-a-viz India or the U.S., but instead from its current perceived ‘rightful place’. China is a classic case of misplaced nationalism. It firmly believes that once it can showcase its power well, it will gain entry into the ‘great power club’. Such an objective aims to achieve appreciation and an increase in the rank of its
social status. The use of force is thus an instrument, the effectiveness of which goes beyond the horizons of financial prosperity, military armaments and security. From a geopolitical perspective, high status brings with itself benefits such as deterrence from other more enormous powers merely by power projection and an acquired ability to influence the decisions of its neighbouring countries. New objectives such as norm-setting constitute the temptations of using force in foreign relations. Thus, a military conflict for social status remains a strong possibility.
During the pandemic, as China faced international isolation, it stopped with a Galwan’ clash’ and kept relatively low on the question of Taiwan. As the world re-opens, those possibilities are narrowing down. Further, owing to its OBOR non-performing debts and its domestic economic crisis, apart from its financial commitments towards militarisation, there are fears that the ‘bubble’ can burst at any point of time. To divert its people’s attention and gain another five years at the helm of the affairs in 2022, Xi might resort to force and deliberately brush aside negotiations and meaningful talks.
From another dimension, how China and Russia perceive the US withdrawal from Afghanistan is also important. Beijing had raised questions about States in South and East Asia placing their trust in America and had belittled its withdrawal in multiple statements. The decline in American commitments in finance and military may lead China to think about the feasibility of using force against its neighbours- India or Taiwan. Of the two, India has the power of responding in military terms and can ensure strong support from its European and American allies. At a strategic level, China might not want to give Russia a choice between India or itself. The Chinese stalemate with aggressive posturing will continue. However, a repeat of ‘Galwan’ and possible brinkmanship in various other Eastern sectors can be resorted to by China in March or April 2022, given the upcoming cold months. PLA soldiers are not physically fit to fight in high altitude zones. A full-fledged war with India might not be its intention, and it would continue to contain India through its hybrid warfare or by using Pakistan against it. Taiwan probably will be an immediate target because of several factors. It has mild winters suitable for PLA soldiers, limited conventional offensive capabilities, and a lack of an institutionalised agreement with the US for security. Further, its non-membership in the UN, leading to its disability to speak for itself in case of open hostilities and limited outreach to the world countries also increases its risk of inviting Chinese aggression. In tactical terms, these limitations of Taiwan make it suitable for the Chinese area of action. To avoid international criticism of its Taiwan hostilities, Beijing might resolve to strike the command, control, communications and intelligence node and possibly disable the operational systems, making the resistance very low and war a relatively bloodless phenomenon leading to a “peaceful reunification”. Such a move will send strategic signals beyond its immediate peripheries.
Moreover, it might also run a risk to hedge upon the world opinion in which no country would like to disrupt the essential supply chains because of the level of financial interdependencies with China. The warning to Germany and other European countries against adopting trade practices detrimental to its interests could also be associated with its posturing challenges. A territory that will be relatively easy to capture and does not escalate into a significant war guides us to the Chinese concept of “local war under high-tech conditions” as outlined by the previous president Jiang Zemin. Thus, given the calculations that Beijing might have, there are considerably fewer chances that the Taiwan takeover might spill over into regional conflicts.
However, given the formalisation of AUKUS as a reinforcing organisation, the element of force might be less, and the spillover will also depend upon the US response. If the US displays its willingness to get involved in hostilities, chances of Chinese hesitation for a full-blown military conflict on multiple borders will increase. That could make India a potential target that will test the US commitments. In case the US does not commit itself, India’s Arunachal Pradesh may be the next target. The Chinese ability to carry out interoperability operations in space and cyber technologies through militarisation of its artificial intelligence apart from conventional and nuclear operations poses a high risk to the democratic countries. Consequently, such conflicts have high tendencies to spiral into major ones and once initiated, it becomes difficult to limit them into a ‘local area’ due to the intensity of the emotions involved.
Taiwan is highlighting its plight on various world forums and simultaneously preparing for a full-scale Chinese invasion through military drills. Nevertheless, it largely remains a fault line in the security of the Indo-Pacific region.
(The writer is an Assistant Professor at Central University of Punjab, Bathinda. The views expressed are personal.)
