Post Pulwama, several prophecies have been made for India to retaliate. But fact is that the Government is faced with a series of weak choices
The suicide bomber attack on Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel in Pulwama that killed 44 soldiers besides wounding others has received sharp condemnation from the Government, the Opposition and the citizens alike. Powers across the world, too, have given full support to India in dealing with Pakistan-sponsored terror. But despite the severity of the attack and growing pressure for action, New Delhi’s choices are much more limited than they appear. The Pulwama terrorist attack is one of the worst in recent years.
The CRPF is the largest of the central paramilitary forces that falls under the Ministry of Home Affairs. It has been carrying out law and order as well as counter-insurgency operations in Jammu & Kashmir and the North-East for several decades. It is generally less well-trained and less well-armed than the Indian Army but is usually used to bolster local police forces around the country in various contingencies, including counter-insurgency duties.
The Government is now under great pressure to avenge Pakistan’s dastardly act. One reason is the scale of the attack and the open claim of responsibility by the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM). Another reason is that the Modi Government claims to be tough on matters related to national security and its supporters expect it to act forcefully. Moreover, the hyped surgical strikes of 2016 has led to expectations that India will act this time more forcefully. Finally, national elections are due to take place in the next few months, which add domestic political pressure on the Government.
On the other hand, India’s options to respond are fairly limited. On the diplomatic side, while we have seen Indian officials speak about isolating Pakistan and some steps may be taken in this direction, they are likely to have little substantive impact considering that the level of diplomatic intercourse with Pakistan is already minimal and no major negotiations are under way.
India can also try to generate diplomatic pressure on Pakistan through its friends in the international community and through multi-lateral forums such as the United Nations but these have so far proved of little value and they are unlikely to bear much fruit. The attack also raises questions about the Modi Government’s Wuhan initiative to smoothen ties with China. Expectantly, Modi’s efforts to mollify China have given some indication that Beijing my be stopped from providing cover to JeM chief Masood Azhar.
Union Finance Minister Arun Jaitley announced the withdrawal of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan. The decision has been taken to isolate our neighbour economically and diplomatically. Every member country of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) is required to accord the MFN status to all other member countries as specified under Article 1 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 1994. The primary objective of WTO is to monitor and resolve trade-related issues among the member nations. However, MFN itself is a misnomer; it actually means non-discrimination among member nations.
Being a WTO member, India accorded Pakistan MFN status in 1996 but Pakistan did not reciprocate with the same status to India. The main items India imports from Pakistan are cement, petroleum products, fresh fruits, finished leather, bulk minerals and ores. Export items include cotton yarn, chemicals, plastics, man-made yarn and dyes to Pakistan. The decision to revoke MFN status will mean that India can increase custom duties on goods imported from Pakistan up to the bound level duty rates. Currently, India’s customs duties on goods to WTO members are below the bound level rates. The current customs duties imposed are called applied rates and the level at which the duties can be increased are known as bound rates. As a result, India on February 15 raised the customs duty to 200 per cent on all goods imported from Pakistan.
In terms of numbers, India imported goods worth $489 million in 2017-18 from Pakistan and exported goods worth $1.92 billion. Meanwhile, total imports from Pakistan increased by 7.70 per cent from $454 million in 2016-17 to $489 million from April to November in 2017-18. Total exports to Pakistan also went up by 5.59 per cent from $1.82 billion in 2016-17 to $1.92 billion in April-November in 2017-18. India accounts for 1.55 per cent of Pakistan’s imports and 2.55 per cent of its exports. The top five items India imported from Pakistan in 2017-18 were mineral fuels and oils, edible fruits, nuts, salt, sulphur, plasting material, lime and cement, fertiliser and ores. Whereas, the top five items exported by India to Pakistan in 2017-18 include cotton, organic materials, plastic, dyes and pharmaceutical products. Since bilateral trade between India and Pakistan is low, many experts believe that MFN makes no difference to both.
India’s military options are equally constrained. If past crises are any indication, it is unlikely that any well-planned and prepared contingency options have been decided in consultation between the political leadership and the Indian military. Thus, any response will have to wait until plans are drawn up, forces prepared and equipment deployed. This is likely to take time, possibly several months. Surprisingly, Defence Chiefs are not members of Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS). This phenomenon is not understood.
India’s defence preparedness is the poorest considering defence budget layout for 2019-2020 is 1.44 per cent of the GDP, the lowest since 1962. It is also unclear that the Indian military has sufficient superiority over Pakistani forces to even consider full-scale military retaliation. The Indian military has been starved of funds in the last several years, with very little capital acquisition and significant weaknesses in critical areas. The Indian Air Force, for example, is down to about 30 squadrons and it will be years before India is able to field the full 42 squadrons that have been sanctioned for the Air Force. So is the case with the Navy and the Army.
The Modi Government is, thus, likely to find it facing a series of weak choices. However, it has only itself to blame for the poor planning and preparation to meet a contingency that was predictable. The greatest danger is that under pressure to do something in haste, New Delhi may launch a military assault with inadequate forethought that is likely to make the situation worse and awkward.
(The writer is a retired professor in international trade)
