The Defence Minister should declassify the Henderson Brooks-Bhagat report on the India-China war. This will add to the Government’s credibility and assure the nation that the Army is prepared for any threat on the northern border
Following the humiliating defeat of India in the 1962 war against China, the Army Headquarters instituted an operational review. On December 14 that year, lieutenant General Henderson Brooks, who was to be assisted by Brigadier PS Bhagat, was ordered to inquire into what went wrong with training, equipment, the system of command, the physical fitness of troops and the capacity of commanders at all levels. The inquiry was restricted to a review of Indian Army operational functions and command failures.
The Henderson Brooks-Bhagat committee submitted its report, in April 1963. During the conduct of the inquiry, YB Chavan, then Union Minister for Defence, was apprehensive that the committee may cast aspersions on role of the Prime Minister or the former Defence Minister. However, the sources say that this report did review the events which led the debacle and politico-military relations prior to the war.
On September 2, 1963, purportedly after reviewing the report, Chavan castigated the Army in Parliament and surmised that Indian losses were the result of poor military leadership and high-level interferences in tactical operations. Other reasons listed for the Indian defeat included: Unpreparedness of the troops for mountain warfare and unfamiliarity with Chinese tactics, equipment shortages during training and combat, difficulties in mountain communications, inadequate military intelligence, the unexpectedness of the Chinese assault and the numerical superiority of the Chinese forces.
But the Defence Minister failed to recognise the heroic battles fought in the Walong and Chusul sectors. For example, C Company of 13 Kumaon, led by Major Shaitan Singh, fought to the last man and last round at Razangla at 1,600 feet, before being overwhelmed. Of the 123 jawans, 114 were killed, including the company commander. This was a battle which has no parallel in the annals of modern military history.
In April 2010, then Defence Minister AK Antony told Parliament that the report could not be declassified because its contents “are not only extremely sensitive and are of current operational value”. Are we once again lacking in our preparations on our northern frontiersIJ During the election campaign, Mr Ravi Shankar Prasad of the BJP had called for declassification of the report. Senior BJP leader Arun Jaitley had gone a step further to say that public interest demanded that the top-secret document not remain in the Government’s vault indefinitely. But having become the Minister of Defence now, Mr Jaitley has changed his mind.
Some say that the reason behind Mr Jaitley’s u-turn is advice from the Army, which does not want the report to be declassified. But why should the Army not want the report to be declassified given that it has already faced the flak of the then Defence Minister in 1963IJ Moreover, there are volumes written on this subject, including declassified Central Intelligence Agency papers, that make clear different aspects of military and political infirmities, thereby belaying claims of secrecy.
The main cause of India’s defeat at China’s hand was Jawaharlal Nehru’s faith in India-China friendship, despite indications to the contrary. When General KM Cariappa brought to the his notice in early 1951 that some Chinese troops were apprehended with maps showing parts of the North East Frontier Agency as part of China, he retorted, “It is not for the Army to decide who the nation’s likely enemies would be.”
Talking about the Army’s preparedness, lieutenant General KS Thimayya, while handing over his resignation to Nehru following differences with the Defence Minister Krishna Menon said, “With the present state of the Army, I can hardly assure success. We are not prepared. All my efforts — as also of others — have failed for the past 24 to 30 months to make the Armed Forces a viable defence force. So let someone else do the job — I request my resignation be kindly accepted.” Nehru persuaded him to withdraw his resignation, but nothing was done on Gen Thimayya’s recommendations.
To assess the Chinese threat, then Chief of the Eastern Command lt Gen SPP Thorat held an exercise, code named ‘lal Quila’, in lucknow, in March 1960. It was attended by all Principal Staff Officers from the Army HQ. It was clearly brought out that, with the troops, weapons and equipment available at that time, a Chinese attack could not be contained or defeated, and the ‘forward policy’, advocated by the Defence Minister and General Officer commanding the North East, lt Gen BM Kaul, was not practical.
But lt Gen Kaul differed with the assessment of lt Gen SPP Thorat. Defence Minister Menon even called lt Gen Thorat a warmonger, and never sent the lal Quila report to the Prime Minister. later, during a discussion on ‘forward policy’ at the Prime Minister’s Office, Intelligence czar BM Mullick, who had close links with the CIA, opined that the Chinese would not react. His views were unequivocally accepted.
In May 1961, when lt Gen Thimayya retired, lt Gen Thorat was not promoted. Instead General PN Thapar was appointed as the Army chief and lt Gen Kaul as the Chief of General Staff. Both were pliant and backed the ill-fated ‘forward policy’. In the aftermath of the humiliating defeat, the duo, along with Menon, resigned in ignominy.
(The writer is a retired Major General of the Indian Army)
