The Sino-Indian border standoff may be over, but the country needs to prepare itself for future. Its logistics preparedness, especially the road infrastructure in the western and north-eastern sector, remains poor even five decades after the 1962 war
India and China display a peculiar case of ‘constrained cooperation’ with economic convergence of interests tending to only artificially overlook prevailing strategic differences. The fact of the matter remains that it is these very divergences, of which the territorial and boundary dispute comes foremost, which hold the potential of upstaging ties at any given point. This was precisely demonstrated on April 15 when a platoon-strength contingent approximating 50 soldiers of the Chinese People’s liberation Army (PlA) crossed 19 km inside Indian-claimed territory in the Daulat Beg Oldi sector in eastern ladakh and established their presence by pitching tent posts in the area, pushing India into a diplomatic and military tizzy.
Recurrence of strain in the India-China border areas has yet again established that Beijing keeps the border dispute alive as a tactical pressure point against India, despite the clamour in many quarters, including within India, that “all is well” in Sino-Indian bilateral ties. Through the latest Chinese intrusion, the new Chinese leadership under Xi Jinping appears to be moving back to China’s known position during the 1960s when Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai stated in New Delhi that “there exists a relatively bigger dispute” in the Western Sector, and simultaneously seems inclined to test the waters of political decision-making in New Delhi.
Given that till date there is no mutually agreed upon lAC between the two countries, sporadic incidents of border transgressions appear to be a covert Chinese strategy of asserting its claims in the Western Sector, especially in north-eastern ladakh. Similarly, in the Eastern Sector too, the lAC is not physically demarcated on the ground, including that on military maps. The Chinese reluctance, or for that matter refusal, to show its version of the lAC, points towards a larger dodgy ploy of progressively building up a case for its claims in eastern ladakh and Arunachal Pradesh. This reminds one of the remnants of the India-China war, fought in October 1962, that left an indelible impression on the Indian psyche, shattering a myriad of myths and leaving room for nothing but guarded suspicion against the People’s Republic of China.
Examining the current status of India’s logistics preparedness, especially the road infrastructure in the western and north-eastern sector of the country, amplifies the belief that India still does not seem to be taking exigency of this aspect acutely. It is ironic that while India is gradually mastering development and deployment of complex long-range missile technology with reaches beyond the subcontinent, it has simply failed in getting its act together when it comes to construction and repairs of road infrastructure especially in sectors which are crucial from a national security point of view.
Having just returned from a road trip to Assam, further up to Arunachal Pradesh in the Northeast, I was aghast to see the status of the roads leading up to the border areas that India shares with China. More appallingly, this is the current state of affairs, when it has been more than five decades since the 1962 India-China war.
The initial part of the journey till Tezpur in Assam was reasonably alright, but the trying part began thereafter. The first major stretch lies from Tezpur to a village named Tenga in Arunachal Pradesh. Placed right on the Assam-Arunachal Pradesh border lies Bhalukpong — a quaint little township. On nearing Bhalukpong there is a particular stretch, which is a mockery in the name of being called a road. Measuring a mere eight km, it takes more than half-an-hour to cross this stretch and should be considered as the first warning to what awaits ahead.
On route towards reaching the border with China come picturesque villages and small townships, namely Bomdila, Dirang Valley and the Sela Pass situated at an altitude of 13,700 ft. The strategically located town of Tawang lies approximately 80 km from the Sela Pass. The topography here is such that predominant rains and heavy landslides through the year make the already muddied roads slushier. Despite knowing these realities, what catches the eye is the insufficient planning of the drainage system, witnessed all through the uphill climb till Tawang and beyond. Far worse, in many places there is a complete absence of drains which, in turn, messes up all construction/repair activity, whatever little is happening after all. Moreover, culverts, meant for allowing water to flow from under are either missing or remain perennially blocked.
In the name of providing employment to the local populace, it is outrageous to see a brazen neglect of the right to education of adolescent and even younger boys and girls who are seen breaking stones with small hammers. These hammers are suited for menial household work and are ill-suited for breaking stones swiftly. Decades having passed by, the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), tasked with the construction and maintenance of the border roads, astonishingly, still seems to favour “hiring of some of its equipment... It does not make sense to have all the equipment.” No prizes for guessing that resultantly, the pace of the construction work has been preposterously slow.
The sense I got during the visit was that explanations for never-ending delays in commencement of construction/repair activity of roads was quick and extensive. Beginning with acquiring forest and wildlife department clearances and land acquisition, contractors unwilling to work in far-flung areas, frequent local strikes, damages caused due to heavy rains and the complications of working in high altitude terrain. While there is no denying that these issues do, in fact, pose grave challenges, the questions remain: How long can we afford to compromise national security in the garb of these pleas and more so, since how many decades has the pattern been continuingIJ An ostensible lack of road network in isolated border regions is perhaps the biggest challenge for troop movement and mobilisation and poses a grave threat to build up of forces in a given adverse eventuality.
Further on, the drive from Tawang further up to the Bumla Pass situated at nearly 15,000 ft is approximately 40 km and is perhaps the worst and most unpleasant of all. The present condition of roads can be gauged in that a distance of 100 km, which is ideally a three-hour drive in the high altitude terrain, currently takes more than six hours — something which is totally unacceptable and should be considered a wake-up call. On the other hand, standing at the Bumla Pass at the McMahon line — forming the Sino-Indian border in Arunachal Pradesh according to India — a smooth, maintained, metal track road on the Chinese side further magnifies the dismal state of roads in India’s eastern sector.
In fact, the massive infrastructure and logistics build-up being undertaken by China in the Tibet Autonomous Region including national road and rail transport systems has enhanced the PlA’s land-based transport capabilities which shall double up as base support for China’s military. In particular, key civilian highway projects in Tibet comprises 41,000 km of road network, including five major highways and a number of subsidiary roads with an emphasis on trunk rail lines and inter-provincial highways linking the interior and coastal regions. More importantly, the construction works being carried out have military specifications; they will be turned over to the PlA in the event of a conflict.
There is still no clarity as to what were the gains that Indian diplomacy managed to extract out of the Chinese while resolving the latest standoff at Daulat Beg Oldi lasting three weeks. What did come out openly was the Indian announcement that both sides would pull back troops to their earlier positions along the lAC. This brings us to the moot point: Can India afford to give in to unfounded demands by China — of suspending infrastructure development activities in its own territory near the lACIJ Has China ever offered an explanation for a blizzard in the name of infrastructure stack up in the Tibetan region adjoining IndiaIJ
Rapid infrastructure development in Tibet has considerably upgraded China’s military force projection and application capability against India and improved its overall strategic and operational flexibility.
As far as India’s Border Roads Organisation is concerned, it aims at “providing backward Northeastern region, with a road communication network, to support its future development”. The statement provokes one to ask, what is it that the BRO has been able to change drastically in the past decadesIJ It is high time that the BRO explains its lackadaisical approach and is made more accountable vis-à-vis strict timelines that need to be met. Moreover, there should be better coordination between the BRO roads and other special border area schemes in order to optimise effort and cost outlay.
Interestingly, claims made in Parliament averring that “BRO is developing 82 strategically important roads in the Northeast to double lane and class IX” are, most certainly, not visible on the ground — in fact, not even close to that. Perhaps a detailed sketch of every one of these “82 roads” along with the exact respective progress report would bring more clarity to the murky picture that unfortunately prevails today. The BRO provides non-specific statistics in the name of projects such as Arunank, Udayak and Vartak (with a budgetary provision of about `5,000 crore for projects a year). It has been declared that under the auspices of these projects 2,776 km of new roads and 150 permanent bridges have been constructed. Besides, 1,690 km of roads are under construction and another 2,134 km remain under maintenance. While speaking in the lok Sabha in May 2012, Defence Minister AK Antony stated that the BRO maintained a road network of 11,672 km in the region.
More specifically, the 317.5-km-long stretch of road from Balipara in Assam to Tawang in Arunachal Pradesh was said to be “under development and being upgraded to double-lane specifications”. Tall claims made by the BRO in 2012 — that “by 2014, you will see a marked difference across the borders... Combining both big and small schemes, we are working on more than 2,000 road projects (along the borders)” — can be termed as sheer travesty given that the situation on ground tells a different story altogether. It was stated by the BRO way back in 2008, “We have identified 3,400 km of roads along the border identified as critical... This comprises 61 roads and we plan to complete it in a time-bound manner by 2012.” Today, having nearly reached mid-2013, the objective is not even close to being achieved. The 2012 timeline has conveniently been pushed forward to 2016 — with a declaration in February 2013 that the Centre will earmark sufficient funds for the BRO to complete 44 of the 61 strategic roads along India’s borders by 2016.
The communications infrastructure on the ground in India’s isolated border areas is just a shade better than what it was more than six decades ago. Given the dreadful rate of road construction and repairs, this writer’s assessment is that it would be at least another decade by when India would be in a position to expect all strategically significant roads to become something that could be vouched for.
Despite confidence-building measures signed in 1993, 1996 and 2005, there has been an abject failure in bringing about any tangible breakthrough to the boundary impasse between Beijing and New Delhi and China’s brawny posturing is not easing the situation whatsoever. By pitching tents in territory held by India, Beijing has explicitly violated the above-mentioned agreements and, more alarmingly, sent the message that China can flash the offensive card and covertly notch up tensions in the Himalayas with India, at the time and place of its choosing. The answer lies in being better prepared, in which improvement of infrastructure logistics comes foremost. The country’s decision-making elite would now be expected to accord highest priority to political realism to deal with Beijing given that economic convergence and cooperation cannot take the liberty of jeopardising national interest and security.