Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s recent visit to China assumes immense significance in light of the long-standing complex relationship and the security dilemma that exists between the two countries. Political interaction at the higher level is always conducive for strategic trust and communication
China is India’s largest neighbour and the two countries share a land border of 3,488 km, which is undemarcated and is known as the line of Actual Control (lAC). Engagement with China, therefore, is not an option but a strategic necessity. As border incursions or transgressions do take place sometimes, maintenance of peace and tranquillity on the lAC, at times, becomes a matter of concern. Hence, defence cooperation and strategic communication between leaders of the two countries and their defence establishment are of critical significance.
Defence and military exchanges are an important aspect of India’s overall relationship with China. This is precisely because security between the two countries is not only dependent on defence preparedness, but also on mutual political and military trust.
Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar’s recently concluded visit to China can be put into perspective and better understood and appreciated in the context of the complex narrative of the relationship between the two countries and security dynamics in the region.
Significantly, almost the same time as Parrikar’s visit, External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj also travelled to Moscow to participate in the Russia-India-China trilateral meeting that took place in Moscow on April 18, where on the sidelines of the meeting she had parleys with her Chinese counterpart Wang Yi. She raised the issue of China blocking the UN sanction on the banned Jaish-e-Mohammed.
Parrikar’s visit to China was closely followed by the visit of National Security Adviser Ajit Doval, who is also India’s Special Representative to the India-China border talks, to Beijing to participate in the 19th round India-China border talks held last week. This multi-pronged engagement of India with top Chinese leaders suggests its sincerity and seriousness to engage in further strategic partnership with its eastern neighbour.
Parrikar, in his talks with his Chinese counterpart Gen Chang Wanquan, said: “India attaches highest priority to relations with China and is committed to further developing friendly cooperative relations with it.” Responding to the sentiment, Wang hoped that the Defence Minister’s visit would improve the mutual trust between the two armies. Parrikar later met China’s highest military official Gen Fan Changlong, the Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission, which is the overall commanding body of the 2.3 million strong military. It is headed by the Chinese President.
Parrikar reiterated India’s stand for demarcation of the lAC, which was raised during the visit of Prime Minister Narendra Modi to China last year. Terming the recurring incidents of Chinese troops entering what India claims as its territory as “transgression, not incursions”, Parrikar emphasised that clarity over lAC will bring down tension between the troops on both sides which patrol the areas to assert their control.
“Marking the lAC is one of the preconditions of smooth border operations. Without that everything goes by perception, which has caused problems sometimes,” he added. The two sides also discussed expediting efforts to establish a hotline between the two military headquarters and more confidence-building measures (CBMs), such as opening more border points for interaction with troops on the grounds. Currently, both sides have five border points for interaction with the trough flag meetings and border personnel meetings.
Referring to the proposed hotline, Parrikar said, “The Chinese have returned the draft of the memorandum on establishing a hotline between the two military headquarters. The issue should be closed within one or two months.” later, he also called upon Chinese Premier li Keqiang and held wide ranging discussions; he also visited China’s newly integrated Western Command military headquarters in Chengdu.
A COMPlEX DISPUTE
The India-China border dispute is complex. The dispute can be attributed to historical factors, political dynamics and security imperatives of the two countries. After India’s independence in 1947, it inherited its territorial boundaries from the legacy of British India. As it stands, China claims 90,000 sq km of Indian territory in Arunachal Pradesh and occupies around 38,000 sq km in Jammu and Kashmir, which India claims as its territory. Also, under the China-Pakistan Boundary Agreement signed in March 2, 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Indian territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) to China.
The unfortunate border war which broke out between the two countries in 1962 not only inflicted a severe blow to their relationship, but also heightened the security dilemma. It also put the border negotiation, started in 1950s, on the back burner.
The Chinese attack on India evoked a stormy debate in Parliament. The then Defence Minister VK Krishna Menon had to step down under pressure following severe criticism. On November 8, 1962, initiating an animated discussion seeking the approval of Parliament for declaration of Emergency in the wake of the Chinese attack, the then Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, referring to the McMahon line, said: “We have previously demonstrated by means of evidence that our boundary is what has been called the McMahon line, but that boundary was not laid down even by Mr McMahon, whoever is responsible for it. It was the recognition of the long-standing frontier on the high ridge of the Himalayas which divided the two countries at the watershed. To some extent, though indirectly, the Chinese accepted this. But apart from the constitutional or legal aspects, it is undoubted and cannot be challenged that no Chinese has ever been in that part of this side of the line, excepting, as the House knows, in a little border village called longju.” Parliament also adopted the resolution that affirmed the “firm resolve of the Indian people to drive out the aggressor from the sacred soil of India, however long and hard the struggle may be”.
Diplomatic relationship between the two countries was restored in 1976 with the appointment KR Narayanan as India’s Ambassador to China, who subsequently became the President of India.
The first major initiative to engage China after the restoration of diplomatic relationship was the visit of Atal Bihari Vajpayee as the Foreign Minister of the erstwhile Janata Government. It was a bold and proactive initiative and spoke of his farsightedness. He, however, had to cut short his visit when China attacked Vietnam, a close friend of India. This again endorsed Vajpayee’s principled position.
This major breakthrough was followed by the visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi to China in 1988. After the formation of PV Narasimha Rao Government, Sharad Pawar earned the distinction of being India’s first Defence Minister to visit China in 1992.
The next major achievement in the CBMs came during the visit of the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao to China in 1993. The visit witnessed the signing of the historic Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquillity along the lAC. The Agreement affirmed that the India-China boundary question shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultation and that neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means.
Yet another highlight of the Agreement was that it stipulated “pending an ultimate solution of the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly observe the lAC”. Three years later, this Agreement was followed by another CBM during the visit of Chinese President Jiang Zemin to India in 1996.
Defence cooperation between the two countries received further impetus during the historic visit of PM Vajpayee in June 2003. The Joint Declaration signed by the two sides mentioned, “… they agreed on the need to broaden and deepen defence exchanges between the two armed forces. They confirmed that exchanges of visits by their Defence Ministers and military officials at various levels should be strengthened”.
INDIA-CHINA BORDER TAlKS
The India-China border negotiation can be broadly divided into three phases. The first phase began in the Sixties in accordance with the joint communiqué issued by Nehru and his Chinese counterpart Zhou Enlai at the conclusion of week-long discussions in April 1960. In the second phase, eight rounds of talks were held, which ended in 1981. A major outcome of Vajpayee’s visit to China in 2003 was the appointment of special representatives of the two countries to explore from the political perspective of the overall bilateral relationship the framework for settlement of the border dispute. With this, the third round of border talks commenced, and the 19th round of talks was held in Beijing only last week.
Yet another incremental yet important step towards the settlement of border dispute is the Political Parameters and Guiding Principles for settlement of the India-China boundary question signed between the two countries during the visit of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao to India in April 2005.
In the first place, the Agreement reiterated: “The two sides will resolve the boundary question through peaceful and friendly consultation. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means”. Secondly, it envisaged that the two sides should in accordance with the five principles of peaceful co-existence seek a fair, reasonable and mutual solution to the boundary question through consultations on an equal footing.
It may be mentioned in this connection that the Protocol signed between the two countries during Jiabao’s 2005 visit provided for two additional border meetings each year at Spangur Gap in the Western sector, Nathula Pass in Sikkim and Bum la in the Eastern Sector respectively in celebration of the National Day or Army day of either side.
The Protocol further provided that both sides agree in principle to expand the mechanism of border points to include Kibhitu-Damai in the Eastern Sector, and lipulekh Pass/Qiang in the Middle sector, and that the precise location of these border meeting points will be decided through mutual consultations. These border meeting points have since been operational.
BORDER DEFENCE COOPERATION PACT
In spite of these CBMs and institutional mechanisms, border transgressions continued from either side of the lAC. Their reportage in the media, particularly electronic, has the tendency to cast a shadow on the relationship between the two countries. It was in this context that during the October 2013 visit of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh to China that the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement (BDCA) was signed.
The preamble to the Agreement, while alluding to earlier CBMs signed in 1993, 1996 and 2005, said that “the India-China Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity serves the fundamental interests of the people of the two countries”. Reference to Strategic and Cooperative Partnership seems to be a new addition to the nomenclature of the existing CBMs because the relationship between the two countries was elevated to the strategic level only in 2005.
The third line in the Preamble to the BDCA said that “neither side shall use its military capability against the other nor shall their respective military strength be used to attack the other side”. Although it reads like a no-war pact, the problem in the India-China lAC is not about war or attack, it is more about border intrusion or transgression. A close analysis of the Agreement suggests that most of the clauses were already part of the provisions of earlier CBMs, with only words having been changed here and there, except Clause VI.
The Preamble to the Agreement further said that neither side shall use or threaten to neither use force against the other side by any means nor seek unilateral superiority. Clause I of the Agreement on the maintenance of peace and tranquillity along the lAC signed in 1993, stated, “The two sides are of the view that the India-China boundary question shall be resolved through peaceful and friendly consultations. Neither side shall use or threaten to use force against the other by any means. Pending an ultimate solution to the boundary question between the two countries, the two sides shall strictly respect and observe the lAC.”
Article 1 of the Agreement says that the two sides shall carry out border defence cooperation on the basis of their respective laws. Article 2 of the Agreement deals with incidents which may happen on the border, and the ways and means to tackle them. Such incidents include military exercises, crossing over of aircraft, demolition operation, and also natural disasters or outbreak of infectious diseases. It also provides for cooperation and information-sharing in the event of border crossing by both human beings and livestock and aerial vehicles. Again, the 1996 Agreement contained such provisions.
An addition to such eventualities and possibilities is Clause II of Article 2 which provides for jointly combating smuggling of arms, wildlife, wildlife articles and other contraband.
Smuggling of arms seems to have been included presumably in the context of allegations of clandestine procurement of arms by some cessationist groups operating in the North-East. Similarly, the mention of wildlife and wildlife articles suggests taking note of poaching of tigers and illegal smuggling of their skin to China, and from China to outside.
IMPlEMENTING MECHANISM
Article 3 of the Agreement provides for implementing mechanism to deal with all such situations and eventualities. Here too, the Article reiterates existing institutional mechanisms both at the micro and macro level. At the micro level, it is done through Flag Meetings or border personnel meetings at designated places along the lAC.
Incidentally it may be mentioned that after the Depsang incident, the Flag Meeting took place at Spangur in Chushul, which helped in diffusing the stand-off between the two armies. Article 4 of the Agreement reiterates these provisions already spelt out in the 2005 Protocol. Additionally, however, it proposes establishing telephone and telecommunication links at mutually agreed locations along the lAC. It also envisages “establishing a hotline between the military headquarters of the two countries”.
Article 6 is perhaps the most significant in the Agreement; it states that “the two sides agree that they shall not follow or tail patrols of the other side in areas where there is no common understanding of the lAC”. This, in fact, is the substance of the BDCA, which formalised the understanding. Just as the taste of the pudding lies in eating, its efficacy will only be known in real-time situations because the problem is the lack of clarity on the lAC.
Article 7 of the Agreement, therefore, reiterates the provisions of the earlier CBMs that “in case a doubtful situation arises with reference to any activity by either side in border areas where there is no common understanding of the lAC, either side has the right to seek a clarification from the other side. In such cases, the clarification shall be sought and replies to them shall be conveyed through any of the mechanisms”.
Article 8 of the Agreement, which provides for resolution of face-off situations, seems to be problematic. The text of the Article says that “the two sides agree that border defence forces of the two sides shall exercise maximum self-restraint, refrain from any provocative action, not to use force against the other side, treat each other with courtesy and prevent exchange of fire or armed conflict”.
It is worth a while to recall that Clause II of the 2005 Protocol, on the contrary, clearly mentioned that “the personnel crossing over to the other side should, in the light of the prevailing circumstances, take measures to return to their own side or proceed to places designated by the other side en route to return to their own side”. Article 8 of BDCA is silent on this.
It is against this backdrop of the complex relationship between the two countries and the security dilemma existing between them that Parrikar’s recent visit to China assumes significance. Political interaction at higher level is always conducive for strategic trust and communication. It is unfortunate, however, that even after more than two decades of the mutual agreement that “early clarification and confirmation of the alignment of the lAC accords with the fundamental interests of the two sides”, border talks are still moving at a snail’s pace.
The writer is a China specialist and was a senior fellow with the IDSA. Views expressed are personal