The himalayan face-off
Author: Shishir Gupta
Publisher: Hachette, Rs 650
The book is about the Indian response to various activities that Beijing has indulged in since 1962, which have had a bearing on New Delhi, and how that response has shaped bilateral relations between the two countries over the decades, says RAJESH SINGH
To those who believe that this book is primarily about China, it is a reminder that Shishir Gupta has attempted no such thing. His book is about the Indian response to the various activities that Beijing has indulged in since 1962, which have had a bearing on New Delhi, and how that response has shaped bilateral relations between the two countries over the decades. These have been in the domain of both diplomacy and military.
Such narrative for most part, barring rare exceptions, has ended up with India seemingly the loser. This could be an issue of perception, but an element of reality cannot be ruled out in the fact that New Delhi’s counter-actions in the wake of not just military incursions by the Chinese into Indian territory, but also the various infrastructure projects in the former’s region that are said to adversely impact India, and Beijing’s verbal sabre-rattling off and on, have all not been as adequately dealt with by New Delhi as one would have desired.
Post-May 16, the book does sound politically dated, since the author has discussed at length the Congress-led UPA Government’s strategy (or the lack of it) in tackling the challenges it faced in dealing with China or its occasional standing up to Beijing’s bullying. That chapter has ended, and we now have a new Government headed by a Prime Minister who is both open to a new and happy beginning with China and clear on the limits that Beijing can touch in its aggression. For Narendra Modi, China will present almost as many challenges as Pakistan as he works to craft a new synergy between India and its neighbours. Whatever the hurdles, it is clear that there will be a break from the past. It is here that Gupta’s book acquires added importance: It serves as a useful and informative guide, without having wanted to, for the new powers-that-are.
Expectedly, he begins with the shocking intrusion of Chinese troops at Daulat Beg Oldi on April 15, 2013, which lasted close to three weeks. Even by Beijing’s standards, this was the most brazen attempt by it to lay claim on what clearly has been Indian territory. It angered experts and laymen alike in the country. The author writes that the high-profile China Study Group vehemently suggested that India should call off the Indian Army delegation-level talks with China’s PlA in protest. But the then Prime Minister Manmohan Singh vetoed the move on the ground that the Chinese aggression was a “localised” problem. The word was picked up by some of his Ministers who went to town with it. Then External Affairs Minister Salman Khurshid embellished the cause by calling it “acne” on the face. It was, in reality, a slap on India’s face that the Chinese had rendered.
Gupta provides details of the negotiations that began to resolve the crisis. But the important take-away from the episode is what the author observes: “These signs are ominous for the future as India will have to be even vigilant to the Chinese threats across the lAC, with the PlA determined to dominate the lAC.” Beijing had all but been allowed by India to do so for decades. Will this changeIJ
The lack of a firm response by the then Government of India could have been one reason for the subsequent acts of belligerence by the neighbour. The author points to an incident in November 2007 when the Chinese forces destroyed three Indian Army bunkers in Doka la on the Sikkim-Bhutan-Tibet junction. He writes, “The way the PlA was allowed to demolish the bunkers without the matter being taken up at the highest levels did not go down well with the Eastern Army Command as they felt China should have raised objections when the bunkers were being constructed. local Army commanders were also unhappy at their own bosses who chose not to make a stand and gave into the Chinese without any fuss.”
Gupta gives a riveting insight into how the UPA regime allowed petty politics and babudom to override national security on at least one instance. As Army chief, General VK Singh along with his officers developed a new plan to ensure that China did not have the upper hand in sectors along the border where the Indian Army traditionally had a weak presence. Gen Singh presented the plan to the then Minister for Defence AK Antony, who directed the plan to be converted into a note for the consideration of the Cabinet Committee on Security. This was in 2011.
According to the author, “With India aspiring to be on the global high-table, Manmohan Singh and his team knew that the country could ill-afford another setback or humiliation of the PlA occupying its territory. The clear message was that India would build its capacities without instigating the Chinese or launching any military adventure on the lAC.” These included military and otherwise.
Then the plan ran into hurdles. The first was that the Union Government did not oblige the Army with the finances needed for the “force accretion plan”, although Gen Singh met the then Union Minister for Finance on three occasions before the former’s retirement. The second obstacle came in the form of adverse ‘expert opinions’ which laid down that there was no need to invest so much in an Army-centric plan since the Air Force and Navy would make the real difference in a future conflict with the Chinese. The third, and perhaps the biggest, setback to the Army’s plan came in the wake of the conflict between Gen Singh and the Government over the former’s age.
Gupta observes, “When General Singh moved the Supreme Court over the age controversy, the UPA-II government began viewing him with a degree of suspicion and decided to hold back the strike corps proposal, with the Finance Ministry marking the plan back to the Defence Ministry for further consultations.” It was only after Gen Singh demitted office that the proposal was revived and pushed ahead.
The author has towards the end done a quick survey of the capabilities of the Indian Navy and Air Force to meet potential Chinese challenges and concludes that they are far from being optimally equipped for the purpose. In the chapter that has been appropriately titled, ‘An Uncertain Future’, Gupta has reposed great expectations on the Border Defence Cooperation Agreement, but we will have to wait and see. Meanwhile, we must take pride in the statement of a senior Indian official, who is unidentified in the book, that “it takes more than four tents and a dog to rattle India”.