With the Union and States arguing over the Governor’s discretionary power to assent to the bills, and as a division bench of the Supreme Court is hearing all sides on the reference by the President, what could be the way forward? The bottom line is always this: constitutional design delivers only when institutions internalize constitutional culture.
The Constitutional Architecture Articles 111, 200, and 201 form a seamless chain for assent. Article 111 governs Union Bills presented to the President. Articles 200 and 201 mirror that framework in the States: The Governor may assent, withhold assent and return a Bill to the Assembly, or reserve it for the President’s consideration; the President, on a reserved Bill, may assent or withhold assent. Notably, the Constitution uses the phrase “as soon as possible” but prescribes no firm timelines. The text presumes constitutional good faith and a convention of dispatch. Where conventions falter, institutions must nudge practice back to principle, without usurping each other’s roles.
It depends on how we perceive the role of the Governor. During debates of the Constituent Assembly, while HV Kamath warned against misuse of assent powers by the Governors, which was seconded by SL Sakesna that such withholding of assent may undermine responsible government, Dr Ambedkar ruled that Governors are constitutional heads, who must act on advice of the council of ministers headed by the Chief Minister in the states.
SC in Purushothaman v. Kerala (1962) refused to prescribe any time limit for the Governor’s approval of the University Bill. In Hoechst Pharma (1983) the Court held that if a bill is reserved for the President, it is not justiciable. However, in Nabam Rebia (2016), the Court advised limits on the discretionary powers of the Governor, and it invoked Article 142 to give deemed assent to Tamil Nadu Bills pending with the Governor. While the ARC (1969) recommended codifying conventions and prompt assent, the Sarkaria Commission (1988) advised Governors to act neutrally and avoid discretion; the Punchchi Commission (2010) suggested fixed tenure and timelines. It’s another matter that these recommendations are always cited but never implemented by successive Governments.
The States’ view is that the Governor is a constitutional head, not an alternate political executive. Second, while the Governor is part of the State Legislature under Article 168, the office is not a second chamber with an override power. Therefore, when a bill reaches the Governor for assent, the Governor has, as clarified by the Supreme Court in 2025, only three choices: assent, withhold, and return with a message, or reserve for the President, and that once a Bill is readopted after reconsideration, the Governor “shall not withhold assent”.The Court invoked its extraordinary powers to ensure the passage of Bills that had been caught in a constitutional cul?de?sac. That judgment, while a case-specific judgment, reopened larger questions, which led to the Presidential reference to the Supreme Court under Article 143, which essentially asks: can courts craft timelines and procedures for all cases, or must such structuring come only from constitutional text or parliamentary/legislative action?
Inside the Hearings: What each side argued (as reported)
The Union Government argues that prescribing rigid timelines may be suitable for statutory authorities; the same cannot be said for constitutional offices. That Governor is not a post office, and this office can examine questions of legislative competence and constitutional propriety, and, where in doubt, reserve Bills for the President’s consideration. Finally, Courts cannot judicially insert into the Constitution what the framers left out.
The States’ arguments are no less pressing. The people’s mandate expressed through State Assemblies cannot be defeated by indefinite inaction. Article 200’s “as soon as possible” cannot be stretched into “whenever convenient”.Article 200 gives only three options; there is no fourth option to withhold assent and sit tight without returning the Bill, and no fifth option to keep sending a repassed Bill elsewhere. Once the Assembly repasses a returned Bill, the duty to assent is plain. Practical Governance suffers when essential Bills — sometimes even money Bills — are stalled. In such scenarios, the Court must at least operationalize the text by reading in a duty of promptness and reasons, short of rewriting the Constitution.
From the interventions of the Bench, we may gather that while blanket timelines may be problematic, the phrase ‘as soon as possible’ cannot be reduced to eternity, which may lead to stalling even money bills, a possibility the Constitution never contemplated. And if the Court were to intervene, where does one draw the line of judicial power? Tomorrow, the Court may direct that bills may be returned with reasons or reserve them for the President.
How to fix the process without rewriting the Constitution?
From a commoner’s point of view, it is possible to fix the process without amending the Constitution. And it is in the best interest of the Union and States not to allow the Court to impose hard timelines for constitutional authorities.
The drafting department and Law Department of the States must run a competence check to see that, with Article 254 in mind, the proposed legislature is not repugnant to the constitution. This will clear the constitutional doubts beforehand. Let’s start with a tracker, visible to all, showing the date of receipt of the bill by the Raj Bhawan, and its present status (under examination / returned with message / reserved for the President / assented). Second, if assent is withheld, or if a Bill is returned, it should contain clear reasons, not policy disagreement, but whether the legislature is competent to legislate or if there are any constitutional infirmities.
Third, the state and Raj Bhawan can adopt a model rule of business committing to outer limits, for example, approval within 15 days, thirty days to return with a message, or 60 days for reservation after consultation. These would lead to the development of conventions, which augur well for the future. Fourth, a coordination meeting, once in a quarter, is chaired by the Chief Secretary, between the Law Department and the Raj Bhawan to track the Bill and to remove bottlenecks.
Even after these processes, if assent is prolonged, then the States can move court for case-specific directions, either for directing the Raj Bhawan to return with reasons or, in the extreme case, enforcing the constitutional outcome already compelled by a repassage.
Why this debate matter?
The design of federalism in India, as evidenced by the three lists, is that states legislate on near-ground problems, be it in public health, education, policing, skills, local Governance, etc.
When state legislations are awaiting the assent of the Governor, the delivery suffers, and he cost is borne by citizens. Hence, if there are no manifest illegalities or colorable legislation, which the office of the Governor is designed to examine, it should be through a triad of options under Article 200 and the duty to act “as soon as possible”, reading it as a standard of constitutional promptness. Encourage Union and States to codify internal protocols, including tracking, disclosure and inter-departmental time boxing, so that comity, not compulsion, becomes the operating system.
The framers gave us a constitution that breathes through institutions and conventions. Where convention frays, institutions must repair-not by occupying each other’s turf, but by making the text work. Governors are not second chambers; Assemblies are not beyond constitutional scrutiny; and courts are not permanent supervisors of routine governance. The sensible middle is a culture of reasons, record and reasonable speed, a culture we can build by administrative design today, without waiting for a final word tomorrow.
Atul Kumar Tiwari, IAS (Retd.), Former Secretary, Ministry of Skill Development & Entrepreneurship (MSDE), Government of India. The views expressed in this article are personal