Theatrisation is a much-needed organisational reform to ensure that military-economy-technology develops as a triad to render a powerful nation
The long smouldering amber of theatrisation burst into a ball of fire at a fireside chat at the Army War College recently. Chief of Air Staff (CAS) questioned the need for a joint structure, putting the clock back by a few years. In the same conversation, he acknowledged the smooth conduct of Operation (Op) SINDOOR, with four of them planning together. This was a welcome change from 1999, when the Indian Army and Indian Air Force conducted two distinct operations, namely Op VIJAY and Op SAFED SAGAR, respectively. So credible was the integration in Op SINDOOR that until the Air Chief himself revealed it in a speech, most Indians did not know that five of the seven targets hit on 7th May were by the Army and only two by the Air Force. That subsequent retaliation by Pakistan and coup de grâce on 10th May could be handled equally smoothly is reason enough to believe that the current structures did deliver.
Readers should know that the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was opposed by the IAF equally, if not more, vehemently. This author had a ringside view of all discussions while recording minutes of each meeting of the “Task Force on Management of Defence (TFMD),” headed by Shri Arun Singh, whose recommendations were entirely accepted and subsumed into the Report by the GoM on Security headed by Shri LK Advani and comprising other members of CCS. The task force comprised 11 members — one scientist, four serving bureaucrats, four serving military officers (including the Director General, Defence Planning Staff as the member secretary) and one retired service officer, besides the chairman. All serving officers were additional secretary or of equivalent status. There was complete consensus on every recommendation except the CDS. The final recommendation on CDS was decided through a vote, with numbers mentioned in the report. However, despite the GoM recommendations, CDS appointment took two decades to fructify, perhaps stymied by the objections of not just bureaucrats but also the IAF. In the absence of the CDS, the remaining structure did not quite evolve the way it should have. A common lament in Service HQ is that the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) just added another layer in decision-making between Service HQ and MoD.
CAS, from what is available in the public domain, has flagged two concerns — additional layers in decision-making and lack of resources for dedicated allocation to theatres. As it stands, resources within the Indian Air Force (IAF) are distributed among commands. That does not inhibit concentrated force application when required. The fears regarding decision-making layers perhaps arise not only from the IDS experience, but also from the undefined equation among theatre commanders, service chiefs and CDS. CDS, as the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the principal military adviser to Raksha Mantri (RM), does enjoy the status of the primus inter pares.
However, he does not have an operational mandate over Service HQ. The role of CDS, as envisaged in GoM recommendations, was to integrate planning and budgeting functions for credible perspective planning and necessary force development through optimal utilisation of defence budget. Less than expected results in these objectives does generate apprehensions about unsettling the operational structure. Any discussion on theatre commands must be based on credible operational logic. Agni-Veer is a case in point, where the narrative of saving in pension smothered the logic of a youthful, skilled and motivated force that the Agni-Veer scheme begets.
Jointmanship has a logic, just as three different services for land, sea and air do. New domains of space and cyberspace have since evolved, but without a separate service being raised for them. Back in 1941, Panzer divisions were halted short of Dunkirk for air campaign to progress the war in Western Europe. Fifty years later, air and land battles merged seamlessly in Op DESERT STORM. Five weeks of air campaign were as crucial to victory as 100 hours of land campaign. But the most critical was their joint orchestration. We’re three decades down the road from Op DESERT STORM. Jointmanship exists more in words than in thoughts and deeds.
Where is a modern war fought? What does it target? Where is the victory achieved? It is necessary to discuss such questions to bring out the nuances of physical, informational, perceptual and metaphysical dimensions of modern war, and to appreciate the need for joint orchestration of every military asset. War is but an instrument for prevailing of one national will over another, where every element of national power, whether military, economic, informational or diplomatic, is brought to bear its impact. Military acts exclusively in the physical dimension of war. Higher dimensions, where the whole of the nation gets involved, only count impact, oblivious of domain boundaries. Further, tactical impacts are fleeting and waning and, hence, need synergy in time and space. Individual service characteristics, such as speed, lethality, accuracy, knowledge of target, logistic footprint, survivability and resilience, particularly in face of retaliation, fuse into spatio-temporal orchestration. This is the logic of the unitary command structure of the military that most militaries follow. This logic has no geographical basis and, thus, there is no reason for India to be an exception.
Back in 2000, when the CDS was recommended, the fear was that the concentration of command in one individual would render the military vulnerable to politicisation. This legitimate fear, expressed by experienced bureaucrats, imposed caution. Civil control over the military and an apolitical military are the hallmarks of a healthy democracy. CDS without an operational role was, however, not a compromise solution, but an effort to address the priorities in defence management.
The military had been far more successful in operations than in perspective planning and force development. Although inadequacies were blamed on bureaucracy, many of the problems lay within and among Service HQs. CDS was to lead integrated planning and detailed budgeting to simplify bureaucratic practices. The Kargil Review Report, authored by the redoubtable Shri K Subrahmanyam, had been scathing in its comments on the functioning of Service Headquarters.
TFMD addressed both the weaknesses and fears by recommending a CDS with a planning, rather than operational role. Theatre commands were also discussed. Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) and Strategic Forces Command (SFC) were, thus, recommended to be under the CDS for incubation as joint services command. In the absence of CDS for two decades, the structure, however, could not mature. CAS remarks against “joint structure” indicate that the structure of the theatre command being presented is less than agreeable. There is no gainsaying that an integrated grid for fire support, mobility support, information support, logistic support and protection/survivability of men and machines would render exercise of operational art in a theatre far more effective. Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) is as much about decisions as about actions. Initiative and momentum go hand in hand. Loss of one results in loss of the other. Moreover, since wrong moves lead to loss of initiative, decisions ought to be as correct as speedy. Right decisions are based on timely and comprehensive information for which a joint services theatre is immensely more suitable.
CAS also brought up the need for experience in certain skill sets for higher leadership. This argument is specious. IAF has had a Chief who was not a fighter pilot. Higher leadership is about comprehension, perspectives and visualisation. Perspectives are gained more by exposure than experience. While intellect and exposure build upon each other to develop perspectives, mere experience may result in biases. An Air Force officer can make as good a theatre commander as an Army or a Navy officer. A structure evolved through consensus not only gets implemented more credibly, but is also far more sustaining. No written document on reforms is comprehensive. However, when the logic of change is understood and accepted, the gaps are credibly filled and coherence in reforms is maintained. It is, therefore, essential that the structure of joint services theatre and relationship among theatre commanders, service chiefs and CDS be thoroughly discussed and arrived at with willing consensus. As in humans, so in organisations, health at birth is critical to a healthy life ahead. Theatrisation is a much-needed organisational reform to ensure that
military-economy-technology develops as a triad to render a powerful nation. The need to discuss till consensus cannot be overemphasised. The long smouldering amber of theatrisation burst into a ball of fire at a fireside chat at the Army War College recently. Chief of Air Staff (CAS) questioned the need for a joint structure, putting the clock back by a few years. In the same conversation, he acknowledged the smooth conduct of Operation (Op) SINDOOR, with four of them planning together. This was a welcome change from 1999, when the Indian Army and Indian Air Force conducted two distinct operations, namely Op VIJAY and Op SAFED SAGAR, respectively. So credible was the integration in Op SINDOOR that until the Air Chief himself revealed it in a speech, most Indians did not know that five of the seven targets hit on 7th May were by the Army and only two by the Air Force. That subsequent retaliation by Pakistan and coup de grâce on 10th May could be handled equally smoothly is reason enough to believe that the current structures did deliver.
Readers should know that the appointment of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) was opposed by IAF equally, if not more, vehemently. This author had a ringside view of all discussions while recording minutes of each meeting of the “Task Force on Management of Defence (TFMD),” headed by Shri Arun Singh, whose recommendations were entirely accepted and subsumed into the Report by the GoM on Security headed by Shri LK Advani and comprising other members of CCS. The task force comprised 11 members — one scientist, four serving bureaucrats, four serving military officers (including the Director General, Defence Planning Staff as the member secretary) and one retired service officer, besides the chairman. All serving officers were additional secretary or of equivalent status. There was complete consensus on every recommendation except the CDS. The final recommendation on CDS was decided through a vote, with numbers mentioned in the report. However, despite the GoM recommendations, CDS appointment took two decades to fructify, perhaps stymied by the objections of not just bureaucrats but also the IAF. In the absence of the CDS, the remaining structure did not quite evolve the way it should have. A common lament in Service HQ is that the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) just added another layer in decision-making between Service HQ and MoD.
CAS, from what is available in the public domain, has flagged two concerns: additional layers in decision-making and lack of resources for dedicated allocation to theatres. As it stands, resources within Indian Air Force (IAF) are distributed among commands. That does not inhibit concentrated force application when required. The fears regarding decision-making layers perhaps arise not only from the IDS experience, but also from the undefined equation among theatre commanders, service chiefs and CDS. CDS, as the permanent chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) and the principal military adviser to Raksha Mantri (RM), does enjoy the status of the primus inter pares.
However, he does not have an operational mandate over Service HQ. The role of CDS, as envisaged in GoM recommendations, was to integrate planning and budgeting functions for credible perspective planning and necessary force development through optimal utilisation of the defence budget. Less than expected results in these objectives does generate apprehensions about unsettling the operational structure. Any discussion on theatre commands must be based on credible operational logic. Agni-Veer is a case in point, where the narrative of saving in pension smothered the logic of a youthful, skilled and motivated force that the Agni-Veer scheme begets.
Jointmanship has a logic, just as three different services for land, sea and air do. New domains of space and cyberspace have since evolved, but without a separate service being raised for them. Back in 1941, panzer divisions were halted short of Dunkirk for air campaign to progress the war in Western Europe. Fifty years later, air and land battles merged seamlessly in Op DESERT STORM. Five weeks of air campaign were as crucial to victory as 100 hours of land campaign. But the most critical was their joint orchestration. We’re three decades down the road from Op DESERT STORM. Jointmanship exists more in words than in thoughts and deeds.
Where is a modern war fought? What does it target? Where is the victory achieved? It is necessary to discuss such questions to bring out the nuances of physical, informational, perceptual and metaphysical dimensions of modern war, and to appreciate the need for joint orchestration of every military asset. War is but an instrument for prevailing of one national will over another, where every element of national power, whether military, economic, informational or diplomatic, is brought to bear its impact. Military acts exclusively in the physical dimension of war. Higher dimensions, where whole of nation gets involved, only count impact, oblivious of domain boundaries. Further, tactical impacts are fleeting and waning and, hence, need synergy in time and space. Individual service characteristics, such as speed, lethality, accuracy, knowledge of target, logistic footprint, survivability and resilience, particularly in the face of retaliation, fuse into spatio-temporal orchestration. This is the logic of the unitary command structure of the military that most militaries follow. This logic has no geographical basis and, thus, there is no reason for India to be an exception.
Back in 2000, when the CDS was recommended, the fear was that the concentration of command in one individual would render the military vulnerable to politicisation. This legitimate fear, expressed by experienced bureaucrats, imposed caution. Civil control over the military and an apolitical military are the hallmarks of a healthy democracy. CDS without an operational role was, however, not a compromise solution, but an effort to address the priorities in defence management.
The military had been far more successful in operations than in perspective planning and force development. Although inadequacies were blamed on bureaucracy, much of the problems lay within and among Service HQs. CDS was to lead integrated planning and detailed budgeting to simplify bureaucratic practices. The Kargil Review Report, authored by the redoubtable Shri K Subrahmanyam, had been scathing in its comments on the functioning of Service Headquarters.
TFMD addressed both the weaknesses and fears by recommending a CDS with a planning, rather than operational role. Theatre commands were also discussed. Andaman & Nicobar Command (ANC) and Strategic Forces Command (SFC) were, thus, recommended to be under the CDS for incubation as a joint services command. In the absence of CDS for two decades, the structure, however, could not mature. CAS remarks against “joint structure” indicate that the structure of the theatre command being presented is less than agreeable. There is no gainsaying that an integrated grid for fire support, mobility support, information support, logistic support and protection/survivability of men and machines would render exercise of operational art in a theatre far more effective. Observe-Orient-Decide-Act (OODA) is as much about decisions as about actions. Initiative and momentum go hand in hand. Loss of one results in loss of the other. Moreover, since wrong moves lead to loss of initiative, decisions ought to be as correct as speedy. Right decisions are based on timely and comprehensive information for which a joint services theatre is immensely more suitable.
CAS also brought up the need for experience in certain skill sets for higher leadership. This argument is specious. IAF has had a Chief who was not a fighter pilot. Higher leadership is about comprehension, perspectives and visualisation. Perspectives are gained more by exposure than experience. While intellect and exposure build upon each other to develop perspectives, mere experience may result in biases. An Air Force officer can make as good a theatre commander as an Army or a Navy officer. A structure evolved through consensus not only gets implemented more credibly, but is also far more sustaining. No written document on reforms is comprehensive. However, when the logic of change is understood and accepted, the gaps are credibly filled and coherence in reforms is maintained. It is, therefore, essential that structure of joint services theatre and relationship among theatre commanders, service chiefs and CDS be thoroughly discussed and arrived at with willing consensus. As in humans, so in organisations, health at birth is critical to a healthy life ahead. Theatrisation is a much-needed organisational reform to ensure that military-economy-technology develops as a triad to render a powerful nation. The need to discuss till consensus cannot be overemphasised.
The writer is Major General, VSM (Retd)