The Arabian Sea has emerged as one of the most important fronts in India’s battle against narcotics. The threat is no longer confined to drugs crossing the land border into Punjab or Rajasthan. Increasingly, enormous consignments of heroin and synthetic drugs are moving from the Golden Crescent through the maritime domain, using the Makran coast, offshore transhipment and fishing or cargo vessels to reach India’s shores and, potentially, markets farther east.
The latest seizure off Lakshadweep is a stark reminder of the scale and sophistication of this threat. On 25 September 2026, the Indian Coast Guard (ICG), in coordination with the Gujarat Anti-Terrorism Squad (ATS) and central intelligence agencies, intercepted an Iranian dhow in the Arabian Sea, about 160 nautical miles northwest of Lakshadweep and within India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Approximately 526 kg of heroin and methamphetamine, valued at more than `3,000 crore, was seized and five Pakistani nationals operating the vessel were arrested. The operation followed 16 days of intelligence-led surveillance and culminated in a coordinated hot pursuit and boarding of the vessel. The dhow, crew and contraband were subsequently escorted to Mumbai for interrogation and further investigation.
The importance of the operation goes beyond the value of the seizure. An Iranian vessel carrying five Pakistani nationals in India’s EEZ raises fundamental questions about the supply chain: where was the consignment loaded, who financed it, who controlled the vessel, who were its intended receivers and where did the network’s instructions originate? The answers will determine the full significance of the case.
The Makran–Arabian sea corridor
There is already considerable evidence that the western maritime narcotics pipeline is connected to the Golden Crescent and, in particular, the Makran coast.
The Makran coast stretches across the Pakistani and Iranian sides of Balochistan and provides direct access to the Arabian Sea. Indian agencies have repeatedly identified it as an important source or transit zone for narcotics moving towards the Indian Ocean.
In April 2021, the NCB reported that 337 kg of heroin seized from a Sri Lankan fishing vessel had been sourced from the Makran coast and transferred at sea to the vessel. The agency described the Makran coast as a major port of origin for Afghan heroin.
In another 2021 operation, the Indian Coast Guard intercepted a Pakistani boat off Jakhau, Gujarat, carrying approximately 30 kg of heroin. Eight Pakistani nationals were arrested. The same official account referred to an earlier Lakshadweep interception involving about 300 kg of narcotics, five AK-47 rifles and 1,000 rounds of ammunition, suspected to have originated from the Makran coast. These cases are important because they show that the maritime narcotics threat cannot be understood simply in terms of the nationality of the vessel. A shipment may originate on the Pakistan-Iran coast, be transferred to another boat in international waters, and eventually approach India under a different flag. That is precisely what makes the maritime route attractive to organised crime.
A pattern of Pakistani linkages
The latest Lakshadweep seizure should therefore be viewed against a broader pattern rather than as an isolated incident.
In March 2024, the Coast Guard, working with the NCB and Gujarat ATS, intercepted a Pakistani boat about 350 km from Porbandar in a sea-air coordinated operation. Six crew members were apprehended and narcotics worth approximately Rs 480 crore were recovered. The Coast Guard had deployed ships and Dornier aircraft on the basis of intelligence inputs, located the suspicious vessel at night and pursued it when it attempted evasive manoeuvres.
Only weeks later, in April 2024, the Coast Guard, ATS and NCB intercepted another Pakistani vessel carrying 14 crew members and approximately 86 kg of narcotics valued at Rs 600 crore. The vessel attempted to evade detection but was stopped by the Coast Guard ship Rajratan, supported by other ships and aircraft. The evidence therefore supports a carefully worded but significant conclusion: Pakistan-linked actors, Pakistani crews and the Makran coast repeatedly feature in India’s western maritime narcotics threat. That is stronger and more defensible than claiming that every consignment is directly controlled by the Pakistani state. There have also been allegations in individual investigations of links between major narcotics syndicates and Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Such allegations deserve investigation, particularly where narcotics revenues may intersect with terrorism, organised crime or illicit finance. But unless established through investigation and judicial proceedings, they should remain described as allegations — not facts.
The distinction is important. It makes the broader argument more credible. There is another lesson from the latest seizure: successful enforcement can displace rather than eliminate trafficking routes. Gujarat has historically been a major entry point for narcotics arriving from the western maritime corridor. Repeated interceptions and intensified coastal surveillance have raised the risk for smugglers operating close to the Gujarat coast. The latest seizure, however, occurred far to the south-west, near Lakshadweep.
This suggests that trafficking networks are willing to alter routes when enforcement pressure increases. The objective is not necessarily to land the cargo at the nearest coastline. It may be transferred offshore, carried southwards and then brought towards Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Sri Lanka or other destinations in the Indian Ocean.
Operation Samudragupt demonstrated the scale of this southern maritime threat. In May 2023, the NCB and Indian Navy intercepted a mother ship carrying an estimated 2,500 kg of high-purity methamphetamine. A suspected Pakistani national was detained. The operation was based on sustained intelligence collection and analysis that identified the likely route of the mother ship.
The lesson is clear: the Arabian Sea, Lakshadweep and India’s southern approaches must be treated as one interconnected narcotics theatre. Against this expanding threat, the Indian Coast Guard’s operational record deserves particular recognition. The 25 September operation demonstrates what effective maritime law enforcement should look like. It began with intelligence, progressed through sustained sea-air surveillance and persistent tracking, and culminated in a coordinated hot pursuit and boarding operation. The 16-day duration of the operation also demonstrates that maritime interdiction is not always a matter of detecting a vessel and immediately intercepting it; it can involve prolonged surveillance and intelligence development before the right moment for intervention. The March 2024 Porbandar interception provides another example. Coast Guard ships and Dornier aircraft were deployed following intelligence inputs. The suspicious Pakistani vessel was located at night, attempted evasive manoeuvring when challenged and was nevertheless pursued and stopped.
Such operations demonstrate the growing importance of intelligence-led maritime security rather than routine patrolling alone.
Yet the challenge is immense. The Arabian Sea is vast, traffickers can switch vessels and flags, rendezvous can occur far offshore, transponders can be switched off and small boats can blend into legitimate fishing activity. A successful seizure therefore demonstrates the effectiveness of intelligence and interdiction; it cannot tell us how many consignments remain undetected. India’s next objective should therefore be to move from interdiction to disruption.
First, maritime narcotics intelligence must be fused across the Coast Guard, Navy, NCB, customs, intelligence agencies and state ATS units. A common operational picture is essential. Second, satellite imagery, synthetic-aperture radar, radio-frequency detection, AIS analysis and long-endurance unmanned systems should be integrated to identify suspicious vessels and offshore rendezvous.
Third, greater attention must be paid to mother ships and transhipment points. Capturing a fishing boat carrying the final consignment is useful; identifying the vessel that loaded the drugs and the network that financed the operation is far more damaging to the cartel.
Fourth, surveillance must anticipate route displacement. If enforcement pressure makes Gujarat increasingly difficult, the southern approaches—including Lakshadweep and the waters leading towards Kerala and Tamil Nadu—will become more attractive. Finally, India must follow the money. Narcotics trafficking is a financial enterprise. Hawala, cryptocurrency, trade-based laundering and overseas assets should be investigated alongside the physical movement of drugs. Regional cooperation is equally important. Sri Lanka, Maldives, Mauritius, Seychelles, Oman and other Indian Ocean partners have an interest in preventing the Arabian Sea from becoming a common highway for narcotics.
The 25 September seizure is a major operational success. More than half a tonne of high-value narcotics was prevented from reaching its intended destination, five Pakistani nationals were apprehended and an international trafficking network was disrupted. But the larger lesson is strategic.
The western narcotics pipeline has a recognisable geography. The Golden Crescent supplies the drugs; the Makran coast provides an important maritime launch and transit zone; Pakistan-linked networks repeatedly appear in Indian investigations; and traffickers are adapting their routes as Indian enforcement becomes more effective.
India must detect the network farther from its shores, identify the mother ships and financiers, anticipate route displacement and dismantle the financial architecture behind the trade. The Indian Coast Guard has demonstrated that even sophisticated maritime networks can be detected, pursued and stopped through intelligence-led operations and close inter-agency coordination. The task now is to turn these successful interceptions into sustained network disruption. The Arabian Sea must not become the easy back door to India’s shores. It is a strategic security space — and India’s Coast Guard must remain at the forefront of defending it.
The author is a defence and strategic study expert, an anthropologist and a retired Additional Director General of Indian Coast Guard; Views presented are personal.