India’s cup of woes with Bangladesh is brimming over. The latest development in its ongoing Bangladesh nightmare is Dhaka renewing its demand for the extradition of the ousted Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, after she was awarded the death sentence by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal on November 17, for crimes against humanity. While New Delhi is highly unlikely to accede to this demand, its stance will only further fuel anti-India sentiments in Bangladesh, especially since Sheikh Hasina was toppled by a popular students’ uprising. These sentiments, in turn, could jeopardise India’s strategic interests, which have already been compromised to a great degree after New Delhi-Dhaka ties nose-dived under the interim government led by Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser. The 78-year-old Sheikh Hasina has been living in exile in India after she fled Bangladesh on 5 August last year following a mass rebellion against her authoritarian regime.
By allowing the Awami League leader to live in India, New Delhi has openly acknowledged — and justifiably so — her valuable role as a steadfast ally who kept India’s security interests in mind as Prime Minister. However, in the long run, New Delhi should consider seeking Sheikh Hasina’s relocation to a third country, given that her continued presence on Indian soil will remain a major irritant in bilateral relations, regardless of who is in charge in Dhaka. India’s response to Sheikh Hasina’s sentencing in absentia, which she has described as “rigged”, has been cautious and muted. It merely “noted the verdict” of the ICT, while attempting to reach out to the people of Bangladesh by saying: “As a close neighbour, India remains committed to the best interests of the people of Bangladesh, including in peace, democracy, inclusion, and stability in that country.”
Out of favour with the Yunus regime, India has also said it will always engage constructively with all stakeholders. Clearly, New Delhi knows it has no option but to work and engage with the government of the day in Dhaka. Discretion, as they say, is the better part of valour.
The prospects of the Awami League’s return to power are extremely bleak for now, as it is barred from undertaking any political activity by the interim government. The Yunus administration has said parliamentary elections and a referendum to bring about constitutional changes as per the July Charter will be held on the same day in February. A date, however, is yet to be announced. For now, India is deeply concerned about the geostrategic implications that a prolonged period of instability in Bangladesh would have on its own security and is hoping for timely elections. A big question mark, however, will remain over the legitimacy of the polls if a leading political party like the Awami League is kept out of the contest. It would also raise doubts about whether the elections could be considered truly inclusive and participatory. The two main outfits in the fray, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), have a pronounced anti-India stance.
The sonali adhyay (golden chapter) that marked bilateral relations for India under Sheikh Hasina has been firmly closed by the Yunus regime. Bangladesh’s disregard for India’s security imperatives is evident in its eager embrace of Pakistan - a country Sheikh Hasina had kept firmly at bay, among other things. Parallel to this, China’s growing influence in Bangladesh has kept India on tenterhooks. Coupled with Dhaka’s pivot towards Pakistan at both the diplomatic and military levels, the collusive Beijing-Islamabad challenge now confronts India in its neighbourhood like never before.
Seeking to forge closer bilateral ties with Pakistan, Yunus met Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September this year. Dhaka had earlier hosted Pakistan’s Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister, Muhammad Ishaq Dar, in August, with Dar becoming the first Pakistani Foreign Minister to visit Bangladesh in a decade. Earlier in January, a military delegation from Bangladesh travelled to Pakistan and met Army Chief Asim Munir, which was followed by a delegation from Pakistan’s ISI visiting Bangladesh just days later. Then, in October, a Pakistan Army delegation visited Bangladesh.
Pakistan and Bangladesh also aim to boost economic cooperation and have now resumed direct trade after a hiatus since the latter was born in 1971 from the erstwhile East Pakistan. They have also decided to explore the maritime route between Pakistan and Bangladesh, with a cargo vessel recently reaching Chittagong from Karachi. India, meanwhile, had set its sights on using Chittagong and Mongla ports in Bangladesh to boost connectivity to its northeast, signing an agreement with its neighbour to enable this. Its cross-border rail connectivity projects aimed at providing access to the northeast are also reported to have stalled amidst the plummeting ties.
With Islamist elements in Bangladesh gaining ground, and the Yunus regime lifting the ban on JeI imposed by Sheikh Hasina, India knows it has trouble brewing in its neighbourhood. The continuing presence of restive Rohingya refugees in Bangladesh, who number over a million, also remains a cause for concern for India. India recently hosted Bangladesh’s National Security Adviser, Khalilur Rahman, who has emerged as a key diplomat for his country, for the Colombo Security Conclave — a regional security grouping of which Dhaka became a member in July 2024. India should continue to engage constructively with all interlocutors from Bangladesh, while also firmly laying down the red lines that impinge on its security interests.
The writer is senior journalist and writes on strategic affairs; views are personal