It is the International Border and not the loC that is on target by Pakistan. The major reason for this is the proximity of NH1 to the IB which provides a target of strategic importance within the ‘striking distance'. Also, the density of troop deployment is weak in this sector
The twin terror attacks in Kathua and Samba districts of Jammu & Kashmir have evoked a strong public outrage against the Pakistan Army and its civilian establishment. The legislative Assembly of the State, currently in session, has also passed a unanimous resolution condemning the unfriendly neighbouring country.
Unhappy with the formation of a Peoples Democratic Party-Bharatiya Janata Party alliance Government in the state, Pakistan is hell-bent on fomenting trouble. Apart from spreading terror, the aim of the twin attacks appears to be to foment communal tension and violence and to hit Jammu’s economy. The time chosen for the attacks coincided with the Navratra festival that is not only celebrated with great devotion in the State but also attracts a large number of pilgrims from all over the country to the shrine of Shri Mata Vaishno Devi.
It is to the credit of the local people in Jammu that the pilgrims have not fallen prey to the nefarious designs of the enemy. Pakistan must realise that Indians are resilient and will not be provoked by such cowardly acts. Such acts make our resolve to fight terror even stronger. Pakistan continues to use terror as an instrument of state policy to further its so called ‘national interests’. Despite having been defeated militarily and snubbed diplomatically, it continues to be obsessed with the idea of Kashmir being its ‘umbilical cord’.
Having realised that it cannot defeat India militarily, Pakistan has now adopted the policy of ‘thousand cuts’ to keep India bleeding. It continues to classify the terrorists in Pakistan as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ terrorists. All of those terrorist organisations that carry attacks against India are termed ‘good’ and their leaders enjoy the patronage of the Government, despite being declared as ‘proclaimed international terrorists’ by the United Nations, the US and many Western countries.
Of late, Pakistan has preferred the International Border sector over the line of Control sector, to infiltrate and carry out terror attacks in Jammu & Kashmir. There are many reasons for this, of which weather is a minor reason. The major reason is the proximity of NH1 to the IB which runs at a distance of five kilometres to 15km from the Border. NH1 provides a target of strategic importance within the ‘striking distance’ that can draw immediate media attention.
‘Striking distance’ is the distance within which Pakistan has the capability to carry out a one-night operation — infiltrate and strike on the same night, thus reducing the chances of being intercepted after crossing the border. The terrain in this sector, in the form of broken ground and numerous nullahs (running East-West) also assist in the infiltration. A number of brick kilns and mobile towers along NH1 provides good navigational land marks at night. There are many lucrative targets — both military and civilian, available within the striking distance as compared to the loC sector. Another important factor is the density of troop deployment. The density is much less as compared to the loC sector which, apart from having a strong
anti-infiltration deployment, also has a very effective counter-terrorist grid in the hinterland. Pakistani authorities also hope that a strike in this sector may rouse communal passions leading to communal riots thus damaging the harmonious social fabric of the state to further its failed agenda of ‘two-nation theory’.Pakistan’s insistence to term the IB as a ‘Working Boundary’ and thus the refusal to accept it as an accepted International Border, is also a reason for preferring this sector so that it can claim the entire Jammu & Kashmir as a disputed territory.
It is worth examining as to how the terrorists manage to cross the border, despite the claim of the Border Security Force that it is well guarded. The aim is not to point fingers at any particular force. All security forces are carrying out their assigned roles to the best of their abilities within the given resources. Is it then the question of resourcesIJ I have already highlighted the aspects of terrain. Another important point to note is that the Border fence has been erected against the line of the ground, and hence, it gets damaged during the monsoons — thus creating gaps. Naturally, to cover these gaps, a greater strength of manpower is required, and that would affect deployment elsewhere.
The first tier of deployment here should be based on all-weather, 24x7 surveillance radars, sensors, hand-held thermal imagers, night vision binoculars and alarm systems. It must be complemented with physical deployment based on threat assessment and terrain. The night ambushes should be laid on a dynamic grid pattern rather than static linear deployment. Vulnerable areas such as nullahs and gaps need to be covered adequately. Each border outpost must have an operational command post, manned by a team led by an officer who should monitor the data being received from the surveillance grid with authority to re-deploy ambushes under its operational control. The entire deployment needs to be backed by a reliable and secure communication system.
The second tier needs to be deployed between the IB and NH1 based on high grounds or dominating ground. A similar dynamic grid of ambushes equipped with night vision devices and night sights need to be established in the second-tier also. This tier also needs to be complemented with police nakas. However, the aspect of communication needs to be coordinated and rehearsed.
The third tier needs to be based on NH1 and areas immediately in depth. Village Defence Committees should be incorporated in this tier. VDCs need to be properly armed, well trained and highly motivated. long-range surveillance radars along with surveillance command posts could also be a part of the third tier.looking inwards, those advocating the revocation of the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act must re-think whether the time is ripe for it. By insisting on its removal, they could be helping the troika in Pakistan.
To sum up, a proactive approach towards border management, surveillance and infiltration is the need of the hour. To achieve this, an integrated, professional and well trained intelligence network is a pre-requisite. This network should not rely only on electronic intelligence but should also be backed up by human intelligence.
Training camps and launch pads need to be under constant monitoring. Since a large number of Army camps are also located in the area, there should be a seamless integration between the BSF, police, intelligence agencies and the Army. The issue of command and control should be unambiguous. There should be no duplicity at all. Coordination between neighbouring units deployed on the border should be flawless since inter unit and inter formation boundaries are always vulnerable. It needs to be understood that, until we make our borders impregnable, we will continue to be a victim of cross-border terrorism. Pakistan is not going to relent from bleeding India.
(The author is a Jammu based security and strategic analyst. He can be contacted at anil5457@gmail.com)