Deliberation on Pakistan’s possible motives is a useful exercise which proponents of military action must objectively undertake at this juncture. Any hasty reaction might lead us into the trap that Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership has laid out for India
In response to the tragic Uri terror attack, a lot have been said in the news and social media in the last few days. Predictably so, as happens after every Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attack in India, this time too, enthusiastic experts and concerned citizens of India were quick to take recourse to news and social media to suggest a befitting military response to this dastardly attack emanating from Pakistan.
Appeals for military response are quite understandable. But before we can decide and venture on any response strategy towards Pakistan, it would perhaps be pertinent for the Indian Government to get a clear understanding about the rationale behind Pakistan’s move to stage such an attack. Deliberation on Pakistan’s possible motives is a useful exercise which proponents of military action must objectively undertake at this juncture. Any hasty reaction might lead us into the trap that Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership has laid out for India.
The intention of Pakistan’s civilian and military leadership behind orchestrating such an attack appears pretty clear from the very beginning. In the past, on several occasions, Pakistan staged such attacks on India to either deflect the international spotlight on itself or to manipulate the prevailing national mood. When viewed from this prism, staging an attack on Indian Army in Uri sector suited Pakistan’s security establishment in many ways. Since the last few months, especially after the unexpected mention by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, the spotlight of international community was turning towards Pakistan and its security forces over human rights violations in Balochistan. Given the pace of news stories documenting the deplorable situation in Balochistan, Pakistan’s security establishment calculated that such India-driven pro-activism on the issue could put it in a tight spot in the future. Since August 15, India has taken a radically new stance in its Pakistan policy.
Taking leaf from the Dovalian doctrine, the Indian Government perhaps for the first time in its history has been vociferously using the “B” word in all its deliberations on Pakistan. Indications of this were validated by the fact that a Hindustan Times report of September 15, 2016, suggested that India has decided to raise the issue of human rights violations in Balochistan in the UN human rights forum.
The civilian Government in Pakistan had another reason to deflect the domestic public opinion, which was gaining traction. A perusal of Pakistani news reports for the last two months suggested that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif was increasingly getting cornered by Opposition political parties for his role as revealed in the Panama leaks. Reports from Pakistani news media such as the one published by Dawn on August 1, 2016, had suggested that over this issue, the Opposition parties, primarily led by Imran Khan, were planning a nation-wide protests march.
The military planners in Rawalpindi calculated that, at worst, the response from the Indian Armed Forces to a terrorist attack could be a repetition of an Operation Parakram style mobilisation by India. To counter any such military moves, Pakistan felt that it could bank on the support from some of its regional and international partners. Unlike earlier times, China’s stakes in the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor are so high that it would be forced to intervene either diplomatically or militarily on behalf of Pakistan.
Nawaz Sharif even appealed to the US Secretary of State John Kerry to mediate in resolving the current crisis on the Kashmir issue, albeit with no success. Additionally, the Russia-Pakistan military exercises that began on Friday may embolden Pakistan’s calculations for deterring any military response from India.
India would, therefore, be ill-advised to fall into this Pakistani trap by sending its forces for an outright confrontation. Replying to Pakistan’s terrorist attack by initiating the Cold Start doctrine is not a feasible idea given the enormous strain on resources. The advice of Union Minister Gen (Retd.) VK Singh is most pertinent. General Singh has insisted that India should plan its next move in a dispassionate manner. India, it has been asserted by some, must continue its information warfare against Pakistan’s dubious role in Balochistan. The Uri attack must at no point of time compel India to shift its focus away from Balochistan.
B Raman, a former Indian spy and head of counter-terrorism division of the Research and Analysis Wing, had quoted his interaction with the former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his book The Kaoboys of R&AW: Down Memory lane that back in the late 1980s India had begun engaging with those members of Pakistan who did not carry any inhibitions against India. Taking cue from this, India must pro-actively step up its engagement with all stakeholders in and outside Balochistan and pro-actively support any initiative that enables highlighting Pakistan’s atrocities. Additionally, it must also make efforts to encourage Baloch leaders representing different ideologies and affiliations to come together for strengthening their freedom struggle. This process is painstakingly slow but in the long run would make Pakistan rethink its adopted position on terrorism.
(The writer is Fellow, Observer Research Foundation, Mumbai)