Prime Minister Modi's visit to China next week is an opportunity for both nations to step back from the beaten track. A ‘strategic resetting’ of ties would be in the long term interest of both countries. New situations unfolding in their common neighbourhood on their West bring common dangers from extremism. China should be encouraged to think outside the grooves of its existing Pakistan policy to enable effective India-China collaboration there
Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s forthcoming visit to China next week is easily the most challenging one out of all his forays into strategic diplomacy. Not only because China lies at the centre of the Indian strategic firmament — that is something he has already shown cognisance of in the design and detail of his diplomatic duets abroad — but because of the legacy of India-China relations he has inherited, which is by no means an enviable one.
It will be the first substantive engagement between the top leaders of the two countries without peers other than each other. Their earlier interaction, during President Xi Jinping’s visit in September last, was more an “ice-breaking and sizing up” round. (So also their several other meetings on the sidelines of multilateral gatherings.)
Even in that first meeting, and despite the constraints of being the host, the Prime Minister had not minced words in conveying Indian concerns on certain basic aspects affecting the relationship. The importance of early settlement of the boundary question and of building a climate of confidence, i.e., the need for addressing the underlying “trust deficit,” in particular.
Adequate indications of satisfaction on these counts would presumably have been received from the Chinese side officially, and the visit scheduled on that basis. Not merely on protocol considerations, stemming from Chinese preference for public display of bonhomie. Otherwise the visit would not be justified. Economic, investment and other agreements — invariably at the centre of media attention because of the media-corporate nexus — can be decided upon at other levels as well; they do not require the personal attention of the Indian numero uno, bitterly hard pressed for time and energy as he is.
A return visit in less than a year’s time is a special consideration to China that is not extended to any other country by India — a gesture that must therefore not (be allowed to) go unappreciated.
(This may not be an issue for the Chinese side. For frequent meetings well serve China’s grand strategy of obfuscating natural fault lines on the global chess board, whether they lead to any substantive outcome or not. Also, the Chinese system provides for a leadership duo — President Xi Jinping, combining the posts of Head of State and Party (which directs the State in all matters, strategic perspective above all), as the “central mind” and Premier li Keqiang, as the “central arm”/CEO of the State machinery. Governance is, therefore, not affected directly by President Xi’s absences on travel, as much as in case of the Indian PM.)
Unfortunately, there has been too much of that kind of “symbolism sans substance” summitry between India and China in recent years. Indian diplomacy has allowed itself to get locked in a Chinese template of the relationship in which it stands committed to frequent summit-level meetings as an end in itself, almost, unrelated to delivery of results on the (many) issues bedeviling the sui generis relationship. It is a professional failure par excellence, little noticed, that has saddled the political leadership with a burdensome obligation.
The weakness goes farther, unfortunately, beyond an excessive commitment to frequent visits. It extends to substantive aspects as well. A close reading of the corpus of joint Statements/Declarations/Agreements issued or concluded over the years reveals shortcomings in the conceptualisation (and conduct) of the relationship. It betrays a Chinese design, abounding in concepts and clichéd phrases which convey only a connotation, not any clear meaning; and a penchant for generalities (that are prone to conflicting interpretations), instead of casting common understandings and shared agreements in terms of unambiguous specifics.
little wonder then that the record of India-China relations over the last four decades of efforts to “normalise” relations is a highly mixed one, howsoever generously it be viewed.
Border issue
Though the border issue was naturally central to the reconciliation endeavour India initiated under late Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, during the 1988 visit of late PM Rajiv Gandhi India agreed to “work hard to create a favorable climate and conditions for a fair and reasonable settlement of the boundary question, while seeking a mutually acceptable solution” (emphasis added). i.e., not to allow “differences (on the border) to come in the way of improvement of relations”.
This major concession made by India in good faith was (mis)used by China to place the boundary issue on the back-burner through one contrivance or another, in effect shelving it. India-China relations are where they are today because of this gesture by India, taking China at its word. But a resolution of the border issue is nowhere on the cards even, twenty five years plus later. The talks have dragged on and on, through changing mechanisms — eight rounds of talks at Vice-Ministerial level (1981-87), 15 rounds of the Joint Working Group (1988-2003) and 18 of the Special Representatives (2003 to date), with precious little to show for their labours.
The sole tangible advance made — the 2005 Agreement on the Political Parameters & Guiding Principles for Settlement of the Boundary Question — proved to be short-lived because of Chinese back-tracking. The very next year the Chinese Ambassador was made to publicly reiterate claim to the whole of Arunachal Pradesh on the eve of President Hu Jintao’s 2006 visit. There were other indications that the Ambassador’s remark was by no means an outlier but presaged a carefully considered withdrawal from the commitment in the 2005 Agreement, camouflaged under the plea that the Indian side had misunderstood the provisions and was misinterpreting them.
The Special Representatives talks have been (kept) stalemated (by the Chinese) ever since, though a cleverly worded gloss is given in their public formulations to keep naïve Indian hopes (of Chinese willingness for a settlement) alive. Overall, it has been a bleak harvest for India in return for its “upfront payment” in 1988.
Sino-Pak nexus
Nor has there been any change in the long standing Chinese strategic undermining of India through supplies of sensitive strategic technologies to Pakistan. On the contrary, that effort has now been lent a cutting edge, in the shape of supply of submarines during the recent visit of President Xi to Pakistan. And likewise to the “string of pearls” strategy of slow and steady encirclement of India, evident to all but those who do not wish to see, through a quantum leap in commitment of investment resources and plans (US $45 billion plus) for the so-called “economic corridor” along the infamous Karakoram highway running through Indian territory occupied by Pakistan illegally. The Chinese Assistant Foreign Minister’s insensitive statement unilaterally asserting that India need have no worries about China’s investment plans in PoK (and Pakistan) betrays no cognition of the glaring contradiction with China’s own objections to third country participation in economic projects in areas it has a dispute with its neighbouring countries (ADB assistance for any project in Arunachal Pradesh or Indian drilling off the Vietnamese coast).
The symbolism, of anti-Indian grit, in this visit being timed just weeks before PM’s visit to China is too clear to be missed.
Other trans-boundary issues
China has been cagey and non-transparent in sharing information about its long term plans for utilisation of the waters of the rivers originating in Tibet and flowing down to India (and other countries). Some data sharing has commenced after much prodding but the Chinese have a long way to go if the norms of full disclosure and transparency, eminently apt for “strategic partners”, are to be the benchmark, as they should. likewise in respect of the environment and ecology in Tibet, which again has far-reaching implications for India.
Tibet and Tibetans
India has always been on the defensive on matters relating to Tibetans in India due to Chinese touchiness about His Holiness the Dalai lama (HHDl). This despite a categorical Indian position acknowledging China’s complete sovereignty over Tibet right from the start in the 1950s, consecrated early in the day in the 1954 agreement. (The first of its kind between the two as independent nations. India gave up the various privileges inherited from British India in solidarity with China at that time, putting aside its embarrassment at the break in the long standing historical ties based on cultural affinity with the Tibetan way of life that it entailed.)
While the question of Tibetan autonomy remains and the problem (of Tibetan alienation) continues to fester, the Indian position on Tibet has regressed over the years, under pressure from the Chinese, to reflect acquiesce in China’s tightening grip over Tibet, looking away from China’s trampling over provisions for autonomy in the 17-point Agreement of 1955 with HHDl Thus, whereas the 1954 agreement applied to the entire “Tibet region of China” (referring to the areas traditionally regarded as Tibetan), the 2003 Joint Declaration mentions
only the entity “Tibetan Autonomous Region of China” (which is just a part of traditional Tibet, carved out of its boundaries by leaving out Chamdo and other parts now incorporated in Qinghai and Szechuan provinces), implicitly endorsing this clipping of the boundaries of Tibet in the psychological war being carried out by China against the Tibetans and HHDl
The strategic partnership anomaly
Apart from the 1988 concession on the boundary issue, a second major “give” on the part of India — and an even more excessive one — was the 2005 decision to elevate India’s relationship with China to a “strategic partnership”, during Prime Minister Wen Jiabao’s visit (when the above-mentioned boundary Agreement was signed).
The two countries had concluded a “cooperative partnership” just two years earlier (during the 2003 visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee), so there was really no reason to upgrade the declared status of the relationship to a “strategic partnership” so soon after. If the expectation was that the “strategic partnership” decision would result in China turning a new leaf and heeding Indian concerns in its diplomatic posture and conduct, it was belied. Not only did China go back on the 2005 boundary Agreement in 2006, it played (plays) hard to get on India’s candidature for permanent membership of the UNSC and positively dirty in the 2008 Nuclear Suppliers Group decision to grant India a waiver, besides maintaining the anti-edge of its collaboration with Pakistan.
Yet hyperbolic formulations such as India-China relations having transcended “bilateral issues and acquired a global and strategic character” and of their reflecting “a congruence of purpose apart from a common perception of world events” came into vogue in the official lexicon, unmindful of Chinese actions on the ground at just about the same time. Ten years down the line, the “strategic partnership” remains as vacuous a trope as when it was conceived, an empty shell that sends out misleading signals about the state of play in, and health of, the relationship.
Obfuscation
“Words, words, words” — the problem of verbiage, endemic in diplomacy, cannot be said to be a minor one in the India-China context! For a bureaucracy groomed in the traditions of the steel frame, India comes out poorly —unable to resist being caught in a web of words, even on an important issue like the boundary talks.
Taken together with the difficulties of capturing nuances of one language in another and the well-known dangers of messages being “lost in translation” (in the absence of mechanisms for reliable reverse translation checks), it even raises doubt at times about the credibility and dependability of the entire process (of diplomatic exchanges) and whether the two sides really understand each other.
But, of course, in the main it is not a question of translation or language but political intent, will and stratagems, and there the Chinese side would seem to have definitely got the better of its Indian counterpart. Not for nothing is the mandarin bureaucracy respected for its long standing tradition of statecraft, with deception and obfuscation being regarded as par for the course as raison d’état.
Agenda for the visit
Despite these asymmetries and anomalies, the official discourse has been unduly sanguine about India-China relations, almost as if they did not exist. This inexplicable “blind spot” about the underlying “trust deficit”, which stares any disinterested observer in the face but which the official discourse seems to have difficulty in factoring in, is therefore the key aspect deserving of high-level attention at this juncture, on the eve of the PM’s visit. A series of dos and don’ts suggest themselves naturally, some of which can be listed below at the risk of carrying coals to Newcastle.
Border: In retrospect, it is evident that the three-stage methodology (of “principles and parameters” being agreed upon first, then a “framework” for an Agreement and finally the Agreement itself in the third stage) adopted by the SRs in 2003 for addressing the boundary question was a ploy for prevarication that the Indian side was unable to see through or counter.
Given its poor delivery, it is time for India to jettison it and seek negotiation of concrete specifics of the settlement instead. Somewhat like the talks between late PMs Zhou Enlai and Nehru.
There is no guarantee of success, of course, in pushing the negotiations up to the level of the two principals. But they are guaranteed to fail the other way round — that much is clear from the record of the last forty years. The India-China border/boundary issue is one, it is well known to experts and China scholars, which is eminently amenable to resolution on the basis of mutually agreed “strategic frontiers” (provided there is political will and good intent on both sides, of course) since the specifics of the situation allow the vital interests of both sides to be accommodated. I.e. the latter are not irreconcilable.
That ambitious, albeit promising, task can be attempted now, in token of earnestness of both sides to come to grips with the issue, once and for all, instead of taking easy (lazy) recourse behind the formulation that it was a complicated problem left over from history, etc, which is just a way of running away from the demands of statesmanship.
Suggestions for the Prime Minister to lend his weight to the exercise of clarification of the lAC are completely mistaken. That is a red herring. It can be safely left to the two militaries. It is high time the political leaders went in for the jugular, the boundary itself, as above.
Pakistan: China’s brazen assertion that its relations with Pakistan were unexceptionable is simply not tenable. That claim has to be punctured, along with a message that India is not ready to live with that
fiction any longer. China has to be asked how it proposes to square up the nefarious Sino-Pak nexus with its professed goodwill for, and “strategic partnership” with, India. And made to choose between the two — either the ground realities of Sino-Pak relations change or the strategic partnership with India goes; it cannot (be allowed to continue to) ride both horses simultaneously any more.
Trans-boundary waters and ecology: These are aspects that should be brought within the ambit of the strategic partnership, especially in its morphed form (since September last) of a “developmental partnership”. They cannot be ignored any longer if the trust deficit is to be addressed.
Tibet: The harsh truth is that if China is still not convinced that India has no designs of any kind in Tibet after all these years of restraint, it never will be, no matter what India commits to. Therefore, instead of seeking to ingratiate itself with China through ever more strongly binding formulations on Tibet “belonging” to China, which is like running harder to stay still, it may be time to seek a frank, and earnest, dialogue focusing on the real problem instead — creation of conditions conducive for the return of the Tibetan refugees to China. India has a legitimate stake in that denouement, as a kindred land with close cultural and close historical ties, and should therefore be able to raise the matter so without batting an eyelid.
It can do better, in fact, and offer to play a helpful role in the process. This will, of course, require China to shed its prickliness and approach the problem with an open mind, undoubtedly a tall order as of today. But the offer could be made in the spirit of the “strategic partnership”, as a well-wisher, leaving it for China to pick up should it so desire. The possibility of its wanting to make a new beginning need not be ruled out, completely alienated as the Tibetans continue to be after all these years of “development” and propaganda — at least not under a leader like President Xi Jinping, who has not hesitated to open a new chapter on many a front.
No unilateral concessions: Strict reciprocity (and not unilateral gestures/concessions) is the accepted basis of diplomacy. Why this was not observed (in 1988) is a question only those privy to official records can answer; what is clear from the outside is that India has paid a price for that mistake, a cardinal sin in diplomacy. This must not be repeated.
No falling for oral promises, howsoever tall or attractive — all understandings to be reduced to writing at the time they are arrived at. Whatever the basis for the optimism in the Indian camp in 1988, it should not have been left oral. The Chinese side should have been persuaded to put it down on paper.
Understandings to be worded in terms of specifics, not abstractions (such as principles/parameters/guidelines, etc): Results of negotiations must be worded in tangible terms, or elaborated upon in specifics; not in ambiguous phrases that can be interpreted at will. So that the nation is spared the ignominy of 2005, of being a helpless spectator to Chinese back-tracking.
Conclusion: Strategic Reset vs Tactical Meandering
A “strategic resetting” of India-China relations, in short, is what required. In contrast to the directionless, essentially tactical, meandering of the past that has left India in a position of disadvantage vis-à-vis China.
lessons must be learnt from the experience of four decades of “normalisation”, with a view to finding ways of redressing not only the trust deficit but also the “dignity deficit,” which has crept in, or been allowed to creep in rather, over the years. “Diplomatic meeting; eating and cheating,” the earthy late President Zail Singh had quipped once, in his inimitable manner.
A frank talk with the Chinese leadership seeking a complete change in the dynamics of China’s policy approach towards India, Pakistan and the Af-Pak-Iran region as a whole can open the door for the much larger possibilities that await a blossoming of the India-China relationship to its full potential. If there is convergence between the interests of India and China on any issue outside the bilateral rubric, it is on the dangers of extremism incubating in the terrorist hotbed in the NWFP —northern area of Pakistan abutting Xinjiang. Conventional approaches will not so; creative, cross-cutting solutions will have to be thought of — now, before it is too late.
This will not be easy, obviously — no tough delivery of a message ever is or can be. But it has to be done — as tactfully as possible, of course, but without papering over problems that are not of India’s making. The nation’s diplomatic machine will have to brace up for that challenge.
Admittedly unorthodox, such an out-of-the-box approach should not be consigned to the realm of the unthinkable a priori. With strong leaders (described, interestingly, by one Chinese academic as “political entrepreneurs”) in both countries in the early stage of their tenures, they have enough time ahead of them to explore alternative approaches instead of treading the beaten track of yesteryears.
(The author is a former senior diplomat with a background in Chinese and strategic affairs. He is currently with the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bengaluru. His views on China can be seen in more detail at http://www.nias.res.in/aboutnias-people-faculty-ambassadorsaurabhkumar.php)