What is worrying today is the growing popular appetite in Pakistan for intervention by the army in the political sphere. One can see a strange sense of fraternity emerging in the horizon between the liberals opposed to talks with the TTP and the army-baiters who see in it an opportunity to bounce back
The democratic experiment in Pakistan is facing multiple challenges. The Sharif Government’s talks with the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) do not show any promise. Its relationship with the military is showing early signs of strain. The government’s efforts to create an enabling environment for economic growth and consolidate the process of civilianisation/democratisation seem to falter. Will the situation improve, or deteriorateIJ
Direct talks
First let us take the case of the dialogue. After months of false starts, even after the Taliban declared a month-long ceasefire on March 1, the first direct talks with the Taliban Shura could only take place on March 26 at a place of TTP’s choice — at the residence of a retired Subedar of Frontier Corps, identified only as Jamil, in the Biland Khel area of Shawa Tehsil on the border of Orakzai and North Waziristan tribal agencies bordering Afghanistan, close to the garrison town of Thal.
The members of the government and TTP committees were flown from Peshawar to Thal in a military helicopter and taken from there by TTP members to Bilandkhel. Given the remoteness of the place and the military’s presence in the area, the TTP Shura members took about two days to negotiate the streams and mountainous tracks to reach the venue. The talks went on from 11 am till 5 pm. During the talks both parties exchanged their views.
The TTP refuses to bend
The Taliban looked more prepared than the government in the talks. They handed over a list of 250 non-combatants and 700 combatants and asked for their early release and declaration of a peace zone to enable their free movement in the tribal areas, in the interest of continuation of dialogue in quest of peace. The leaks about the talks in the media suggested that the Taliban were quite rigid about their demands on jehad and Islam. It was reported in Pakistani press that when one of the members of the government committee tried to provide the Shura member of his own views about jehad and his disagreement with the Taliban version of it, he was snubbed by Qari Shakil, head of the TTP political Shura, who bluntly asked him not to lecture them on jehad.
Qari Shakil, whose original name is Shakeel Ahmed Haqqani, is Number 3 in the Taliban hierarchy, after TTP chief Mullah Fazlullah and Mullah Khalid Haqqani, who is his deputy and head of the supreme TTP Shura. He was assisted by Maulana Azam Tariq, Maulvi Bashir and Maulvi Zakir. The clout that the political Shura has in the Taliban supreme Shura is unknown. However, known for their uncompromising stance on imposition of Sharia and suspension of the existing Constitution of Pakistan, it is highly unlikely that they would ever oblige the Sharif Government with their commitment to shun violence without implementation of Sharia and meeting of their demands.
Moreover, since the TTP is a loose conglomerate of disparate radical Islamist groups, the control of the central Taliban Shura on all its members is questionable. This was quite visible in the assertion of a splinter group calling itself Ahrar-ul-Hind (liberator of India) even when the TTP claimed its seriousness about observing the ceasefire, it had declared on March 1. Omar Khalid Khurasani, the Taliban commander in Mohmand — who was earlier responsible for the beheading of 23 FC soldiers — threatened even during the talks that attacks would begin again in Pakistan.
Ceasefire off, Talks on!
Despite the government’s release of 19 Taliban and its assurance that it was considering the TTP demands by the first week of April, the differences between the two seemed hard to reconcile. Following the release, the TTP hesitantly extended its truce offer by another ten days, only to call it off on April 16. The TTP spokesman issued a one-page statement in Urdu, which claimed that the government was either not serious or did not have the necessary authority to make peace.
The TTP’s innuendo was all too familiar. It was referring to the army as the main spoiler, and the organisation which had the power to negotiate and stopped short of saying that it was useless to talk to the government — an indirect flattering hint that it is the army which mattered more than the Sharif Government. It is also believed that the army refused to meet the TTP demand for a peace zone, even if the government was considering it for discussion. This led the TTP to argue that even if it was ready to continue the process, the attacks will start again. In fact, two days later when an army depot caught fire, the news that was initially splattered in the internet by the news agencies suggested that the attacks by the TTP had begun.
The TTP threat has been taken quite seriously by all concerned. The Sharif government convened a high-level meeting of the Cabinet Committee on National Security (CCNS) on April 17 and discussed the options to counter the TTP blackmail. like the TTP, the government now says it will continue the process of dialogue "gradually", even if there is no ceasefire. At the same time the CCNS held that "internal security was of paramount importance for consolidating the economic gains that the government had achieved through sound macroeconomic policies and hard work of the economic team".
Fear of the return of khaki
Amid the fear of TTP reprisals and talks of differences between the government and the army about peace dialogue with the Taliban, there was a political turmoil in Pakistan over the issue of Musharraf trial. After Musharraf’s indictment in the treason case against him, rumour was rife that he would soon be allowed to leave Pakistan to attend his ailing mother. However, the PMl-N camp seemed divided over the issue with the ministers for defence and railways coming out openly against any possible leniency to be shown to the dictator. Apparently, the army felt offended by some of the remarks made by defence minister Khawaja Asif and according to some reports, asked for his scalp.
Adding grist to the grind mill, the ISPR press release of April 7 referred to army chief’s reactions to “undue criticisms" being levelled against the army. Gen Raheel Sharif, while visiting the Headquarters of Special Service Group (SSG) at Ghazi Base, Tarbela, was quoted as saying that the Army would uphold “the sanctity of all institutions and will resolutely preserve its own dignity and institutional pride”.
In Pakistan, an army chief’s statement is always put under the scanner and is given disproportionate importance. Many commentators in the media held that he was voicing the frustration in the army about the civilian government’s policies. The Sharif Government’s propensity for talks with the TTP and its vendetta against Musharraf were touted as twin examples of the civilian government’s flouting of the army’s wishes. The resultant political tension in the Pakistani capital was quite palpable. Nawaz was seen to be parleying with Zardari in a bid to convey a sense of unity among the democratic forces, as a deterrent to any probable coup.
The fear has somewhat subsided after the CCNS meeting of April 17. Another report that Nawaz Sharif had accepted an invite from the army to chair the 128th long Course passing-out ceremony at the Pakistan Military Academy, Abottabad, today (April 19). However, the incident suggests the deep suspicion that characterises civil military relations in Pakistan even after six years of continuous democratic rule.
Prospects
While the army maintains a façade of toughness vis-à-vis the insurrectionary challenge from within, it is well-known that it was the chief architect of numerous failed peace deals with domestic Taliban even when it held absolute power during Musharraf’s rule. Even in the Swat case, where the army apparently dealt with the radical elements with firmness, it was not committed to its clear-hold-build strategy and has tamely conceded ground to the Taliban in an incremental manner. Its expeditionary thrusts into the tribal agencies of FATA have been rather episodic, without any clear-cut strategy to consolidate the gains.
Therefore, to say that the army wants to unleash a full-throttle operation against the TTP may not be entirely true, howsoever attractive it may look as an alternative to the civilian government’s seemingly timid policy of dialogue. In reality, the army may be finding in it an opportunity to divide the TTP and take it on more effectively.
What is worrying today is the growing popular appetite for intervention by the army in the political sphere. One can see a strange sense of fraternity emerging in the horizon between the liberals opposed to talks with the TTP, and the army-baiters who see in it an opportunity to bounce back. The Musharraf case is being cited an example of personal vendetta rather than a genuine attempt to bring a dictator to justice. The treason case against the former military dictator, with all its limitations — for he is being tried for invoking emergency in 2007 and not for his misdeeds in Kargil and usurpation of power in 1999 — should be ideally pursued to its logical conclusion, for it could serve as a deterrent against praetorian assertion by the army in future.
A judicial revisit of the ‘doctrine of necessity’ cited by Justice Munir, which legitimised coup by the army, way back in the 1950s, is also necessary for stabilisation of the ongoing process of democratisation. Only with a clear locus of power can Pakistan fight out the challenges it is confronted with.
(Dr Ashok Behuria is Coordinator of South Asia Centre and a Fellow at IDSA. The views expressed here are his own)