As a consequence of inter-operability, the Pakistan military could well use China's military capabilities, in addition to its own, to increase its options both in north Kashmir and on the line of Control. This is the clear military message that India should get from Xi's Pakistan visit
While Pakistan has described the recent visit of Chinese President Xi Jinping as a fate-changing event, it is much the same for India. Addressing a joint session of Pakistan’s Parliament, Mr Xi said that “China’s friendship with Pakistan is transforming into a strategic partnership for mutual benefit”.
Mr Xi was referring to the 2,395km long economic corridor, connecting Xinjiang to Gwadar port in the Arabian Sea through Gilgit-Baltistan and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, which is central to his ambitious ‘one belt, one road’ plan. The subtext was the cemented military ties between ‘brothers’ needed to protect and provide depth to the economic corridor passing through disputed territories the two have with India. This mutual strategic need has spurred Pakistan and China to achieve military inter-operability unmatched even by the US-Nato alliance at the height of détente in the seventies, when the Soviet Union threat to Western Europe was at its peak. This should worry Prime Minister Narendra Modi as a threat to India’s disputed borders with Pakistan and China has enhanced manifold.
Inter-operability is the ability of two Armed Forces to operate together in combat environment with ease as one whole. Once fully achieved, this will help Pakistan strengthen its deterrence, manage crises, shape battlefields and win wars against India with China’s operational support. The three years that the economic corridor would take to be completed is the time available to Pakistan and China to accomplish the inter-operability. This is also the time for India to understand and take corrective steps to face the humongous challenge staring it in the face. Pakistani and Chinese Armies and Air Forces are well on the road to achieve inter-operability, while their Navies have taken steps in this direction, with the proposed acquisition of eight Chinese submarines by Pakistan.
Inter-operability is about four steps; Two were taken before President Xi assumed power in November 2012, and the remaining since his arrival on the scene. It is little coincidence that Mr Xi became the Chairman of the Central Military Commission, the highest defence policy-making body in China, the day he was elevated to the top posts of head of the Communist Party and the Government. This has helped; Pakistani and Chinese militaries now interact more directly than before.
The road towards inter-operability starts with commonality of equipment. At present, most of Pakistan’s strategic and the bulk of its conventional war capabilities are of Chinese origin. From strategic to tactical nuclear weapons, ballistic and cruise missiles, fighter aircraft, tanks, unmanned aerial vehicles, air defence systems to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance aircraft and so on, have been given either clandestinely or at friendly prices by China to Pakistan.
The second step involves regular upgrades and an uninterrupted supply of spares for procured equipment, without which a war cannot be sustained. In military terms, this is referred to as strategic and operational sustenance. To recall, during the 1999 Kargil conflict, the Pakistan Army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, was in China, seeking both political support and operational sustenance for his military gamble. That uncertain situation has improved dramatically with the all-weather opening of the land route. The Karakoram Highway (constructed in 1966) is being upgraded into a four and six lane highway with China’s assistance since December 2010, when Beijing announced that it did not have a border with India in Jammu & Kashmir.
China has reportedly constructed 16 airstrips on the Karakoram Highway, primarily for military support by enhancing airlift capability. It is also laying optical fibre cables for secure communications along the Karakoram from Rawalpindi to Kunjerab Pass. Moreover, China has given access into restricted high resolution capability of its phase-one Beidou navigation system (equivalent of the US’s GPS) to the Pakistan military. Phase-two of Beidou, with a total of 35 satellites, has been launched. Pakistan is again the partner country. This move has undoubtedly picked up pace.
The third step towards inter-operability involves mission compatibility, and is intrusive and intensive. In this, the two militaries understand each other’s doctrines, force structuring, operational planning and art of war through regular visits and high-end exercises. The last step is a familiarity with terrain where combat is expected. Once achieved, inter-operability will bring standardisation, integration, cooperation and synergy.
Chinese and Pakistani Air Forces, with equipment compatibility, have, since March 2011, undertaken Shaheen series of exercises over Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. According to reports, the two Air Forces shared digital data links during these manoeuvres, implying the ability of the pilots of the two sides to communicate while in the air. The two Armies regularly visit each other’s operational areas. To recall, the Indian Army chief in 2011, General VK Singh, had spoken about the presence of 3,500 to 4,000 Chinese troops in northern Kashmir (PoK). In 2014, Chinese troops were reportedly spotted opposite the International Border in Jammu, where the maximum exchange of fire between India and Pakistan has occurred in recent times.
Unfortunately, India does not appear to have dovetailed growing inter-operability between the two adversaries into its thinking and operational planning. The reasons for the lapse are not far to find. India’s political leadership seems to have outsourced external defence to the three defence services which, to-date, have not produced a combined paper on the China threat. The Army, which should be most concerned with the growing land threats, has blinkers on. A majority of the Generals excel in fighting and winning small wars (counter-insurgency operations).
The remaining Generals working in perspective planning and military operations directorates at Army Headquarters appear focussed on the last wars. The thinking is that, in the case of a war with Pakistan, China is unlikely to start its own war with India. However, if India was to go to war with China, Pakistan would certainly open its war front.
A third, far more worrisome, scenario has escaped Indian military planners. China has mind-boggling asymmetrical war-fighting capabilities in space, cyber and ballistic and cruise missile domains. These give it the option to fight a non-contact war; blinding and then pulverising enemy assets by stand-off land and air firepower without showing its hand. As a consequence of inter-operability, the Pakistan military could well use China’s military capabilities, in addition to its own, to increase its options both in north Kashmir and on the line of Control. This is the clear military message that India should get from Mr Xi’s Pakistan visit.