Oped

Prachanda '08 vs Prachanda '16

Hari Bansh Jha

As Prime Minister in 2008-09, the Maoist leader performed poorly at home and abroad. This time around, he has promised to do better and also taken some steps in the right direction. However, it is difficult to see how he can resolve his biggest challenge: The Madhesi crisis

Political instability has become the order of the day in Nepal. On an average, no Government in the country lasts for more than a ysear. On August 4, Maoist leader Pushpa Kamal Dahal, popularly known as Prachanda, became the Prime Minister of Nepal, after the fall of the nine-month old Government of KP Sharma Oli on July 24. The overwhelming majority of the population in Nepal is satisfied with the change in Government.

Expectations are high that Prachanda will deliver on all those fronts where Oli failed — addressing Madhesi issues, war-era criminal cases against Maoist fighters, implementation of the new Constitution, rehabilitation of earthquake victims, and maintaining a balance in foreign relations vis-à-vis India and China. Only time will show if Prachanda is able to meet these challenges and that too within the fixed time frame of nine months, after which he will have to transfer power to Sher Bahadur Deuba of the Nepali Congress, as per the seven point agreement between the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN-MC) and the Nepali Congress.

If Prachanda performs well as Prime Minister, it is likely that the CPN-MC under his leadership will regain its image. During the Constituent Assembly election of 2008, the party had emerged as Nepal’s largest political force but it substantially lost its image and was pushed to the third spot in the Constituent Assembly election of 2013. His failure, on the other hand, will not only weaken his party, but might also invite further political instability in the country.  

Notably, Prachanda’s performance during his nine month tenure as Prime Minister in 2008-2009 was far from satisfactory. He annoyed India by undertaking his first foreign trip to China in 2008. By tradition, a Nepalese Prime Minister always visits India before going to any another country in view of the special relationship that exists between India and Nepal. Prachanda also incurred the wrath of the Nepalese people when he made an unsuccessful attempt to sack Army chief Rookmangud Katawal and replace him with who shared his own communist ideology. It was only at the intervention of President Ram Baran Yadav that Prachanda’s move to remove Katawal was foiled.

Also, Prachanda visited China at a time when in Nepal hundreds were were dying in the Koshi floods and thousands were struggling for their life. He had no time to address the problems of those who needed immediate relief from the Government. As if this was not enough, Prachanda even allowed Maoist cadets to become priests of the lord Pashupatinath Temple in Kathmandu for some time. This was against the Hindu tradition of assigning this job to particular castes of Bhatt Brahmins from south India.

Significantly enough, Dahal made several attempts to bring Nepal closer to the Chinese axis in 2008-2009. He strongly advocated in favour of the extension of Chinese railways deep into the Nepalese territory, right up to lumbini, the birthplace of lord Buddha, which lies at a stone’s throw from the Nepal-India border. He knew well that this could jeopardise India’s security interests. Chinese penetration in Nepalese affairs multiplied during his tenure — be it in the Army, the armed police force, the police and other administrative services. Prachanda vocally opposed India and raised contentious issues such as Kalapani and  Susta. later in 2012, he made a deal with the China-backed Asia Pacific Exchange Cooperation Foundation to bring three billion dollars for the development of lumbini. This caused great embarrassment of India.

 However, before becoming Prime Minister this time, Prachanda publicly acknowledged that he had made some mistakes while in power in 2008-2009 because he lacked experience of governance that time. He also made a promise that he would do all within his means to address the crucial challenges faced by the country, both on domestic and foreign fronts.

Accordingly, he entered into three-point agreements with the Madhes-based parties before becoming Prime Minister, promising to address their grievances. Soon after becoming Prime Minister, Prachanda also declared those killed during the Madhesi agitation to be ‘martyrs’. His Government has made arrangements to pay each of the martyrs’ family one million rupees. He is paying for the medical expenses of those who were injured during the movement and has withdrawn cases against Madhesi activists detained on false charges.

These gestures are welcome. Yet, Prachanda’s real test will lie in addressing the main demands of the Madhesi agitators such as re-drawing of provincial boundaries, the determination of parliamentary, provincial and local electoral constituencies on population basis, proportional representation of Madhesis and other excluded groups in the state mechanism, and correction of mistakes made in the new Constitution’s citizenship clauses.

However, given the mindset of the ruling elite group of Bahun-Chhetris that represent only 28 per cent of Nepal’s total population, it is unlikely that they would like to share power with the overwhelming majority of disadvantaged groups such as the Madhesis, Tharus, Dalits and hill Janajati who form nearly 72 per cent of Nepal’s population. Even the Maoist party suffers from this mindset. No wonder the new Constitution and its two amendments essentially give continuity to the 250-year old rule of the minority over the majority.

Moreover, the present Government does not even have the support of two-thirds members in Parliament to amend the Constitution. No amendment of the Constitution is possible without the support of Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist–leninist). But it is unlikely that this party, led by Oli, will support Prachanda’s efforts to resolve the Madhesi issue through an amendment of the Constitution.

The most that the present Government can do is to soften its stand on Madhes issues through dialogue, but this is not going to resolve the crisis. Given the prevailing mistrust between Kathmandu and Madhes, there is hardly any guarantee of any agreement between the two sides being implemented. Experience shows that agreements made by Madhesi leaders with the Kathmandu are not implemented. Madhes-based political parties will desist from joining the Government till their demands are met. If they join the government in haste, they are bound to invite wrath of the new generation which has emerged from the Madhes movement. This dedicated force will not allow the sacrifices of Madhesi martyrs to go in vain. 

(The writer is a Nepali national, and a Research Fellow at the Indian Council for World Affairs, New Delhi)s